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Abstract 
 
It is my contention that physics and metaphysics (or at least the aspects of 
metaphysics to be considered in this thesis) broadly strive to achieve 
common goals: to understand what our physical system is constituted by, 
and both how, and why it evolves in the way that it does. Metaphysicians, 
as well as the scientific disciplines, play an important role in our 
understanding of the universe. In recent years, physicists have focussed on 
finding accurate mathematical formalisms of the evolution of our physical 
system - if a metaphysician can uncover the metaphysical underpinnings 
of these formalisms; that is, why these formalisms seem to consistently 
map the universe, then our understanding of the world and the things in it 
is greatly enhanced. Science, then, plays a very important role in our 
project, as the best scientific formalisms provide us with what we, as 
metaphysicians, should be trying to interpret ± but these interpretations 
are integral to understanding the nature of natural laws and causation. 
 
In this thesis I examine existing metaphysical views of what a law 
is (both from a conceptual and from a metaphysical perspective), show 
how closely causation is linked to laws, and provide a priori arguments 
for and against each of these positions. Ultimately, I provide an analysis 
of a number of metaphysics of natural laws and causation, apply these 
accounts to our best scientific theories, and see how these metaphysics fit 
in with our concepts of cause and law. Although I do not attempt a 
definitive metaphysical account myself, I conclude that any successful 
metaphysic will be a broadly Humean one, and furthermore that given the 
concepts of cause and law that shall be agreed upon, Humean theories 
allow for there to be causal sequences and laws (in line with our concepts) 
in the world. 
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Introduction 
Though there is not room here to argue for my every basic tenet, it is 
worth confessing at this point that this thesis is written by someone who 
holds that physics and metaphysics (or at least the aspects of metaphysics 
to be considered in this thesis) broadly strive to achieve common goals: to 
understand what our physical system is constituted by, and both how, and 
why it evolves in the way that it does. It seems to me that the primary 
tools of the scientist are empirical evidence, mathematics, and although 
this is perhaps less appreciated, imagination - these are fundamental to any 
great scientific breakthrough. For us, the metaphysicians: imagination, 
science and a priori reasoning form the foundation of our enquiries. I 
believe that for the metaphysician, reasoning without due consideration of 
science will almost inevitably lead to unjustified, and probably false 
conclusions. 
Metaphysicians play an important role in our understanding of the 
universe. In recent years, physicists have focussed on finding accurate 
mathematical formalisms of the evolution of our physical system - if a 
metaphysician can uncover the metaphysical underpinnings of these 
formalisms; that is, why these formalisms seem to consistently map the 
universe, then our understanding of the world and the things in it is greatly 
enhanced. Science, then, plays a very important role in our project, as the 
best scientific formalisms provide us with what we, as metaphysicians, 
should be trying to interpret. 
In this thesis I examine existing metaphysical views of what a law 
is (both from a conceptual and from a metaphysical perspective), show 
how closely causation is linked to laws, and provide a priori arguments 
for and against each of these positions. Ultimately, I aim to provide an 
analysis of a number of metaphysics of natural laws and causation, apply 
these accounts to our best scientific theories, and see how these 
metaphysics fit in with our concepts of cause and law. Although I do not 
attempt a definitive metaphysical account myself, I conclude that any 
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successful metaphysic will be a broadly Humean one, and furthermore that 
given the concepts of cause and law that shall be agreed upon, Humean 
theories allow for there to be causal sequences and laws (in line with our 
concepts) in the world. First, though, I need to define and explain a few of 
the notions central to this thesis. 
The aim of the first part of this thesis is to outline a conceptual 
analysis of causation. Ideally this conceptual side of things should not get 
entangled too much with the metaphysical analyses ± however, if we are 
to talk about the metaphysics of causation and laws of nature, we need to 
NQRZZKDWFRQFHSWVZH¶UHWU\LQJWRPDNHVHQVHRI. After all, whether or 
not there are laws, and whether or not there is causation in the world at all, 
depends on our concept of cause and law. Imagine, for example, that our 
conceptual analysis of cause and law leads us to conclude that the 
properties involved in causal sequences need to be of a certain nature (to 
have certain second-order properties), but, following our metaphysical 
analysis, it turns to be metaphysically impossible for any property(ies) to 
be of this nature ± in this scenario there would be no causal sequences. I 
hold a success theory with respect to causation, by which I mean that ours 
is a world with causation, and much of our causal talk should come out to 
be true - so in the scenario outlined above, I would contend that something 
has gone wrong in the conceptual analysis. My conceptual analysis will 
then SURYLGHXVZLWKWKHPHDQLQJVRIWKHWHUPVµFDXVH¶DQGµODZ¶DQGWKXV
the de dicto necessities that need to be satisfied for something in the world 
to be a causal sequence, or a law.  
One might compare this contrast between the conceptual and the 
metaphysical analysis of cause and law to questions concerning the 
µQRWLRQ¶RIDSHUVRQWKHFRQFeptual questions), and the more metaphysical 
TXHVWLRQV DERXW WKHLU µQDWXUH¶ DUH WKH\ H[WHQGHG SK\VLFDO REMHFts, etc). 
Another example being an analysis of the notion of value (concept), 
contrasted with the metaphysical question of whether there is anythinJµLQ
WKH ZRUOG¶ WKDW FRUUHVSRQGV WR YDOXHV :H FHUWDLQO\ KDYH D QRWLRQ RI
causation and a notion of law, the aim of the conceptual analysis is to 
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consider this notion in detail. The aim of the metaphysical analysis is to 
take a look at the metaphysics of the evolution of the physical system, and 
to see how the nature of this system corresponds to our notions (if at all).  
One of the most contested questions in the debates scrutinised in 
this thesis is ZKHWKHU WKHUH LV µQHFHVVLW\¶ LQ FDXVH DQG ODZ 'RHV RXU 
concept RI FDXVDWLRQ LQFOXGH RQH HYHQW µQHFHVVLWDWLQJ¶ DQRWKHU" ,f so, is 
the belief that there is necessity in the world justified metaphysically? Are 
the laws themselves necessary (that is, could our laws have been 
different)? Are there necessary connections between events in this world, 
when there might not have been? These concern different kinds of 
necessity that are central to both the metaphysical and conceptual 
analyses, and so before embarking on this project it is important that the 
different kinds of necessity be spelt out in more detail. 
I.1.1 Physical Necessity 
I call an event e physically necessary in world w if and only if its 
occurrence is logically entailed by the full set of propositions describing w 
immediately prior to e, and the full set of true law-statements of w. For 
example, if (i) w consists in its entirety of one grain of salt and a pint of 
water; (ii) in w it is a true law-statement that all salt dissolves in water; 
and (iii) the grain of salt comes into contact with the water, then the grain 
RI VDOW ZLOO GLVVROYH 7KH HYHQW¶V RFFXUUHQFH is logically entailed and 
hence physically necessary.  
I.1.2 Metaphysical Necessity: (a) Between Events 
Necessary connection between distinct events is a metaphysically stronger 
notion than physical necessity. It requires not only logical entailment, but 
WKHUH WREHVRPHZKDW ,ZLOO UHIHU WRDV µPHWDSK\VLFDO JOXH¶KROGLQJ WKH
world together. Metaphysical glue (if indeed it is there and can be made 
sense of), is whatever it is in the world that is the reason some events 
occur in virtue of others. I call it metaphysical glue because, in a sense, it 
glues worldly properties together (in the case of electronhood and charge -
1, metaphysical glue would be seen as whatever it is that glues these 
properties together; that is, what makes sure all electrons have charge -1). 
There are various different proposals as to where the metaphysical glue is, 
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and to what it might be ± some believe it exists in the form of extrinsic 
relations between the properties of particulars, some believe the 
metaphysical glue is intrinsic to the properties of things. But for my 
purposes, it is enough to say that one event is metaphysically necessary1 if 
there is some metaphysical glue in the world ensuring its occurrence. 
I.1.3 Metaphysical Necessity: (b) Between Distinct Existences 
Necessary connections between distinct events of course fall into this 
category, but they only form a subset of this class. There may be a 
necessary connection between a conjunction of entities (not necessarily an 
event)/events and a further event. This is relevaQW EHFDXVH $UPVWURQJ¶V 
view of laws and causation does not involve necessary connections 
between distinct events, but does involve necessary connections between 
dLVWLQFWH[LVWHQFHV ,Q$UPVWURQJ¶V FDVH WKH µH[LVWHQFH¶ , UHIHU WRGLIIHUV
IURPDQµHYHQW¶LQVRIDUDVWKHµH[LVWHQFH¶LVDFRQMXQFWLRQRIDQHYHQWDQG
DµODZ-in-QDWXUH¶%XWPRUHRQWKLVODWHU 
I.1.4 Logical Necessity  
A proposition is logically necessary if it is true in every possible world. 
An event is logically necessary if it occurs in every possible world (the 
proposition describing it is true in every possible world), and a law is a 
law with logical necessity if it is a law in every possible world. If 
proposition L is a true law-statement in w but not in w1, then L is not 
logically necessary. 
 
 
I.2 The Main Contenders  
First: two Apologies 
This thesis is of wide scope, and so it is not possible to cover all the 
material written on each of the metaphysical views I consider. The views I 
focus on are The Regularity View, The Nomic-Necessitation View (the 
Armstrongian View), Scientific Essentialismm, and what I will call Neo-
                                                          
1
 In this thesis, metaphysical necessity is completely detached from logical necessity. An event 
can be metaphysically necessary without its occurrence in every possible world. 
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Dispositionalism. Because of space restrictions, it is not possible to 
examine arguments from all the many philosophers who have contributed 
to this debate, so I focus on only a few of the main proponents of each 
view, and their arguments in defence of their position and in opposition to 
the others. In the metaphysical debate, representing the Regularity View 
will be David Hume, David Lewis, and Helen Beebee; the Armstrongian 
view will be largely represented by David Armstrong; Scientific 
Essentialism by Brian Ellis; and Neo-Dispositionalism by Alexander Bird 
and Stephen Mumford. 
 Secondly, in this thesis I assume, from the metaphysical 
perspective at least, that we live in a deterministic world.  
 Before beginning a more detailed discussion, I outline the four 
main views of cause and law to be considered, and the notions central to 
them.  
The Humean Naive Regularity Theory of Causation is devoid 
of all metaphysical necessity and necessary connections between distinct 
existences; laws are mere regularities in nature, and cause is reducible to 
law. The Humean Sophisticated Regularity Theory (SRT) is also a 
view devoid of metaphysical glue, but it has stronger restrictions on which 
regularities count as laws ± the SRT account of causation does not 
resemble the Regularity View, either, as the SRT offers a counterfactual 
account of singular-causation (See chapter 3), as oppoVHGWRWKHµFDXVHDV
DQLQVWDQFHRIODZ¶DSSURDFKWKDWWKHQDLYHUHJXODULW\WKHRULVWVXSKROG   
 7KLV VHFRQG µ+XPHDQ¶ YLew is the main opposition for the three 
µQHFHVVLWDULDQ¶YLHZVWREHlooked at. I call these three necessitarian views 
WKH µ$UPVWURQJLDQ¶ View, Scientific Essentialism, and Neo-
Dispositionalism. All three views are distinctly anti-Humean insofar as 
they deny that there is nothing more to laws and causation than just 
patterns of events. However, what they do pick out as the metaphysical 
underpinning of cause and law differ significantly. Crudely, where the 
Regularity Theorist believes that laws turn out to be regularities of the 
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IRUP µDOO ;V DUH <V¶ DQG WKDW WKHUH DUH QR QHFHVVDU\ FRQQHFWLRQV in the 
objects at all, The Armstrongian View is that there are necessary 
connections between distinct existences, and that these are a result of 
natural necessitation relations between universals, which are in themselves 
µSRZHUOHVV¶.  
 In the Armstrongian view, the all-important necessitation relations 
hold contingently; that is, the relation may hold between F and G in some 
worlds but not in others2. Where N(F,G) does hold, it governs the 
universals such that where F is instantiated G will also be instantiated. 
However, it is possible that we can have two qualitatively identical 
worlds, but at one world N(F,G) holds and at the other it does not.  
 The neo-dispositionalist on the oWKHUKDQGKROGVWKDWWKHµRRPSK¶ 
in the world is provided by the intrinsic properties of particulars. For the 
neo-dispositionalist, all properties in all possible worlds are wholly 
dispositional, and (For Alexander Bird (Bird 2007), at least) the laws of 
nature supervene on these properties. 
 Finally, the Ellisian Scientific Essentialist holds a similar thesis to 
the neo-dispositionalist insofar as he accepts that dispositional properties 
provide the oomph in the world - EXW SURSRQHQWV RI (OOLV¶V YLHZ DOVR
believe there to be an abundance of categorical (non-dispositional) 
SURSHUWLHV)XUWKHUPRUHWKHµHVVHQFH¶RIVFLHQWLILFHVVHQWialism is that the 
laws of nature describe the essential properties of natural kinds.  
I.3 Properties in the Cause and Law Debates 
As might DOUHDG\EHDSSDUHQWµSURSHUWLHV¶DUHFHQWUDOWRWKLVHQWLUHGHEDWH
In fact, the differences between the views can, for the most part, be 
demonstrated in terms of the nature of the properties taken to exist in this 
                                                          
2
 ƐŵŽƐƚƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐŚĂǀĞĨŽĐƵƐƐĞĚŽŶĂǀŝĚƌŵƐƚƌŽŶŐ ?ƐǁŽrk on the DTA view (and due to 
the lack of space required to provide a fully comprehensive account), my discussion will also 
focus on Armstrong, for whom a law of nature takes the form N(F,G), where N(F,G) denotes a 
natural necessitation relation holding between the universals F and G (as a point of interest, N is 
itself a universal). N(F,G) holds contingently at a world, so where there is a natural necessitation 
relation between F and G at one world it may not hold at another. 
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and other possible worlds. I now briefly outline the different types of 
property we will encounter, but a far more detailed discussion of all these 
property-types will be provided in the relevant chapters.  
I.3.1 Dispositional Properties 
Both the neo-dispositionalist and Ellisian Scientific Essentialist have 
ontologies ripe with dispositional properties. These are taken to be 
intriQVLFDOO\ µSRZHUIXO¶. They are instantiated in particulars, and in 
dispositional ontologies they determine (wholly determine in the case of 
the neo-dispositionalist) how those particulars behave, so if there is such a 
thing as necessary connection between distinct existences, the 
dispositionalists hold that these connections exist (at least partly) in virtue 
of the dispositional properties of things. 
 In short, dispositions are properties with at least one determinate 
manifestation (generally events identifiable by a change in the properties 
of the particulars involved) and at least one determinate stimulus 
condition; when the stimulus conditions are met, and in the absence of 
finks or antidotes (a discussion of which will be provided shortly), that 
property will (as a matter of metaphysical necessity) manifest. A vase (the 
classic example, although certainly not a fundamental property) has the 
GLVSRVLWLRQDO SURSHUW\ µIUDJLOLW\¶ )UDJLOLW\¶V VWLPXOXV FRQGLWLRQV DUH
QXPHURXV EXW RQH RI WKHP LV µKLWWLQJ ZLWK D KDPPHU¶ DQG LWV
manifestatiRQLVµVPDVKLQJ¶,W IROORZVWKDWZKHQHYHUDYDVHLVKLWZLWKD
hammer (in the absence of finks or antidotes) it will, as a matter of 
metaphysical necessity, smash. The identity of these properties is 
determined by their manifestations and stimulus conditions; that is, their 
causal and nomological roles. 
 One might argue that one can simply define µIUDJLOLW\¶ DV WKH
property that plays the dispositional role it plays, and maintain that 
properties have their dispositional roles as brute fact - if property F plays 
the fragility role in the actual world, and the property G plays this role in 
w*, them (DVZH¶YHGHILQHGDSURSHUW\¶VLGHQWLW\DVbeing its causal role), 
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property F in our world and property G in w* are the same property. 
However, this would be a matter of de dicto necessity. The 
dispositionalists want dispositional properties to play their dispositional 
roles as a matter of de re necessity, such that there is a fact of the matter 
about which properties play which dispositional roles independently of our 
defining them into existence. Brian Ellis (Ellis 2000) considers these 
SURSHUWLHV WR EH µQDWXUDO NLQGV RI SURSHUW\¶ WKDW GHWHUPLQH WKH µQDWXUDO
NLQGV RI SURFHVVHV¶ %LUG DQG 0XPIRUG DUH QRW IRUFHG LQWR DFFHSWLQJ D
natural kind ontology, but they consider dispositional properties to be 
universals (or perhaps perfectly resembling tropes) with their identities 
fixed by their relations to other dispositional properties. For both Ellis and 
the neo-dispositionalists then, the same property plays the same 
dispositional role in every possible world. It follows that in two worlds 
with the same properties, the same equations of motion will apply. As you 
can see, dispositional properties have a distinctly modal character.  
I.3.2 Categorical Properties 
Categorical properties confer no causal powers; that is, they are 
intrinsically inert. They provide no oomph in the world, and they cannot in 
themselves determine the evolution of our physical system ± taken in 
isolation they provide no metaphysical necessity. Categorical properties 
are wholly non-dispositional.  
I.3.3 The Natural Necessitation Relation (The N-relation) 
The natural necessitation relation is a relation between universals that 
plays a specific nomological role. Relations and properties, although both 
universals in the Armstrongian ontology (supposedly the only ontology 
that includes the N-relation), do differ in some important respects. 
Properties are typically monadic and non-relational, and relations are 
polyadic. But properties and relations are also closely related in many 
respects, not least (for Armstrong, at least) in their status as universals.  
13 
 
 The N-relation is what Armstrong takes to be a second-order 
relation. It holds between two or more universals (say, F and G), and 
ensures that F and G are linked with metaphysical necessity in any world 
where N holds between them (This is denoted by N(F,G)). The second 
order relation, N, is itself a universal. For the time being this is all I shall 
say on the matter, but making any sense of N outside of the nomoligical 
role it is supposed to play is no trivial matter. I leave further talk of the N-
relation to the more detailed discussions of Armstrongianism later in this 
thesis. 
I.4.1 The Modal Character of the Necessitarian Views 
There are two modality features I consider. First there is the notion of 
necessary connection between distinct existences, which we already know 
is entirely absent in the Humean theories. This necessity concerns what 
must happen in some world given the state of affairs given the 
metaphysical glue ± a world at time t can be seen as a particular 
distribution of properties, and if there are necessary connections between 
distinct existences, at least some aspects of property distributions 
immediately subsequent to t are determined. In a wholly deterministic 
world, the entire property distribution at t+1 is determined, and so any 
world with property distribution Pd1 at t will have the same property 
distribution Pd2 at t+1, but whether or not a world instantiates Pd1 is 
contingent. 
 The second modality feature I consider is the necessity of the laws; 
that is, whether the laws are themselves metaphysically necessary. If they 
are, then the laws will be the same across all metaphysically possible 
worlds, if not, there will be metaphysically possible worlds with different 
laws. This, however, is work for later chapters. We may now embark on 
the conceptual analysis of cause and law. 
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Part I 
 
The Concept of Cause  
 
1.1 A Conceptual Analysis of Causation 
The purpose Part I of this thesis is to find the best of the candidates for our 
FRQFHSWRI FDXVDWLRQGLVFXVV WKHVH FDQGLGDWHV¶ FRPSDWLELOLW\ DQGQDWXUDO
pairing with the metaphysical positions outlined in the introduction, and to 
show how all these concepts are closely linked with laws of nature. The 
analysis below, amongst other things, provides us with the de dicto 
necessities for sequences to be considered causal, and for statements to be 
law-statements. The evolution of our physical system may be mind-
independent, but the notions of cause and law certainly are not..  
 There are three main contenders for our concept of causation to be 
FRQVLGHUHG7KHILUVWLVµQRQ-VLQJXODUFDXVDWLRQ¶ZKHUHDFDXVHLVGHHPHG
to be an instance of a law. This is generally associated with the Humean 
regularity theory metaphysic. This, I think, is easily dismissed. The second 
is a form of singular-FDXVDWLRQ NQRZQ DV WKH µFRQGLWLRQDO¶ RU
µFRXQWHUIDFWXDO¶DFFRXQWRIFDXVDWLRQ$OWKRXJKWKHFRXQWHUIDFWXDODFFRXQW
is also mentioned by Hume (who seems to mistakenly equate it with non-
singular causation), it is strongly associated with David Lewis and J.L. 
Mackie (see Lewis 1973; Mackie 1974). The final conceptual analysis I 
will look at will be a dispositional account. This, again, is an account of 
singular-causation, but is FKDUDFWHULVHG E\ WKH DFWXDOLVDWLRQ RI WKLQJV¶
propensities/dispositions rather than by counterfactual conditionals. This 
links most naturally with the dispositional metaphysics. I will argue that 
WKHERWKWKHGLVSRVLWLRQDOLVWDQGWKHµFDXVHDVLQVWDQFHRIODZ¶YLHZVIDLOWR
capture our concept of causation, but that the counterfactual account 
succeeds  
15 
 
1.2 My Starting Point 
I think as good a place to start an analysis of the concept of causation as 
any is to look at what David Hume saw to be the main conditions for a 
causal sequence. Hume writes  
7KH UHODWLRQRI&217,*8,7< LV HVVHQWLDO WR WKDW RI FDXVDWLRQ« WKH VHFRQG
UHODWLRQ«LVWKDWRI35,25,7<RIWLPHLQWKHFDXVHEHIRUHWKHHIIHFW«7KHUHLV
(also) as NECESSARY CONNEXION to be taken into consideration; and that 
relation is of much greater importance than any of the other two above-
mentioned (T, I, I, pp 120-125)  
In the following sections, then, I consider both whether causes and effects 
must stand in certain spatiotemporal relations, the asymmetry of causation 
that naturally follows from these spatiotemporal considerations, and of 
course the nature of the necessity relation that seems to be central to our 
conception of causation. I conclude that neither spatial nor temporal 
considerations play a necessary role in our concept of causation, and 
furthermore that contrary to what the necessitarians believe, the necessary 
connection between events in causal interactions can be satisfied without 
PHWDSK\VLFDO QHFHVVLW\ WKDW LV ZLWKRXW DQ\ NLQG RI µPHWDSK\VLFDO JOXH¶
constraining the evolution of our physical system. If necessity is required 
in our conceptual account, it can be captured by physical necessity, where 
effects must follow from their causes if statements describing these events 
are logically entailed by statements describing the laws of nature, and 
statements describing the states of affairs at the time of causal interaction3. 
1.3 Spatial Contiguity 
One posited necessary condition is that of spatial contiguity, whereby if 
object involving event a causes object involving event b, the object 
involved in a has to be touching the object involved in b (noting that if we 
DGYRFDWH WKLV SRVLWLRQ WKDW¶V QRW WR VD\ ZH UHTXLUH µHYHU\ FDXVH WR EH
contiguous with its effect, but merely that where this is not the case, cause 
                                                          
3
 Note the claim here is a conditional one  W if necessity is required, it can be captured by physical 
necessity. 
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DQG HIIHFW DUH WKRXJKW WR EH MRLQHG E\ D FKDLQ RI LQWHUPHGLDWH LWHPV«¶
(Mackie, JL 1974: 19)). This condition is perhaps appealing as it rules out 
the initially counter-intuitive concept of action at a distance. Nevertheless, 
, GRQ¶W WKLQN it plays a significant role in our concept of causation, nor 
need it in a metaphysical account, as despite the fact that we normally 
associate causation with spatial contiguity, it would seem too restrictive to 
deny the possibility of causal connections between objects spatially 
separated. We can imagine Bob getting into a Star Trek-style transporter, 
pressing a button and arriving twenty miles away from where he started. 
This may be difficult to acknowledge as possible in our world, but only 
because it is not something we regularly observe. It is neither necessarily 
inconsistent with current physical theory4, nor does action at a distance 
seem totally at odds with our concept of causation. It certainly seems in 
WKLV FDVH WKDW %RE¶V SUHVVLQJ WKH EXWWRQ LQ WKH WUansporter caused his 
arrival twenty miles down the road.  
1.4 Temporal Priority 
Another possible necessary condition is temporal priority - that causes 
must be temporally prior to their effects. I accept the view that causal 
relations are generally not static facts, having temporally distinct events as 
their relata, but the temporal priority condition is questionable. I hold that 
neither simultaneous nor backwards causation are (at least conceptually) 
impossible, despite our tendency to envisage causes to be temporally prior 
to their effects. There are even phenomena in our world that suggest 
µVLPXOWDQHRXV FDXVDWLRQ¶ QRW RQO\ WR EH PHUHO\ D FRQFHSWXDO SRVVLELOLW\
but regularly occurring. 
 We know from empirical evidence that no matter how far two 
quantumly entangled particles are separated, one will have the spin-state 
+0.5 and the other will have the spin-state -0.5; it follows that when the 
                                                          
4
 Quantum mechanics allows for spontaneous movements of this kind at a quantum level, and if 
all the quantum particles move at the same time precisely 20 metres down the road 
simultaneously, to all intents and purposes the entire macroscopic object would have moved 20 
metres without having passed through any spatial points in between. 
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spin state of one particle changes, the other changes simultaneously. One 
interpretation of quantum mechanics suggests that the observation of an 
as-yet indeterminate spin-state (a wave function) causes the wave function 
to collapse, giving it a determinate +0.5 or -0.5 spin-state. As soon as the 
observed particle has a determinate spin-state the as yet unobserved 
particle with which it is quantumly entangled will also have a determinate 
spin-state (the opposite spin-state to that observed). If this interpretation is 
FRUUHFW WKH REVHUYHG SDUWLFOH¶V FROODSVLQJ FDXVHV WKH DV-yet unobserved 
SDUWLFOH¶VFROODSVHWKHODWWHUFounterfactually depends on the former), and 
so the cause is simultaneous with its effect. The view that, in cases like 
these, the mere act of observation has this causal influence, is perhaps 
rather counter-intuitive - and indeed it may well be false. Nonetheless, it 
does not seem conceptually problematic for changes in an observed 
SDUWLFOH¶VVWDWHWRVLPXOWDQHRXVO\FDXVDOO\DIIHFWWKHXQREVHUYHGSDUWLFOH¶V
state.    
 Although we tend to think of effects occurring subsequent to their 
causes, as we have seen it is conceptually possible for an effect to occur 
simultaneous to, or even prior to its cause (any story with backwards time 
travel seems to involve backwards causation). One might respond, 
KRZHYHU WKDWZHDUHPDNLQJDQHUURU LQ FKRRVLQJ µH[WHUQDO¶ WLPH as the 
basis from which we judge temporal priority. David Lewis (1976) argues 
WKDWWKHUHDUHWZRNLQGVRIWLPHµH[WHUQDOWLPH¶DQGµSHUVRQDOWLPH¶7KH
former is time as measured by calendars and clocks in railway stations 
(the period of external time passed between midnight on the first of 
January 29 ±time A-, and midnight on the first of January 21 ±time B-, is 
precisely one year), and personal time is time as measured by our own 
watches. Every individual has their own personal time, and although in 
general, personal time is synchronised with external time, it is possible for 
less personal time to pass than external time between times A and B - 
although one year of external time may have passed, it is possible for only 
WZRPLQXWHVRIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VSHUVonal time to have passed given certain 
circumstances. Lewis writes that when this happens, when the time of the 
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journey is unequal to the external time passed, the individual has time 
travelled5. We know that it is physically possible for forwards time travel 
to occur in this way, but whether or not backwards time travel is possible 
is still up for debate. However, remember we are not interested in physical 
possibility for the time being, but in the concept of causation. Fictional 
novels and films are full of stories involving backwards time travel, so this 
is clearly a concept we can entertain.  
 ,Q OLJKW RI WKLV OHW XV QRZ FRQVLGHU WKH µHIIHFW PXVW IROORZ WKH
FDXVH¶ FULWHULRQ LQ Werms of personal time rather than external time: Bob 
got in a time machine in 2009 and arrived in 1989. The external time 
passed is minus twenty years, but the personal time passed is whatever 
SHULRGRIWLPHSDVVHGRQ%RE¶VZDWFKZKLOVWLQWKHWLPHPDFKLQH%RELV
older in 1989 than he was in 200VRLQWHUPVRI%RE¶VSHUVRQal time his 
arrival in 1989 (the effect) is after his departure in 2009 (the cause), and so 
WKHµHIIHFWPXVWIROORZWKHFDXVH¶FULWHULRQZDVVDWLVILHG 
 Of course now we have to consider what determines the direction 
and passage of personal time. One common answer to this question is the 
direction of causation, but if by definition personal time passes in 
accordance with the direction of causation, trivially all effects are 
VXEVHTXHQWWRWKHLUFDXVHVLQSHUVRQDOWLPHµ,I$FDXVHG%WKHQ%IROORZV 
$¶EHFRPHV WULYial. It therefore seems far more plausible that we should 
judge the direction of causation by external time. If we do this, though, 
WKHQWKHUHDUHH[FHSWLRQVWRWKHµWHPSRUDOSULRULW\¶UXOH:HDUHOHIWZLWKD
dilemma ± either in a causal sequence, B is trivially always subsequent to 
A (personal time), or we must dispense with temporal priority as a 
condition for a to cause the cause of b (external time).   I would suggest 
the latter is the more intuitive choice. 
 
                                                          
5
 Time dilation in special relativity shows this to be possible, and empirical evidence has verified 
the hypothesis. Time travels slower for objects at high velocities, so it is theoretically possible for 
a man to get in a space rocket, go round and round the Earth very quickly for 10 years, and come 
back to find 100 earth years have passed. Forward time travel is therefore not only possible, but 
regularly occurs  W even if not by noticeably large amounts.  
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1.5 The Asymmetry of Causation 
It does seem to be the case, however, that there is an asymmetry in 
causation. When A causes B it is not also the case, at least not 
conceptually, that B causes A. If we were to assume that causes always 
precede effects in external time this would be easy to deal with. We could 
simply identify the temporally prior event, A, as the cause. However, as I 
have just shown, there is no conceptual (and perhaps even physical) 
problem with simultaneous or even backwards causation in this respect. 
But we still need to account for this asymmetry somehow, so we must 
look elsewhere. 
 J.L. 0DFNLH¶V DWWHPSW WR FDSWXUH WKH DV\PPHWU\ RI FDXVDWLRQ
DSSHDOVWRµIL[LW\¶+HFODLPV that X cannot be considered causally prior to 
<LI<ZDVIL[HGLQWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVSULRUWR;¶VEHLQJIL[HGZhere X is 
fixed if X has already occurred or if circumstances sufficient for X have 
already occurred. He claims that (a) if X is fixed before Y is fixed then X 
is causally prior to Y; (b) if Y is fixed as soon as X is fixed, and X is 
unfixed until it occurs (this will be the case when X is sufficient in the 
circumstances for Y) then X can be causally prior to Y; and (c) µif there is 
some continuous causal process linking X and Y, and if Z was not fixed 
XQWLOLWRFFXUUHGWKHQ;ZDVFDXVDOO\SULRUWR<¶. (Mackie 1974: 190) 
 Mackie describes causes as events that are sufficient in the 
circumstances for their effects, and so if X occurs and Y is the effect of X, 
then there can be no cases where X is fixed and Y is not fixed. 
Circumstances (a) will therefore never come about. This problem is not so 
SUREOHPDWLFLIZHGLVFDUG0DFNLH¶VEHOLHIWKDWFDXVHVPXVWEHVXIILFLHQWLQ
the circumstances for their effects6. However, as David Sanford points out 
there are serious problems with (b) and (c) also. If X is fixed as soon as Y 
is fixed, then of course Y is also fixed as soon as X is fixed. Y would, 
under (b), be as causally prior to X as X is to Y. Similar problems arise 
when we consider (c). If both Y and Z become fixed when X becomes 
                                                          
6
More on this later 
20 
 
fixed, then X is causally prior tR<DQG=µ$FFRUGLQJWR>E@KRZHYHUERWK
<DQG=DUHFDXVDOO\SULRUWR;¶6DQIRUG 
 David Papineau addresses the asymmetry problem in his (1985) 
paper: Causal Asymmetry. He shows that there is a probabilistic link 
between two effects of a common cause, but not between two causes of a 
common effect ± whence the asymmetry. Obviously cHQWUDOWR3DSLQHDX¶V
account is the idea of probabilistic asymmetry, but 3DSLQHDX¶VDFFRXQWRI
causal asymmetry still involves the conjunction of causes being, in the 
FLUFXPVWDQFHV VXIILFLHQW IRU WKHLU HIIHFWV LW¶V MXVW WKDW WKH FRQGLWLRQV
obtaining may not be determinate). Note that given that this section is 
concerned with the conceptual analysis of causation, it should be 
acceptable to use probabilities (at least epistemic probabilities) in our 
analysis, for we do have a concept of probability7, despite my assumption 
of a deterministic universe. 
:H RIWHQ LGHQWLI\ WUXH µJHQHUDO¶ FDXVDO-statements by their 
apparent probability-raising attributes. For example, we may well make 
the following the claim: 
³Smoking is a cause of cancer because it raises the probability of getting 
cancer, but it is not VXIILFLHQWIRUJHWWLQJFDQFHU´ 
But Papineau shows that one can accept this statement whilst holding on 
to the claim that whenever cancer is caused, its cause was sufficient in the 
circumstances to bring it about. Consider the following example8: 
S = Smoking 
X = Some unknown extra condition 
A = Inhaling asbestos 
C = Cancer 
                                                          
7
 A discussion of the details of our concept of probabilities is not required here. I will leave it as a 
brute fact that wĞŚĂǀĞĂŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨ ?yŵĂŬŝŶŐzŵŽƌĞůŝŬĞůǇ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚzŵĂǇƐƚŝůůŶŽƚŽĐĐƵƌ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐ
ĂůůƚŚĂƚ ?ƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚ ? 
8
 See Papineau 1985 pp273-289 
21 
 
Suppose that S&X are together sufficient for contracting cancer (but S and 
X are individually insufficient), and that A is sufficient for cancer. 
Suppose also that one can only get cancer through S&X or A. Then µLI\RX
VPRNHDQGKDG WKDWH[WUDFRQGLWLRQ¶RU\RX LQKDOHDVEHVWRV \RXZLOOJHW
cancer. AND, if you get cancer, you either smoke and have that extra 
condition, or you have inhaled asbestos.  
 6	;Y$ļ& 
If S&X obtains then ex hypothesi C is determined, and S is an inus 
condition (an insufficient but non-redundant part(s) of an unnecessary but 
sufficient condition ± see section 2.2) of C. But S is also a probability 
raiser. Prob(A) is necessarily smaller that Prob(XvA) so long as prob(A) < 
DQGSURE;!,IRQHGRHVQ¶t smoke the Prob(C) = Prob(A), and if one 
smokes then Prob(C)= Prob(X v A). Smoking raises the probability of 
getting cancer, and so the general causal statement that smoking causes 
cancer will be deemed to be true. 
 So how does this help us with an account of causal asymmetry? 
  If  S&XvA฀C   then  C&¬A ฀S 
$VVXPH6OHDYHVDWUDFHµ7¶± say, yellow fingers. We now have: 
 C&¬A v T ฀ S               
As Papineau points out, C is clearly an inus condition S, so there is no 
asymmetry. How do we deal with this? Consider smoking as a potential 
cause of both cancer and yellow fingers. 
S&X v A ฀ C 
S&M v N ฀ Y   (M= not scrubbing fingers) (N=being jaundiced, a chalk 
ZRUNHU« 
There is thereforHDµSUREDELOLVWLFDVVRFLDWLRQEHWZHHQ&DQG<¶3DSLQHDX
1985: 279). X and A are completely causally isolated from M and N, it is 
fairly obvious that cancer and yellow fingers are likely to show up 
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together fairly regularly relative to what might be expected given their 
LQGHSHQGHQWSUREDELOLWLHVRIRFFXUULQJµ,QWXLWLYHO\VPRNLQJPDNHVFDQFHU
more likely, and smoking makes yellow fingers more likely, and so cancer 
makes yellow fingers more likely¶(ibid).  ,I;KDVFDQFHULW¶VOLNHO\WKDW;
smokes, and smoking gives you yellow fingers. 
+RZHYHUZKDWLIZHFRQVLGHUWKHµLQYHUWHGLQXVFRQGLWLRQV¶ 
C&¬A v T ฀ S 
C&¬S v R ฀ A  (where R is the traces of asbestos) 
:HFDQ¶WDUJXe that smoking is more likely in asbestos factories, because 
the inverted inus conditions (¬A, T, ¬S, R) are not probabilistically 
independent of one another. T is negatively correlated with ¬S, and R is 
negatively correlated with ¬A. These negative correlations cancel out the 
appearance of C in both C&¬AvT and C&¬SvR and leave us with a null 
correlation between smoking and asbestos factories (ibid). 
 In other words, in the case of a common cause for two effects, the 
background conditions for e1 and e2 are independent of one another, so 
the occurrence of the background conditions for e1 does not affect the 
EDFNJURXQG FRQGLWLRQV IRU H %XW ZH FDQ¶W VD\ WKDW smoking makes 
working in an asbestos factory more likely, because although C is a 
condition of both, the background conditions for S include conditions that 
negate the background conditions for A. When T obtains above, C&¬S 
cannot, and where R obtains, C&¬A cannot.  
 So one can justifiably assert an association between two effects of 
a common cause, but there is no association between two causes of an 
effect. The link between the two effects of a common cause enables you to 
say ³e1 is more likely given e2´, because the background conditions 
leading to e1 and e2 from the common cause are probabilistically 
independent. However, there cannot be shown to be an association 
between two causes of an effect. In the case provided, the two causes are 
smoking and working with asbestos, where cancer is the common effect. 
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So we ask, is there a connection between smoking and working with 
asbestos? With the inverted inus conditions in the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for smoking, cancer is conjoLQHG ZLWK µQRW ZRUNLQJ LQ DQ
asbHVWRV IDFWRU\¶ LQ WKH ILUVW GLVMXQFW EXW RI FRXUVH WKLV LV LQFompatible 
ZLWKµZRUNLQJZLWKDVEHVWRV¶)RUPH3DSLQHDXKDVFOHDUO\GHPRQVWUDWHG
that an asymmetry between causes and effects is an important part of our 
concept of causation, and that it can be accommodated within our 
conceptual analysis. 
1.6.1 7KHµ1HFHVVLW\¶&RQGLWLRQ 
These first few potential conditions for causation are interesting in their 
own right, but perhaps the most controversial and interesting condition is 
the necessity condition ± the requirement that for a pair of events to be 
considered cause and effect, there must be a necessary connection between 
the cause and the effect.  
I claim in chapter 2 that if the thought that one event necessitates 
another is a part of our concept of causation, the necessity is of the 
physical necessity variety ± that is, necessary given the laws of nature, as 
opposed to necessary given the metaphysical glue. However, it is 
nonetheless important to consider the nature of metaphysical necessity, as 
it has been claimed that metaphysical necessity between causes and effects 
is an unintelligible idea. 
 David Hume (1739-4) explicitly states (and I believe quite in line 
with our intuitions) that the most important aspect of our concept of 
causation is the necessary connection between causes and effects. We 
have to consider both what µQHFHVVDU\FRQQHFWLRQV¶DUHDQGLIDQGZKHQ
they can be applied to object-involving events.  
Hume writes in the Enquiry that: 
It is universally allowed, that matter, in all its operations, is actuated by a 
necessary force, and that every natural effect is so precisely determined by the 
energy of its cause, that no other effect, in such particular circumstances, could 
possibly have resulted from it (E, VIII, I, p149) 
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and in the Treatise:  
(With causation) there is a NECESSARY CONNEXION to be taken into 
consideration; and that relation is of much greater importance (than the relations 
of contiguity and precedence in time) (T, I, II, p125) 
Hume sees necessary connection as an integral part of our concept of 
causation, but traditionally he is interpreted as denying the existence of 
necessity µLQWKHREMHFWV¶ This can be seen just by looking at his µUXOHVE\
which WR MXGJHRIFDXVHDQGHIIHFW¶ (T, I, XV) in the Treatise, which do 
not include a necessity condition of any kind - it seems that for Hume, 
then, necessity plays a role in how we think about causation, but not in the 
metaphysics of causation. This brings forth the worry that, given my 
assumption of an success WKHRU\ ZLWK UHVSHFW WR FDXVDWLRQ +XPH¶V
conceptual analysis might be flawed (if there is no causation in the 
metaphysics of causation, there would be no causation in the world. But 
there is causation iQ WKH ZRUOG %XW DV ZH ZLOO VHH JLYHQ +XPH¶V
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIZKDWWKHLGHDRIµQHFHVVDU\FRQQHFWLRQ¶ corresponds to in 
the world, this worry turns out not to be problematic after all. So what 
does Hume mean by necessary connection? Two questions arise:  
1.  According to Hume, where is the necessity if it is not in the objects? 
and; 
2.  If necessity is not in the objects, ZRXOGWKLVRWKHUµNLQG¶RI necessity 
satisfy the necessary connection condition in our concept of causation? 
In other words, must the necessary connection condition that needs to 
be satisfied for an event to be considered FDXVDOEHµLQWKHREMHFWV¶RU
can it be located somewhere else?  
J.L. Mackie (Mackie 1974: 12-13) makes a distinction between two 
types of necessity: the first he defines aV µZKDWHYHU LV WKHGLVWLQJXLVKLQJ
feature of causal as opposed to non-FDXVDO VHTXHQFHV¶ DQG WKH VHFRQG
SURYLGHVµWKHVXSSRVHGZDUUDQWIRUDQa priori LQIHUHQFH¶$VZHVKDOOVHH
Hume shows through his copy principle that an idea of the latter cannot be 
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obtained - ZH ZRXOG QHHG WR µKDYH DQ LPSUHVVLRQ9 in between our 
impression of [the cause] and out impression of [the effect] distinct from 
ERWK WKHVH LPSUHVVLRQV WKDW LV DQ LPSUHVVLRQ EDUHO\ RI WKH SURGXFLQJ¶
(Beebee: 2006: 78). Hume makes the move from this conclusion, to the 
denial that we have an idea of first kind of necessity, and this, it seems, 
might be unwarranted. The assumption Hume makes, as Beebee states, is 
that µthe detection of causation would have to be a detection of something 
that would geQHUDWHLQIHUHQFHIURPFDXVHVWRHIIHFWV¶%HHEHH2006: 79). 
One might argue that +XPH¶V DVVXPSWLRQ here is unjustified. We might 
well detect a connection between the cause and effect which renders the 
HYHQWV WR EH QRW HQWLUHO\ µORRVH DQG VHSDUDWH¶ GHVSLWe our inability to 
directly observe the metaphysical glue. However, it seems clear to me that 
we do detect some connection between cause and effect (albeit perhaps 
not the metaphysical glue). At this point I PRYHRQWR+XPH¶VDUJXPHQWV 
as to (a) why we cannot detect metaphysical glue, and (b) to what he 
believes the idea of necessary connection to correspond to. 
To answer these questions IURP +XPH¶V SHUVSHFWLYH a more 
detailed account of his conception of causation and necessary connection 
is required, and to provide this we first need to examine his method of 
reasoning. 
 Hume held that there are two fundamental kinds of perception, 
impressions and ideas. The former are vivid perceptions that directly 
appear to the mind: we have an impression of an apple when we directly 
perceive the apple, and an impression of a sound when listening to it. 
Ideas, on the other hand, are less vivid, and are copied from the 
impressions. An idea of an apple could be a memory of a previous 
experience, or perhaps a product of the imagination, or its appearance in a 
dream. Importantly, whenever we have an idea, it has always been copied 
from at least one impression (the copy principle). Of course we can 
imagine red unicorns, or trees that sing, neither of which we will ever have 
directly perceived (so our imaginings are not direct copies), but 
                                                          
9
 A vivid, direct perception. 
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nevertheless, these complex ideas will have been copied from a 
conjunction of impressions of red things, horses, horns, trees, and sounds. 
Even if the shape is entirely new, we could not have conceived of it 
without impressions of other shapes. If we accept the copy principle, then, 
somebody who has always been blind cannot form the idea of a red apple, 
and somebody who has never had a sense of smell cannot imagine what an 
apple pie would smell like. Ideas that have no corresponding impressions 
are unreliable, and although they may seem to somehow correspond to 
reality, in truth the terms we use to refer to them are contentless. 
 +XPHFODLPVWKDWµZHQHYHUSHUFHLYHDQ\TXDOLW\ZKLFKELQGVWKH
effect to the cause and renders the one an infallible consequence of the 
RWKHU:HRQO\ ILQG WKDWRQHGRHV LQ IDFW IROORZWKHRWKHU¶7KHUH LVQR
direct impression of necessary connection. But given the argument above 
WKHTXHVWLRQEHFRPHV³LIZHFDQ¶WKave a direct impression of necessary 
connection from which to derive the idea, is there any other sort of 
impression that could enable us to form the idea of necessary connection, 
and what ZRXOGWKLVLPSUHVVLRQEHOLNH"´  
 ,IZHDFFHSW+XPH¶VHPSLULFLVWLQtuitions, then when we observe a 
causal interaction all we see is one event followed by another. When a 
brick hits a window, we have an impression of the brick hitting the 
window and an impression of the window smashing. There is no further 
object of which we have an impression from which the idea of necessary 
connection can be derived. In fact, it is difficult to imagine what this 
impression would be like. 
 If there is no impression from which the idea can be derived, then 
the idea of necessary connection LV µFRQWHQWOHVV¶ 7R VD\ WKDW WKHUH LV D
necessar\ FRQQHFWLRQ EHWZHHQ ;V DQG <V LV LQ +XPH¶V ZRUGV
µXQLQWHOOLJLEOH¶ which (arguably) is DNLQ WR VD\LQJ ³WKHUH LV D EOHXUJK
EHWZHHQ;VDQG<V´But Hume does not make this claim (and we should 
hope not!). He writes ZULWHVWKDWµQHFHVVDU\FRQQH[LRQEHWZL[WFDXVHVDQG
effects is the foundation of our inference from one to the other¶ T, 1, 
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XIV), so he certainly believes we have an idea of necessary connection. In 
fact, he expressly ranked it as the most important aspect of our concept of 
causation - so where does this idea come from? 
1.6.2 7KH0LQGµ6SUHDGV,WVHOI¶RQWRWKH:RUOG 
 Hume suggests that the impression of necessary connection is an 
µLPSUHVVLRQ RI UHIOHFWLRQ¶ UHVXOWLQJ IURP WKH REVHUYHG FRQVWDQW
conjunction of events of one type, A, and events of another type, B. Our 
minds have this propensity, when having observed a constant conjunction 
between As and Bs, to expect an event of type B when observing an event 
of type A. When this occurs an impression of the mind is produced, and it 
is this impression from which the idea of necessary connection is derived.  
(The impression of) necessity, then, is the effect of this observation, and is 
nothing but an internal impression of the mind, or a determination to carry our 
thoughts from one object to another. (T, I, XIV, p215) 
But what is the nature of this feeling? It cannot be the mental event of 
forming the idea of an event of type B from the impression of an event of 
type A, as just like in the physical realm, this would simply be a case of 
WZR GLVWLQFW HYHQWV +DUROG 1RRQDQ ZULWHV WKDW µWKH VHQWLPHQW RU
LPSUHVVLRQ +XPH UHIHUV WR FDQ« RQO\ EH DQ DFFRPSDQLPHQW WR WKH
transition from the idea of an A to the idea of a B, perhaps a feeling of 
helplessness or inevitability that occurs in the mind when the disposition 
WRPDNHWKHWUDQVLWLRQIURPDQLGHDRIDQ$WRWKHLGHDRID%LVDFWXDWHG¶
(Noonan 2007: 83). It is from this feeling that the idea of necessary 
connection is derived.  
 We then, it seems, instinctively and mistakenly attribute necessary 
connections to the objects ± according to Noonan, Basson (see Basson 
1958: 66-67; Noonan 2007: 84) suggests that for Hume, to attribute 
necessity to objects is tantamount to attributing emotions to a specific 
sound (sounGV REYLRXVO\ GRQ¶W KDYH HPRWLRQV ,f we consider a note 
despondent, the despondency is in actual fact an emotion in the listener, 
triggered by the note. The thought is that we begin to attribute emotions to 
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specific sounds through association: the noise made by a siren in war-time 
is considered despondent because it incites feelings of fear and sadness, 
but the emotion is in the mind, not in the note itself (see Basson 1958: 66-
7).  
 ,V LW SRVVLEOH WKDW WKURXJK RXU PLQG¶V SURSHQVLW\ WR LQ +XPH¶V
ZRUGVµVSUHDGLWVHOIRQWRWKHZRUOG¶ZHXQZLWWLQJO\DWWULEXWHWKHIHHOLQJ
of inevitability (the impression from which the idea of necessary 
connection is copied) to the objects themselves? According to this 
interpretation of Hume, then, we copy the idea of necessary connection 
from an impression of reflection, which must turn out to be something like 
a feeling of inevitability (which is itself caused by the observation of 
constant conjunctions) - we then make a grave category error: we 
mistakenly believe that the idea of necessary connection has been copied 
from an impression of sensation (of something in the world), and so 
inadvertently attribute our feeling of inevitability on to the objects; that is, 
we actually unknowingly attribute emotions to inanimate objects. 
1.6.3 %HHEHH¶V3URMHFWLYLVW Interpretation 
Alternatively, one could claim that when we say X causes Y (and in so 
doing assign a necessary connection between X and Y), we are really just 
expressing our inference from the observation of event X to the 
occurrence of event Y ± we are certainly not attributing emotions to the 
objects in the sense described above. Beebee believes we should give such 
a SURMHFWLYLVW DFFRXQW RI +XPH¶V DQDO\VLV RI FDXVDWLRQ ZKHUHE\ FDXVDO
WDONµLVQRQ-representational or non-descriptive: in speaking and thinking 
causally, we express10 our habits of inference and project them on to the 
ZRUOG¶ I find this interpretation more appealing than the frightening 
thought that we attribute emotions to inanimate objects (every time we 
identify a causal relation!), not least because the previous interpretation 
UHQGHUV DOO RXW FDXVDO WDON IDOVH DQG WKLV GRHV QRW VHHP WR EH +XPH¶V
intention.  
                                                          
10
 My emphasis 
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 Regardless of whether one infers %HHEHH¶VSURMHFWLYLVW, or Noonan-
style concluVLRQV IURP +XPH¶V DUJXPHnts, ultimately the impression of 
necessary connection is not an impression of metaphysical glue located in 
the external world. µ7KHHIILFDF\RUHQHUJ\RIFDXVHVLVQHLWKHUSODF¶GLQ
the causes themselves, nor in the deity, nor in the concurrence of these two 
SULQFLSOHVEXWEHORQJVHQWLUHO\WRWKHVRXO«7LVKHUHWKDWWKHUHDOSRZHU
RIFDXVHVLVSODF¶GDORQJZLWKWKHLUFRQQHFWLRQDQGQHFHVVLW\¶T, I, XIV, 
p216). Whatever necessary connection is, for Hume it is in the mind, not 
in the objects. 
1.7 Galen Strawson: We Can Refer to Necessary Connections 
If the Humean concept of necessity is right, WKHQLWGRHVQ¶Wlook to be the 
same kind of necessity many intuitively believe there to be in causal 
sequences - the Humean necessary connections do not seem to be 
plausible candidates for the necessary connections we need, as we really 
require some objective metaphysical glue between events. 
 IV LWSRVVLEOH WKRXJK WKDWE\ µ<KDV WRKDSSHQ LI; KDSSHQV¶ all 
we really can PHDQLVWKDWµWKHre is a necessary connection between X and 
<¶ LQ WKH VHQVH RI QHFHVVDU\ FRQQHFWLRQ that Hume suggests? The term 
µQHFHVVDU\FRQQHFWLRQ¶ZRXOGUHIHU, but it would refer to something in the 
mind (perhaps we are referring to the emotion we experience after 
observing Xs).  
 Prima facie this might seem implausible, but if it were the case, the 
Humean concept of necessary connection would be the only kind of 
necessary connection we can refer to, and hence the kind of necessary 
connection required from the start. But thisRQHFDQ¶WKHOSEXW feel, is a 
little unsatisfying. The question that needs answering, then, is whether the 
+XPHDQ LV ULJKW LQ WKLQNLQJZHFDQQRW UHIHU WRDQ\WKLQJµLQ WKHREMHFWV¶, 
from which it follows that certain events have to follow certain other 
events. 
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 Although what Hume himself believes is unimportant for the 
purposes of this discussion, Galen Strawson has a different interpretation 
of Hume that provides us with an alternative conceptual analysis of 
causation; one in which there really is necessity in the objects. He argues 
WKDW +XPH¶V FODLPV DERXW QHFHVVLW\ EHLQJ LQ WKH PLQG DUH SXUHO\ KLV
µHSLVWHPRORJLFDO¶ EHOLHIV WKDW LV KH VXSSRVHV WKDW +XPH ZDV VLPSO\
showing that we can never know the true nature of power or necessary 
connections. That is not to say, Strawson argues, that there really is 
nothing in the world like power or necessary connection. In fact he 
beliHYHV TXLWH WKH RSSRVLWH LV WUXH LW¶V MXVW WKDW ZH NQRZ QRWKLQJ DERXW
their nature. Nonetheless, the regular succession of objects does indeed 
totally depend on these powers and forces whose nature we are so utterly 
ignorant. (Strawson 1989: 279). 
 I think Strawson is wrong to interpret Hume in this way, but what 
is interesting is that Strawson believes it is possible to uphold the copy 
principle and refer WR SDUWV RI UHDOLW\ RI ZKLFK ZH KDYH QR µSRVLWLYHO\
FRQWHQWIXO RU GHVFULSWLYHO\ FRQWHQWIXO FRQFHSWLRQ¶ Strawson 1989: 278), 
including that of necessary connection. It is simply not the case that from 
+XPH¶V WKHRU\ RI PHDQLQJ ZH DUH UHTXLUHG WR UHMHFW WKH existence of 
anything of which we cannot know the tUXHQDWXUHRU µUHDOHVVHQFH¶. He 
DUJXHV WKDW ZKHQ +XPH GHVFULEHV VRPHWKLQJ DV µXQLQWHOOLJLEOH¶ KH GRHV
not use the term in the same way as we tend to; that is, for Hume, even if a 
term is unintelligible, that term may still refer to something. According to 
+XPH¶V WKHRU\ RI LGHDV ZH DUH QRW DEOH WR IRUP DQ LGHD RI QHFHVVDU\
connection with any positive content; we may never be able to know the 
true nature, or essence of necessary connection, but (according to 
6WUDZVRQ DW OHDVW WKDW GRHV QRW PHDQ RXU WHUP µQHFHVVDU\ FRQQHFWLRQ¶
cannot refer to something in the world. In the same way as when I claim 
WKDW ³VRPHWKLQJ OHW¶V FDOO LW ; VPDVKHG P\ ZLQGRZ´ LW GRHV QRW VHHP
LPSODXVLEOHWRVD\WKDW,FDQUHIHUWRµ;¶ZLWKRXWNQRZLQJRUHYHQEHLQJ
able to know) its nature, and furthermore FODLP WKDW ³QHFHVsary 
connections are the reason µVRPHWKLQJ¶DQDVSHFWRIUHDOLW\RIZKLFKZH
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can form no idea with positive content) why certain events must follow 
certain other HYHQWV´ 
 7KLV ORRNV LQFRQVLVWHQW ZLWK +XPH¶V SRVLWLRQ :KHQ ZH UHIHU WR
QHFHVVDU\FRQQHFWLRQZHFDQQRWEHUHIHUULQJWRVRPHWKLQJWKDW¶VERWKµLQ
WKHREMHFWV¶DQG µLQ WKHPLQG¶, and as we have seen Hume clearly states 
that necessary connections are in the mind - this must follow from his 
conclusions regarding the impression from which the idea of necessary 
connection is copied, but if these conclusions are correct, how can the 
WHUP µQHFHVVDU\ FRQQHFWLRQ¶ UHIHU WR DQ\WKLQJ LQ WKH REMHFWV? If, when I 
attribute a necessary connection between two electrons repelling one 
another, ,¶P UHDOO\ MXVW H[SUHVVLQJ WKH µLGHD¶ FRUUHVSRQGLQJ WR WKH
accompanying feeling of inevitability that would be experienced when 
observing two electrons in close proximity to one another (or expressing a 
feeling of inevitability), I cannot be referring to some metaphysical glue 
out there in the world.  
 Despite WKH FRQVLGHUDEOH GLIIHUHQFHV EHWZHHQ 6WUDZVRQ¶V
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ DQG ZKDW , WDNH WR EH +XPH¶V YLHZV RQ FDXVDWLRQ, 
6WUDZVRQ¶VWKHRU\ (taken as a theory of causation in isolation as opposed 
to a reading of Hume) is compelling. If we can refer to necessary 
connections, even if we cannot know their nature, we can still claim that 
there is a real reason why certain events have to follow certain other 
events, and the counter-intuitive notion that any event can follow any 
other turns out to be false.  
 I have issues with 6WUDZVRQ¶V DUJXPHQW WKRXJK. His example 
seems plausible. We may well look at the dent in a car and presume that 
µsomething FDXVHGLW,NQRZQRWZKDW¶%XWLVLWUHDOO\WUXHWKDWZHKDYH
no positively contentful idea of what that thing is like? We have ideas 
about things that make dents in cars by having impressions of observables 
making dents in other observables. Although we may not know precisely 
ZKDW FDXVHG WKH GHQW ZH FDQ LQIHU WKDW LW ZDV µFDXVHG¶ WKDW LV ZH FDQ
conclude that some event occurred, the type of which is constantly 
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conjoined with the denting of cars. Another car hitting my car could have 
caused the dent; a brick being thrown at it could have caused the dent, and 
so forth. Every suitable event we can think of will involve some kind of 
PRYLQJREMHFWZLWKPDVVDQGDOWKRXJKZHGRQ¶WNQRZSUHFLVHO\ZKDWWKLV
object would have looked like, we do know something about its nature. 
We have positively contentful ideas of the kind of thing that cause dents, 
and we know that were we in the right place at the right time, we would be 
able to identify exactly what massive object it was. We can refer to this 
µVRPHWKLQJ¶Eecause we have some kind of idea of what this thing may 
EH7KHLGHDRI WKHµVRPHWKLQJ¶ LQ WKLVFDVHKDVDW OHDVWVRPHSRVLWLYH
content.  
But this is not parallel to the case of necessary connection. It is not 
possible, according to +XPH¶V FRS\ SULQFLSle, to observe metaphysical 
glue in the objects, even if we are in the right place at the right time. The 
idea of necessary connection (in the metaphysical glue, sense) thus has no 
positive content whatsoever, and so the analogy, on the face of it at least, 
seems to fail. 
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Chapter 2 
 
In chapter 1 I considered some of the main contenders for inclusion in our 
concept of causation, and an asymmetry between cause an effect and 
necessary connection between them seemed paramount. The necessity 
talked about in chapter 1, however, differs from the necessity I shall 
consider in this chapter. Here I discuss conceptions in which the necessity 
is that associated with lawhood. It can be seen not as a conceptual 
phenomenon, but more in terms of entailment ± that is, what 
circumstances are sufficient for an effect, given certain premises. In this 
chapter, I first look at a number of conceptual analyses in more detail: the 
possibility of causes being instances of laws, and two accounts of singular 
causation. I then look at our concept of what it is to be a law of nature, 
discussing the possibility of ceteris paribus laws, and whether or not laws 
must govern there instances. I finish with a more detailed account of 
necessity in causation, and the roles played by laws and causation in 
explanation. 
 
Part I:  Three Conceptions of Causation 
 
2.1 Causation as an Instance of Law 
Hume, when considering the nature of the cause-effect relation, saw a 
cause to be an instance of a constant conjunction. If we assume that all 
laws are exceptionless regularities (clearly a non-trivial assumption!), then 
perhaps all causes are indeed instances of laws, but cause being an 
instance of law is at best a necessary condition. It is by no means 
sufficient. Let us assume that it is a law that all electrons have charge -1. It 
is nonetheless fairly obvious that having charge -1 is not an instance of 
causation. However, as we shall see, laws do play a significant role in 
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causation. The next question to ask is whether one must know the laws if 
one is to identify a cause-effect relation that (in some sense) depends on 
the truth of that law. 
 It seems to me that it is possible that there are worlds in which the 
inhabitants do not know what the laws are (and indeed this is probably 
true of our world!), but they do have a concept of causation (in our sense 
of the term). These inhabitants can identify a rock hitting a slab of ice as 
the cause of the ice smashing without knowing what the laws are. The 
inhabitants may have a concept of law, and they may even believe that 
each causal event is an instance of a law, but surely they need not know 
what the true law-statements are in order to identify an instance of 
causation. However, for Hume, to know something to be a causal 
sequence is already to know that it¶VDODZ 
 The concept of cause cannot simply be that a cause is an instance 
of law, and that the laws do not need to be known to identify a causal 
interaction. This, I think, leads to the conclusion that one should be 
looking more specifically at singular causation; that is, rather than looking 
at more general types of causal interactions and picking out instances of 
those types as causal interactions, we should be looking purely for an 
account of causation capable of picking out individual causal events 
without reference to event-types. The conditional analysis looked at in the 
next section requires no knowledge of what the laws actually are, only the 
notion of logical entailment from law-statements. 
2.2 J L Mackie and the Conditional Analysis 
It seems plaXVLEOHWRVD\WKDW³LI$FDXVHG%WKHQERWK$DQG%RFFXUUHG
and (in the circumstances) if A had not occurred then B would not have 
RFFXUUHG« ZKHUH $ DQG % DUH ORJLFDOO\ DQG conceptually distinct 
HYHQWV´7he brick caused the window to smash if the both the brick hit 
WKH ZLQGRZ DQG WKH ZLQGRZ VPDVKHG DQG LI WKH EULFN KDGQ¶W KLW WKH
window the window would not have smashed-. This can be explained in 
terms of possible worlds by considering a non-A world with previously 
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exact match of particular facts to the actual world, and let this possible 
ZRUOG µUXQ RQ¶ LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK WKH ODZV RI our world - µ«the 
(counterfactual conditional) analysis requires that (the worlds) evolve 
thereafter in aFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHDFWXDOODZV¶ (Lewis 1983: 43). If B does 
not occur, then this second counterfactual condition is satisfied. As Lewis 
ZULWHVµ«ZHWKLQNRIDFDXVHDVVRPHWKLQJWKDWPDNHVDGLIIHUHQFHDQG
the difference it makes must be a difference from what would have 
KDSSHQHGZLWKRXWLW¶ (Lewis 1973: 557). 
 I look at LeZLV¶VDFFRXQW in more detail later, but this general way 
RIORRNLQJDWVLQJXODUFDXVDWLRQLVZKDW-/0DFNLHWHUPVµWKHFRQGLWLRQDO
DQDO\VLV¶0DFNLHSURYLGHVDFRPSUHKHQVLYHGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHSRVLWLRQLQ
The Cement of the Universe, a summary of which I provide below11. 
 :KHQ DQ $FH HIIHFW µ=¶ LV VHUYHG LQ D WHQQLV PDWFK RQH PD\
GHWHUPLQHWKHFDXVHWREHSOD\HU$¶VKLWWLQJWKHEDOOYHU\KDUGZLWKJRRG
WHFKQLTXH+RZHYHUWKLVFRXOGQ¶WEHVHHQDVWKHRQO\IDFWRULQYROYHG7KH
opponent, player B, also plays a role (in not reaching the ball in time). 
3OD\HU%¶VODFNRISDFHFOHDUO\FRQWULEXWHVWRWKHUHVXOWDQW$FHVRHIIHFW=
should really be seen as a conjunction of causes: XY - &DXVH µ;¶EHLQJ
SOD\HU $¶V KLWWLQJ WKH EDOO KDUG, DQG FDXVH µ<¶ EHLQJ SOD\HU %¶V VORZ
running. X is the event we would identify as the cause, but it is not 
sufficient for Z. To emphasise, XY (where XY represents the conjunction 
of causes X and Y) may well be sufficient for Z, but it is not the case that 
X is sufficient for Z, alone.  
 Neither is it the case that all Aces require particularly hard serves 
of the kind denoted by X. A softer serve with a lot of spin (Q), for 
example, combined with the slow pace of player B may also result in Z. X 
is therefore neither a necessary, nor sufficient condition for Z, but 
nonetheless we identify it as the cause. 
 To avoid the conclusion that sufficiency is not a relevant factor in 
picking out a cause, one option is to introduce a weaker form of 
                                                          
11
 Using my own examples 
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sufficiency, whereby we fix the circumstances VXFK WKDW ; µLQ WKH
FLUFXPVWDQFHV¶ LV VXIILFLHQW IRU = ,Q WKH FDVH DERYH WKH FLUFXPVWDQFHV
ZRXOG LQFOXGH SOD\HU %¶V ODFN RI SDFH DQG VR ; ZRXOG LQ WKH
circumstances, be sufficient for Z.  
 Can we now claim that if X is sufficient for Z in the circumstances 
then it must be the cause of Z? - sadly not. It is easy to construct situations 
where a condition is sufficient in the circumstances but is clearly not the 
cause of the effect. Suppose that event A is Bob stubbing his toe on a rock, 
and event B is Bob¶VG\LQJ1RZVXSSRVHWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVDre such that 
just as Bob stubs his toe a tidal wave crashes onto the beach where poor 
Bob is located. A was not causally relevant to % GHVSLWH $¶V EHLQJ
sufficient for B in the circumstances. This weaker sense of sufficiency 
looks to be far too inclusive12. 
 0DFNLHWKXVVXJJHVWVZHLQWURGXFHWKHQRWLRQRIµVXIILFLHQF\LQWKH
VWURQJ VHQVH¶ ZKHUHE\ ZH NHHS WKH µLQ WKH FLUFXPVWDQFHV¶ FULWHULRQ EXW
LQWURGXFH D QHZ FRXQWHUIDFWXDO FRQGLWLRQDO µLQ WKH FLUFXPVWDQFHV LI <
KDG QRW EHHQ JRLQJ WR RFFXU ; ZRXOG QRW KDYH RFFXUUHG¶ Mackie, J.L. 
1974: 39). In the tidal wave sequence above, sufficiency in the strong 
VHQVH ZRXOG QRW DSSO\ WR %RE¶V VWXEELQJ KLV WRH DQG VR ZH JHW WKH
welcome result of it not being a cause of his death. However, in the 
circumstances, if player A had not served an ace, then player A would not 
have hit the ball so hard, and so his good serve still counts as the cause.  
 Mackie refers to events like X as inus FRQGLWLRQVµinsufficient but 
non-redundant part(s) of an unnecessary but sufficient FRQGLWLRQ¶Mackie 
1974: 62) There could, of course, be numerous inus conditions that can be 
associated with the same effect, so when we consider what the cause of an 
Ace is (on a more general scale) we are left with a disjunction of 
conjunctions ± = UHVXOWV IURP ;< RU 4< RU µHWF¶ $VVXPLQJ WKDW µHWF¶
represents a finite number of conjunctive conditions, we may assert that Z 
                                                          
12
 It will turn out that it is examples of this kind that show why laws alone are insufficient for 
picking out causal events, but I will address this issue in greater detail later on. 
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LVDOZD\VSUHFHGHGE\;<RU4<RUµHWF¶DQGFRQYHUVHO\WKDWDOO;<RU
4<RUµHWF¶DUHfollowed by Z. 
 To take this further, the effect Z is also partially reliant on the 
absence of certain occurrences; a gust of wind (D), for example, may 
force the tennis ball out of play. Perhaps these considerations should also 
be incorporated into the concept. We are then left with the rather more 
FRPSOLFDWHGµ=iff (XYnot-D or QYnot-D or...). Clearly the exhaustive list 
of conditions that need to be satisfied for most causal sequences of this 
NLQG ZRXOG EH HQRUPRXV 1HYHUWKHOHVV 0LOO ZULWHV WKDW µWKH
caXVH«SKLORVRSKLFDOO\ VSHDNLQJ LV WKH VXP WRWDO RI WKH FRQditions 
positive and negative¶ 0DFNLH-/1974: 63, quoting Mill (1911: Book 
3, Ch.5, Sect 3)) %XWDV0DFNLHSRLQWVRXWµLIZHJRVRIDUDVWRVD\ 
 7KLV µIXOO FDXVH¶ LV REYLRXVO\ QRW ZKDW ZH DV observers, would 
normally associate with the concept of cause. We identify specific events, 
or at most relatively small combinations of events as causes, as opposed to 
these extensive disjunctions of conjunctions. When we identify causes, we 
are almost always referring to the inus conditions within this full cause.  
 Looking back to whether or not causes necessitate their effects it 
seems that although X may not itself necessitate Z, the conjunction of X 
with certain other conditions does. But the counterfactual µLI ; KDG QRW
RFFXUUHG WKHQ=ZRXOGQRWKDYHRFFXUUHG¶ZRXOGRIWHQEHIDOVHDV WKHUH
are numerous other conjunctions of events that might lead to the same 
effect. If we consider only the conjunctive condition that actually causes 
Z, however, if we omit X from that conjunctive condition it would not 
have been sufficient. In some sense at least it looks as though X is a 
necessary condition, in that the conjunctive condition without X would not 
be sufficient for Z. To put it another way: if none of the other minimally 
sufficient conditions for Z are satisfied, then X is both individually 
necessary, and in the circumstances (whereby all the other conjuncts of the 
relevant conjunctive condition are satisfied) sufficient for Z. 
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To see how this fits nicely into the conditional analysis of 
causation, consider the following example: a foul is committed in a 
IRRWEDOOPDWFK7KHUHIHUHHµVHHVWKHRIIHQVH¶;DQGµEORZVWKHZKLVWOH
IRUDIUHHNLFN¶<:HFRQFOXGHWKDWWKHUHIHUHHEORZLQJKLVZKLVWOHZDV
caused by his observation of the IRXODQGFODLPWKHFRXQWHUIDFWXDOµLIWKH
UHIHUHHKDGQ¶W VHHQ WKH IRXOKHZRXOGQRWKDYH EORZQKLVZKLVWOH¶ WREH
true. However the referee has assistants on the touchlines. In this case, the 
assistant saw the foul and raised his flag (R) to indicate this to the referee. 
Thus regardless of whether or not the referee saw the foul himself, he 
would still have blown his whistle. The counterfactual is therefore false. 
+RZHYHU LI ZH QRZ FRQVLGHU WKH µIXOO FDXVH¶ WR EH 3 ZKLFK LV D
disjunction of conjunctions comprising every possible combination of 
IDFWRUVWKDWFRXOGJLYHULVHWR<DVSURSRVHGE\0LOOHYLGHQWO\µLIQRW-P 
then not-<¶LVDOZD\VWUXH WKXVVDWLVI\LQJWKHFRXQWHUIDFWXDOFRQGLWLRQDO
Identifying P as a cause using counterfactuals does not seem to be 
WURXEOHVRPHEXWWKLVLVWULYLDOO\WKHFDVH:H¶UHLQWHUHVWHGLQVXFFHVVIXOO\
identifying the inus condition(s), X, as a cause, rather than P. 
 We know that if X occurs, but none of the other minimally 
sufficient conditions (ie R) within the full cause are satisfied then Y also 
occurs. If we now consider a similar instance, except on this occasion X 
GRHVQRWRFFXUHLWKHUWKHQLWZRXOGIROORZWKDWµ<GLGQRWRFFXULQ)13; 
such an inference justifies the assertion within the scope of the supposition 
that he (did not see the foul), that Y did not occur, that is, that (he did not 
blow his whistle), hence sustains the conditional (if he had not seen the 
IRXOKHZRXOGQRWKDYHEORZQKLVZKLVWOH¶14 (Mackie, J.L. 1974:65).  
2.3.1 Singular Causation and Dispositions 
In later chapters I GLVFXVV WKH µPHWDSK\VLFDO¶ DVSHFWVRI WKHGLVSRVLWLRQDO
analysis of causation in detail (whether or not dispositional properties are 
natural properties of objects that provide the causal oomph, or 
metaphysical glue that determines the evolution of physical systems). In 
                                                          
13
  ?& ?ƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽƚŚĞďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐƵŶĚĞƌǁŚŝĐŚĂĐĂƵƐĂůĞǀĞŶƚƚĂŬĞƐƉůĂĐĞ 
14
 Bracketed areas indicate my substitution of DĂĐŬŝĞ ?ƐĞǆĂŵƉůĞĨŽƌŵǇŽǁŶ ? 
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this section I merely wish to introduce the concept of objects being 
disposed to act in certain ways, how this would fit into an account of 
singular causation, and ultimately how I believe even a dispositional 
analysis is closely connected with laws of nature. 
 0DUNXV 6FKUHQN IRUWKFRPLQJ VXPPDULVHV /HZLV¶V GHILQLWLRQ RI
dispositions as follows: 
Something x is disposed at time t to give response r to stimulus s, iff x has some 
intrinsic property B so that: if x were to undergo stimulus s at time t and retain 
SURSHUW\%ORQJHQRXJKVDQG[¶VKDYLQJRI%ZRXOGFDXVH[¶VJLYLQJUHVSRQVH
r. (Schrenk cf. Lewis 1997: 157) 
Under this account, an event would be identified as causal if it involves 
WKHPDQLIHVWDWLRQRIDWOHDVWRQHRIWKHREMHFW¶VGLVSRVLWLRQDOSURSHUWLHV%
when the stimulus conditions for that disposition are met. 
 The dispositional analysis thus supposes that objects have certain 
properties, the manifestations of which constitute the causal events and the 
evolution of the physical system. This position in the modern debate is 
taken to be distinctly anti-Humean, yet conceptually speaking, objects can 
be seen to be disposed to act in certain ways regardless of whether one 
accepts an anti-+XPHDQYLHZRIFDXVDWLRQµ)UDJLOLW\¶LVRIWHQJLYHQDVD
classic example of a dispositional property, but on the face of it an object 
being fragile could be interpreted in terms of counterfactuals, without any 
commitments regarding whether or not fragility is a natural property 
providing causal oomph. OQH FRXOG FRQFHSWXDOO\ GHILQH DQ REMHFW¶V
possessing dispositional properties in the following way:  
Disposition B is initially defined in terms of its stimulus conditions and its 
manifestation ± µIUDJLOLW\¶LVWKHGLVSRVLWLRQDOSURSHUW\VXFKWKDWVLVµEHLQJ
KLW ZLWK D KDPPHU¶ DQG U LV µVPDVKLQJ¶ $Q REMHFW [ SRVVHVVHV
dispositional property B iff, if the stimulus conditions for property B are 
met then SURSHUW\%LVPDQLIHVWHG¶± An object is fragile iff, if that object 
were to be hit with a hammer it would smash. So (again purely on the face 
of it) a conceptual analysis of an object being disposed to B only requires 
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one to consider how that object would behave under certain 
circumstances.  
 This counterfactual analysis of dispositions runs into trouble, 
however, when considering finks and antidotes. For example, a poisonous 
VQDNH¶V YHQRP ORRNV WR EH GLVSRVHG WR NLOO WKRVH ZKR KDYH WKH YHQRP
injected into their blood-stream via the snake biting its victim ± under the 
account presented above, this disposition could be captured by the 
FRXQWHUIDFWXDOµLISHUVRQx had been bitten, x ZRXOGKDYHGLHG¶+RZHYHU
if the requisite antidote is taken in time the disposition of the venom to kill 
will fail to manifest. TKHFRXQWHUIDFWXDOµLIx had been bitten, x would have 
GLHG¶ZRXOGEHIDOVHDQGVRWKHYHQRPZRXOGEHGHWHUPLQHGQRWWRKDYH
that dispositional property. Yet this is clearly false. Similarly, a negatively 
charged object, a, is disposed to move towards a positively charged object, 
b, if caught in its electro-magnetic field. But if that negatively charged 
object is also within the gravitational field of a separate larger massive 
object, c, a may not move at all (if the two forces exerted are equal), or 
may even move away from b if the gravitational force exceeds the electro-
magnetic force exerted on a.  
 Perhaps these issues can be cleared up by giving a more detailed 
account of the stimulus conditions that includes absences, rather like in the 
complete disjunction of conjunctions proposed by Mackie. I discuss these 
issues further in the chapter on the metaphysical analysis of dispositions.  
2.3.2  But is Necessity Necessary? 
In these final remarks concerning the conditional/counterfactual analyses, 
I should like to point out that the necessity required (LQ0DFNLH¶VFDVHWKH
QHFHVVLW\ WR ZKLFK , UHIHU LV VHHQ LQ WHUPV RI µVXIILFLHQW LQ WKH
circumstances¶) is thought by some to be absent in many cases of causal 
interaction. Markus Schrenk (forthcoming in Noûs) argues that even when 
FRQVLGHULQJ GHWHUPLQLVWLF FDXVDWLRQ µZKHQHYHU D SURFHVV VWDUWLQJ ZLWK
event C and finishing with event E, is temporally extended, that is, 
whenever E is supposed to succeed C afWHU D WLPH ǻW WKHUH LV WKH LQ
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principle possibility of an interference with C such that E could have been 
SUHYHQWHG¶. This looks bad not only for those who believe that some form 
of metaphysical glue provides de re necessity between events, but for any 
conception of causation requiring physical necessity as a necessary 
condition of causal interactions (which under my interpretation includes 
all the previously outlined metaphysical views of causation). 
 , GRQ¶W EHOLHYH 6FKUHQN¶V REMHFWLRQ LV WRR SUREOHPDWLF when we 
consider what will be my approach to the kind of necessity required for a 
causal interaction. It may well be the case that interfering factors during ǻW
may prevent the effect event we usually associate with a cause event from 
occurring, EXW WKLV MXVW DPRXQWV WR µLI WKH FLUFXPVWDQFHV KDG EHHQ
GLIIHUHQW¶$PLJKWQRWKDYHFDXVHG%,GRQRWGHQ\WKLV$VZHVDZZLWK
Mackie, the circumstances, or background conditions, are vitally 
important ± and these background conditions are contained within the 
propositions describing the state of affairs at the time of the cause. I use 
0DFNLH¶Vinus FRQGLWLRQDQDO\VLVWRSLFNRXWµWKHFDXVH¶  
 Schrenk suggests that that dispositions provide more than 
contingency because they µtend WRZDUGV¶ their manifestation, but less than 
QHFHVVLW\µIRURQO\ LQDGHULYHGVHQVHGRGLVSRVLWLRQVZKHQ WULJJHUHGE\
FRPSOHWHZRUOGVWDWHVµQHFHVVLWDWH¶WKHLUPDQLIHVWDWLRQV¶EXWHYHQLI he is 
correct, it seems to me that only this derived sense is required to satisfy 
the necessity condition in our concept of causation, whatever metaphysical 
view we adopt. As we shall see in chapter 7, according to %LUG¶V 
neo-dispositionalism the laws of nature supervene on the dispositional 
properties of objects in the physical system, so for him, any causal 
interactions that take place do so in virtue of the laws. Given the laws and 
the distribution of the property instantiations at t, any causal effect 
observed at t+1 happens as a matter of physical necessity - for any causal 
interaction, it is still the case that the state of affairs at t, plus the laws of 
nature, necessitate the effects at t+1.  
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Chapter 2, Part II: The Concept of Natural Laws 
 
2.4.1 The Concept of Natural Laws 
As with the concept of causation, I consider the task of explicating the 
concept of law to be separate from the task of investigating what laws in 
nature are (what is their nature), and indeed, in 6WHSKHQ 0XPIRUG¶V
words, whHWKHUµODZVFDQH[LVWin nature itself15¶ (Mumford 2004: 9) at all. 
These questions are unquestionabO\PHWDSK\VLFDOLQWKDWRQH¶VFRQFOXVLRQV
ZLOODIIHFWRQH¶V worldly ontology. The conceptual analysis, on the other 
hand, has no ontological implications. There may be no laws in nature, but 
we certainly have a concept of law; after all, we could all sit down and list 
many statements we consider either to be, or at least to express. However, 
as with the concept of cause, the outcome of the conceptual question may 
well have important implications when we begin to look at questions 
regarding laws in later chapters (de dicto necessities need to be taken 
seriously, too). 
 To begin with I take a brief look at the semantic structure of law-
statements, concluding that we should not restrict ourselves to one 
particular structure, or else we risk ruling out numerous generally accepted 
law-statements. I then consider a number of widely accepted conditions of 
being a law-statement ± if a statement is either to be, or to express a law, it 
must, I believe, satisfy these conditions. After outlining these less 
contentious conditions, however, I present a number of possibilities that 
will be endorsed by some philosophers, but not others. In particular I look 
at the proposals that laws must govern their instances, and that there can 
be ceteris paribus laws. Frequently these disagreements in conceptual 
analysis play a large role in the corresponding metaphysical debates; as we 
shall see, there are numerous examples of philosophers arguing WKDW³WKLV 
metaphysical view of laws cannot work because laws would then not have 
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 My emphasis 
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SURSHUW\µ;¶DQG;LVHVVHQWLDOWRODZV´± but for those who deny that X is 
essential to laws, such an argument is unsound.    
2.4.2    The Semantics of Law-Statements 
It is not a true law-statement in our world that the force of gravity between 
two objects is inversely proportional to the cube of the distance between 
them. This is trivially so because the statement is false, but perhaps it 
might have been a true law-statement, as it certainly seems to be of an 
acceptable semantic form for this status. 
 Law-statements can take a variety of semantic forms. Laws of 
nDWXUH RQH VXEVHW RI ZKLFK LV µFDXVDO¶ JHQHUDOO\ VHHP WR VLPSO\ OLQN
certain properties, so one possibility for the semantics is the universally 
quantified conditional ׊x)[ĺ*[URXJKO\WUDQVODWDEOHDVµDOO)VDUH*V¶
0DQ\ZLGHO\DFFHSWHG ODZVRIQDWXUHµDOOHOHFWURQVKDYHFKDUJH -¶ IRU
example) take this semantic form16. 
 Not all law-statements are expressible in this way, however. In this 
thesis I am also concerned with laws closely connected with causal 
interactions. With causal laws, the relata can be object-involving events or 
processes - many law-statements express diachronic laws, so we must also 
DOORZVWDWHPHQWVRIWKHIRUPµDOO)VDUHIROORZHGE\*V¶where Fs and Gs 
are object involving events to be law-statements too.  
But these two semantic-IRUPV VWLOO GRQ¶W FRYHU DOO WKH ODZ-
statements we allow, as often the more fundamental (higher-order) laws 
tend to be functional laws involving forces (where the less fundamental 
diachronic laws can be derived from, and arguably explained by the more 
fundamental). Nevertheless these fundamental laws can generally be 
H[SUHVVHG LQ WKH VLPLODU VHPDQWLF IRUP RI µ)V VWDQG LQ D IXQFWLRQDO
UHODWLRQVKLS WR *V¶17. Consider accelerating bodies where the net force 
exerted on an object is equal to its mass multiplied by its rate of 
acceleration. If F is the rate of acceleration of an object of a particular 
                                                          
16
 Whether this is a true law of nature is, nevertheless, debatable. 
17
 The kind of functional relationship must be specified of course. 
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PDVV DQG * LV WKH IRUFH DFWLQJ RQ WKDW REMHFW WKHQ WKH VWDWHPHQW µ)V
(different rates of acceleration of objects of that particular mass) are 
directly proportional to Gs (different magnitudes of force acting on the 
REMHFWV¶ORRNVWREHDWUXHODZ-statement. 
 Law-statements, then, can take a variety of semantic forms: some 
assert the properties certain objects must have; some express diachronic 
laws, and some express the functional relationship between object-
involving events and forces.18 It seems that specifying precise semantic 
conditions would rule out many propositions that we accept as expressing 
laws, and so perhaps it is best not to stipulate exact requirements for 
semantic structure. 
 Candidates for Necessary Conditions of Law-Statements 
2.5.1 One thing common to all the semantic forms suggested above is 
µXQLYHUVDOLW\¶,QWXLWLYHO\SURSRVLWLRQVOLNHµDOOREMHFWVin this room have a 
gravitational pull between them inversely proportional to the square of the 
GLVWDQFHEHWZHHQWKHP¶DUHQRW ODZ-like. Law-statements tend to be non-
local; that is, they tend not to refer to individuals, or specify groups of 
LQGLYLGXDOV µ$OO UDYHQV DUH EODFN¶ PD\ EH D ODZ RI QDWXUH ZKHUHDV µDOO
UDYHQV FDOOHG %HQ DUH EODFN¶ FRXOG QRW EH (see Mumford 2007: 43). 
Similarly, law-statements are never temporally restricted. However, there 
is extensive literature concerning ceteris paribus laws; that is, laws that 
allow of exceptions. I will discuss ceteris paribus laws in more detail 
below. 
2.5.2 Most philosophers suggest that law-statements, if they are to express laws, 
must express something with explanatory value and predictive power (or 
if the laws are the propositions, perhaps they should be something with 
explanatory and predictive power). Laws must either explain, or at least 
play an important role in explaining some phenomena in the world, and as 
a result allow us to make predictions about future states of affairs ± the 
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 The existence of forces, as a rather more abstract notion than that of massive objects, is a 
matter of contention. Even if we deny the actual existence of forces, however, they provide a 
useful mathematical tool that aids expressing uniformities. 
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ODZ RI FRQVHUYDWLRQ RI PRPHQWXP H[SODLQV WKH EHKDYLRXU RI µ1HZWRQ¶V
EDOOV¶ DQG DOORZV XV WR SUHGLFW ZKDW ZLOO KDSSHQ ZKHQ PDVVLYH REMHFWV
collide in the future. I take this to be absolutely of the essence of laws of 
nature (note though, that having explanatory and predictive power is not 
sufficient to be a law; Causes, for example, can explain, and 
understanding what causes what can also help us to make predictions).  
2.5.3 Laws are also usually seen to bH REMHFWLYH ,Q 9DQ )UDDVVHQ¶V ZRUGV
µ:KHWKHU RU QRW VRPHWKLQJ LV D ODZ LV HQWLUHO\ LQGHSHQGHQW RI RXU
knowledge, belief, state of opinion, interests, or any other sort of 
HSLVWHPRORJLFDORUSUDJPDWLFIDFWRU¶YDQ)UDDVVHQ0RVWZRXOG
think the Law of Gravitation is a law irrespective of whether or not anyone 
is around to observe or make inferences about the behaviour of massive 
objects.  
2.5.4 Law-statements should avoid expressing tautologies and other analytic 
truths; the laws expressed should be discovered empirically, so 
SURSRVLWLRQVOLNHµDOOEDFKHORUVDUHXQPDUULHGPHQ¶FDQQRWEHFRQVLGHUHG
law-statements. 
2.5.5 The true law-statements must be consistent with one another ± this is just 
an assumption I am willing to make. 
2.6  Properties in Laws  
Laws involve properties ± of the metaphysical positions I discuss, laws 
either describe, supervene upon, or simply are relations between 
properties. It is important, therefore, to have an idea of what a property is. 
The metaphysical work to be done is extensive, and this will be the main 
focus of all the metaphysical analyses. Conceptually, though, I think we 
can see properties as qualities we can attribute to things in our world that 
make for similarities and differences with other things in our world. If two 
things share all the same properties, then they will be qualitatively 
identical. If they share very few, they will be very different indeed. I 
assume for the rest of this thesis that the attributes I list below are central 
to our concept of properties and property-terms: 
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1. Each property term refers to a unique quality  
2. Two objects that share a property X are qualitatively similar in the X-
UHVSHFW 7ZR REMHFWV LQVWDQWLDWLQJ WKH SURSHUW\ µUHGQHVV¶ ERWK ORRN
red.) 
3. Two objects that share all the same properties aside from 
spatiotemporal properties are qualitatively identical, but distinct.  
4. Properties can play causal/nomological roles in the world 
5. Properties are objective features of the world, independent of our 
identification of them. 
 The vocabulary used in law-statements should refer purely to 
natural properties19. What makes a property a natural property is 
contentious ± but whatever conception of natural property one adopts, 
roughly the same properties end up being the natural ones. Often, 
naturalness is seen to cRPHLQGHJUHHVWKHSURSHUW\µIUDJLOLW\¶PLJKWEHD
natural property, but it is not as natural aVWKHSURSHUW\µPDVV¶7KLVUDLVHV 
the question: ³how natural must a property be for it to be included in law-
statements?´ The answer to this question depends, I think, on whether one 
is willing to accept a hierarchy of laws, and perhaps also on whether one is 
willing to allow for ceteris paribus laws. Again, these issues shall be 
addressed in greater detail in subsequent chapters. 
2.7  Must Laws Govern (Extrinsically)? 
One of the more contentious debates about the role laws are supposed to 
play is that concerning whether or not laws must govern their instances. 
Firstly though, I must explain what I mean E\µJRYHUQ¶LQWKLVFRQWH[W.  
 There are a few metaphysical interpretations of what a governing 
law might be, but Armstrong sees a world full of intrinsically inert objects, 
with extrinsic governing laws that affect these objects in such a way that 
they move around in accordance a set of rules.  Imagine governing laws as 
µmagical invisible fairies ZLWKDUXOHERRN¶ - they push and pull the objects 
in the system around, working in perfect harmony with one another by 
                                                          
19
 For a discussion of natural properties see chapter 5 
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following the rule-books (for some the rules may differ in different 
worlds).  
However, just as with causation, on the face of it, all we see are 
UHJXODULWLHV:HFHUWDLQO\GRQ¶WVHHDQ\Pagical fairies with rule-books. A 
discussion of the nature of governing laws will be provided in later 
chapters, but conceptually, a governing law is extrinsic to objects, and 
ensures that these objects move in the way that they do. The governing 
conception is therefore one option for those who want that elusive 
metaphysical glue20. 
 This contrasts with the non-governing conceptions of laws, in 
which there are neither magical invisible fairies, nor anything playing the 
role the fairies are supposed to play. Laws, in the case of non-governing 
laws, are generally seen as a special set of propositions that best describe 
the world ± ZKDW¶V LQ LW DQGKRZ WKHVH WKLQJVEHKDYH ,Q WKLV sense, the 
laws depend on the evolution of the physical system, rather than the other 
way around. 
 The issues with the non-governing conception of laws arise 
elsewhere. Many claim that if laws are just propositions that describe, then 
they cannot play the other roles laws are supposed to. For example: 
statements, it is argued, could never play any significant role in 
explanation, but playing a role in explaining phenomena is a fundamental 
requirement of being a law. I shall not spend any time here discussing 
these objections, but in the next chapter I provide a number of arguments 
in response. Statements corresponding to states of affairs can, I argue, play 
an explanatory role.  
 The issue of whether laws govern is of great importance in a 
metaphysical analysis of laws. But our concept of law does not obviously 
include a governing aspect, neither does it obviously exclude a governing 
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 Note that what does the governing need not be anything in addition to the natural properties 
 W Alexander Bird, for example, argues that laws supervene on first-order natural properties.  
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aspect. In light of this, any de dicto arguments against there being laws in 
YLUWXHRIWKHUHEHLQJQRµJRYHUQLQJHQWLW\¶, shall not be admitted.  
2.8  Ceteris Paribus Laws 
The concept of law, I claimed, includes their universality; that is, genuine 
laws hold at all times and all places. But when we actually look at specific 
examples of laws, this basic assumption looks imprecise at best. In the 
special sciences, there are plenty of laws that require ceteris paribus 
clauses; that is, they require a little addendum to the effect of: µif all else is 
KHOG FRQVWDQW¶ ,Q HFRQRPLFV IRU H[DPSOH WKHUH DUH µODZV¶ FRQFHUQLQJ
supply and demand. Keep the supply of a commodity constant, increase 
demand, and keep all else constant (no corruption etc), then the price of 
that commodity will rise. This thesis, however, is about laws of nature, 
and the law of supply and demand is not a law of nature. Our concept of 
laws in the special/social sciences might allow for ceteris paribus laws, 
whilst our concept of fundamental laws of nature does not.  
 Many philosophers, however, argue that there are such laws in 
nature - in fact, some go so far as to say all or nearly all our laws require 
ceteris paribus clauses (Cartwright 1995: 155). But does our concept of 
law allow for exceptions?  
There are two GLVWLQFWZD\VRILQWHUSUHWLQJµH[FHSWLRQV¶,ZLVKWRVSHOORXW
here:  
The first is that there can be laws that do not hold universally: 
µHQHUJ\LVDOZD\VFRQVHUYHG¶FRXOGEHDODZHYHQLI WKHUHDUHRFFDVLRQDO
instances of energy not being conserved. It is not obvious, some claim, 
that one exception should prevent a statement from being a law - consider 
a Humean wRUOGZKHUH(LQVWHLQ¶VHTXDWLRQVFRUUHFWO\GHVFULEHGWKHZRUOG
for the whole of eternity, except at one spacetime point. Should we really 
UXOH(LQVWHLQ¶VHTXDWLRQVRXWDVODZVEHFDXVHRIWKLV one counter-example? 
'HVSLWHWKHLQLWLDOWHPSWDWLRQWRµOHWWKDWRQHH[FHSWLRQIO\¶LWVHHPVWRPH
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that as universality is such a well-entrenched condition of lawhood, we 
VKRXOGQRWWDNH(LQVWHLQ¶VHTXDWLRQVWREHODZVLQWKLVZRUOG 
 The second allows for laws to hold universally by introducing a 
ceteris paribus clause into the law itself ± there are thus no exceptions to 
the law, only exceptions to what the law would be without the ceteris 
paribus clause. Those philosophers that argue all laws are ceteris paribus 
in this respect tend to use examples like the forces between an electron 
and a proton, and how they will move towards one another - because there 
are nearly always interfering factors (other charged objects in the physical 
system etc), our predictions about where they will be at certain times can 
be incorrect if we use purely the laws of electromagnetism, despite these 
being universally accepted law of nature. However, it seems to me that 
this is not a genuine ceteris paribus law. The law of electromagnetism 
always holds, even without the ceteris paribus clause - our predictions are 
only incorrect insofar as we have failed to factor in other universally 
holding laws and states of affairs. The laws do not correspond to the 
actual movements/accelerations/charges of things, but to what might be 
GHVFULEHG DV WKH µaccelaratory YHFWRULDO FRQWULEXWLRQV¶ WKRVH ODZV PDNH 
The law of electromagnetism gives us a constant, fixed vectorial 
contribution for the movement of an object. But counteracting vectorial 
contributions from other laws also contribute to the motion of an object. It 
might be a law that two protons repel one another, but protons also have 
mass, and are thus subject to gravitational forces from other massive 
objects. Suppose there is an uncharged massive object in between two 
protons placed in such a way that the attractive gravitational force cancels 
out the repulsive electromagnetic force. In this case, the vectorial 
contributions WR WKHSURWRQV¶PRWLRQPDGHE\ WKHFKDUJH LVSUHFLVHO\ WKH
same as if the massive object was not present, but the vectorial 
contribution of the massive object of the same strength but opposite 
direction means the protons remain motionless. When it comes to the 
fundamental laws, all µH[FHSWLRQV¶VHHPWREHRIWKLVNLQG± but these are 
not really exceptions at all 
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 We might claim that our concept of laws involves a hierarchy of 
fundamentality: the laws of physics are more fundamental than the laws of 
biology. The laws of biology or economics may admit of exceptions, but it 
seems to me that at the most fundamental level, the laws always contribute 
the same in any situation. In this thesis I regularly use non-fundamental 
examples to make my arguments clear, but ultimately I assume that our 
concept of fundamental laws of nature rules out ceteris paribus laws; 
fundamental laws must not allow for exceptions, as this is part of our 
concept of a fundamental law. I therefore take it to be a de dicto necessary 
truth that there are no fundamental ceteris paribus laws. 
 
Chapter 2, Part III:  Laws and Causation Explaining Together 
 
In this final part of my conceptual analysis of cause and law I discuss 
certain areas where I believe that our concepts of cause and law come 
together. In particular, I firstly claim that all the conceptual (and indeed, it 
will turn out, metaphysical) analyses of causation are in some way 
dependent on laws. Secondly, I demonstrate why I believe that both cause 
and law play a role in our explanations of events and property 
instantiations.  
2.9.1 Physical or Metaphysical Necessity in our Concept of Causation? 
There are those who believe that real laws must be extrinsic governing 
aspects of reality: that laws provide the metaphysical necessity in the 
world, and that, in a sense, laws determine what causes what; there are 
those who believe in necessaU\ FRQQHFWLRQV µLQ WKH REMHFWV¶ - that the 
metaphysical necessity derives from the intrinsic properties of 
particulars21; and there are also those who believe that there is no 
metaphysical necessity whatsoever, but there are laws and causal events 
                                                          
21
 ŝƌĚ ?ƐďĞůŝĞǀĞƐƚŚĞƌĞĐĂŶďĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŝŶŐůĂǁƐƚŚĂƚƐƵƉĞƌǀĞŶĞŽŶƚŚĞŝŶƚƌŝŶƐŝĐƉƌŽƉĞƌƚŝĞƐŽĨƚŚŝŶgs, 
but more on this in chapter 7. 
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nonetheless. The question I want to ask now is: given that there are 
necessary connections in our concept of causation, what kind of necessity, 
if any, is required? 
 In the conditional account of causation provided by Mackie, he 
talks of causes being necessary for their effects. But Mackie does not ask 
any questions concerning whether effects follow necessarily from their 
FDXVHVQRULQSDUWLFXODUZKDWWKHQDWXUHRIWKLVµQHFHVVLW\¶ZRXOGEH)RU
X to be a cause of Y, must Y occur as a matter of logical, metaphysical, or 
logical necessity (or indeed, with any kind of necessity at all)? It is my 
intention in this section, to show that our concept of causation, if it 
requires necessity at all, only requires physical necessity. 
 There is a clear dichotomy between those who think there is 
metaphysLFDOJOXHµFRQVWUDLQLQJ¶QDWXUHDQGWKRVHZKRWKLQNWKHUHLVMXVW
one discrete event followed by another, but the arguments concerning 
whether or not there is metaphysical glue in the world are distinct from the 
arguments concerning whether or not there is metaphysical glue in the 
concept of causation. There is, as we shall see, some kind of necessity 
involved in our concepts of cause and law, but what kind of necessity is 
involved is not a trivial matter. There are three main options: 
1. Physical necessary connections 
2. Metaphysical necessary connections 
3. No necessity is required 
I think nearly everyone agrees that our concept of causation involves some 
kind of necessary connection between causes and effects (or at least 
EHWZHHQ FDXVHV DQG VRPH µWHQGHQF\¶ WR SURduce an effect), so it is 
reasonable to rule out option (3); if our concept requires events to satisfy 
(2), then, de dicto, only the anti-Humean ontologies could ever have 
causation ± in which case if we do live in a Humean world, it would be a 
world without causation (this will be more upsetting to some than others!); 
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if only (1) is required, then there can be causation in Humean as well as 
anti-Humean worlds.  
 The necessitarians will no-doubt jump to conclusion number (2) ± 
that there is something out thHUHLQWKHZRUOGWKDWµJOXHV¶FHUWDLQSURSHUWLHV
or events together. But for 'DYLG+XPH VKRZVXV LW¶V IDU IURPREYLRXV
WKDW ZH FDQ HYHQ JLYH WKH WHUP µQHFHVVDU\ FRQQHFWLRQ LQ WKH REMHFWV¶
(µPHWDSK\VLFDO QHFHVVDU\ FRQQHFWLRQV¶ DQ\ SRVLWLYH FRQWHQW. If the 
concept of causation (i) includes necessary connections, (ii) we accept that 
we have no intelligible idea of necessary connections in the objects, and 
(iii) we disDYRZ+XPH¶VYLHZWKDWZHKDYHWKHNLQGRI idea of necessary 
connection required (that is, we do not accept that necessity in the mind is 
sufficient), then the concept of causation is incoherent ± it has a necessary 
condition of which we have no contentful idea. But our concept of 
causation is not incoherent. Hume provides us with an account of 
necessary connections that deals with this problem: the necessary 
connection between distinct existences is really just the belief that the 
effect will inevitably occur given the cause, or a projection of our habits of 
inference, induced by the observation of constant conjunctions between 
similar events. 
 One believes that µFLUFXPVWDQFHV < LV LQHYLWDEOH JLYHQ
circumstances X (or one projects our habits of inference onto the objects) 
if one believes that, given circumstances X, circumstances Y had to 
RFFXU¶, or in other words: µDOO ;V DUH IROORZHG E\ <V¶ - leaving out the 
more specific modal features of this claim for the time being, it should 
becoPH DSSDUHQW WKDW µinevitability¶, or the projection of a habit of 
inference (as I interpret it), and thus the idea of necessary connection, is 
closely connected to the concept of law, in so far as both are tied to 
universally quantified statements. If one believes that all Xs are followed 
by Ys is a law, then one believes that Y is inevitable given X. As we shall 
see in the next chapter, for the naïve regularity theorist, this translates into: 
RQHEHOLHYHVWKDWµY inevitably follows ;¶LIRQHEHOLHYHVWKDWµDOO;VDUH
folORZHGE\<V¶LVDODZRIQDWXUH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(a) Y inevitably follows X if X causes Y 
(b) Causes are instances of laws 
(c) All Xs are followed by Ys is a law 
 Hume concluded that the idea of necessary connections in the 
objects is unintelligible, and as I show in chapter 3, he concludes that 
causation is just a matter of regularities in nature. The necessitarians think 
there is something in the world that makes event Y have to follow event X 
in a metaphysically meaty sense ± a metaphysical glue. I believe, though, 
that Hume was right in thinking the necessity required in our concept of 
causation is linked with thoughts of inevitability, and furthermore that that 
inevitability is linked to the notion of law. 
Physical or Metaphysic Necessity?  
Argument 1: 
Firstly I must consider what comes first: our concept of law, or our 
concept of causation; in other words, which of these concepts is 
µFRQFHSWXDOO\SULRU¶" 
*LYHQ WKDW , DFFHSW VRPHWKLQJ OLNH 0DFNLH¶V inus conditions 
conceptual account of causation, we must have a concept of 
counterfactuals in order to make sense of our concept of causation. 
Although I accept that a child may undersWDQG WKDW LI VKH KDGQ¶W IDOOHQ
GRZQVKHZRXOGQ¶WKDYH IHOWSDLQ , QRQHWKHOHVV WKLQN WKHFRXQWHUIDFWXDO
analysis of causation involves an implicit reliance on the notion of law. In 
accepting the conditional analysis, it seems to me that in the context of our 
conception of causation, whether one event is inevitable, or necessitated 
by another, can be seen as determined by the states of affairs at the time of 
the proposed cause of the event, and the true law-statements of the actual 
world. Furthermore I believe that both the Humean and the necessitarian 
can accept this conclusion. All we need to get our necessity, then, are 
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basic law-statements and some rules of inference ± no metaphysical glue 
is required, only physical necessity. 
Argument 2: 
If our concept of causation requires there to be metaphysical necessity in 
the world, then a Humean world is a world without causation. Of course, 
most inhabitants of a Humean world qualitatively similar to ours (that is, 
one with apparent universal regularities) would have a concept of 
causation, and they would all believe there to be causation in their world, 
but they would all be wrong. 
 For me this is an unacceptable conclusion. When conducting a 
conceptual analysis of causation, we start by identifying causal events, and 
then discovering what features link them all together. It is possible that 
after a general analysis, certain events that were considered causal before 
are no longer considered causal ± we might discover that the effect fails to 
satisfy the inus conditions requirements, for example. In the case of 
causation, I will assume my success theory is justified. In some cases, a 
conceptual analysis of X may well lead us to conclude that there are no Xs 
(we have a concept of fairies, and yet we can conclude that there are no 
fairies). However, if we were to come up with a conceptual account of 
causation that, following a metaphysical analysis, lead us to conclude that 
there was no causation in the world, then I believe something must have 
gone wrong with our analysis. It might be argued that metaphysical 
necessity is required for causation, but if one concluded that we live in a 
world without metaphysical glue, then one would be forced to concede 
that there is no causation. It is, I believe, de dicto necessary that ours is a 
world with causation, not least because causal roles are de dicto necessary 
conditions for so many of the things we identify as kinds, or as 
individuals.  
Nonetheless, it is also de dicto necessary that a world with 
causation is a world with necessary connections (in one sense or another). 
To overcome this apparent difficulty, we can claim that only physical 
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necessity is required. We do not need to know what laws are 
metaphysically, all we really need to get our necessity are some basic law-
statements and some rules of inference. The laws of nature are expressible 
as propositions ± the truthmakers of these propositions will differ 
depending on the metaphysical view of laws one endorses, but all parties 
should, I venture, come up with the same list of propositions as expressing 
(or being, in the case of those who feel laws just are those propositions) 
laws. I propose that the necessity in causation is a matter of logical 
entailment from propositions expressing states of affairs at the time of 
causal interaction, and the propositions expressing the laws of nature - the 
necessity required in causation is thus physical necessity alone, and this 
need not make any assumptions with respect to whether or not there is any 
metaphysical glue in the world.  
In the next section I show in more detail how physical laws are suited to 
playing the necessity required in our concept of causation. 
2.9.2 The Conceptual Role Played by Physical Necessity 
Suppose that there is a causal law at w captured by the law-VWDWHPHQW³all 
$V DUH LPPHGLDWHO\ IROORZHG E\ %V´ DQG WKDW DW WLPH t, A obtains. 
Naturally it follows through simple logical entailment that B must 
(immediately) obtain. B necessarily follows given A and the laws of 
nature, and is thus physically necessitated. If we assume that both the laws 
of nature, and the causally relevant state of affairs that obtain at any 
particular time can be captured entirely through carefully structured 
sentences, then any time one event is necessitated by another there will be 
a logical entailment similar to that above. If the entailment is not there, 
then we were wrong in supposing a causal connection between the events. 
An effect is therefore physically necessary in virtue of the laws of nature 
holding at w and the state of the physical system w at t, if and only if there 
is logical entailment from statements representing the relevant aspects of 
w. Of course the language these statements are written in need not be 
English, indeed generally mathematics is the language of the sciences. 
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However, it remains the case if a subsequent state X is physically 
necessitated, then X is entailed by the laws (as mathematical functions) 
and the initial state of the system (expressed mathematically). 
7KLVYLHZVHHPVWRFRUUHVSRQGZLWK'DYLG/HZLV¶VFRQFeption of physical 
QHFHVVLW\9DQ)UDDVVHQRXWOLQHV/HZLV¶VSRVLWLRQDVIROORZV 
World y is physically possible relative to world x exactly if the laws of x 
are all true in world y. 
It is physically necessary that A is true in world x if and only if A is true in 
every possible world which is physically possible relative to x. 
[Therefore]  it is physically necessary that A is true in world x if and only 
if A is implied by the laws of x. (van Fraassen 1989: 44) 
Van Fraassen finds this position somewhat unsatisfactory, however. He 
ZULWHV WKDW µ«LW LV KDUG WR HVFDSH WKH IHHOLQJ WKDW LI WKH FULWHULRQ >IRU
physical necessity] can be satisfactorily met in this way, then it must be 
GHYRLGRIDOOSUREDWLYHIRUFH'RHVQ¶W/HZLVPHHWWKHFULWHULRQE\UREELQJ
it of signiILFDQFH"¶van Fraassen 1989: 45). He thinks that the laws need 
to explain their instances and why something or some event is physically 
QHFHVVDU\ µDQGQRIDFWFDQH[SODLQDQ\WKLQJ WRZKLFK LW LVGHILQLWLRQDOO\
HTXLYDOHQW¶ ibid) It seems to me that the intuition that this semantic 
account does not capture physical necessity probably arises because 
physical necessity holds between events, not propositions.   
 But consider for the time being that for each statement expressing 
a state of affairs (denote this statement: O(r)), there is a corresponding 
state of affairs r, where O(r) is true at all and every world where r is the 
state of affairs. O(r) is thus the proposition that r is the state of affairs. We 
can then discover what events are physically necessitated by taking O(r), 
and deriving the logical entailments from these propositions and the law-
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statements22. Semantic entailment from statements corresponding to laws 
and to the state of a physical system at a particular time is therefore at the 
very least co-H[WHQVLYH ZLWK WKH HIIHFWV DV QHFHVVLWDWHG E\ µUHDO SK\VLFDO
QHFHVVLW\¶ZKDWHYHUWKDWPD\EH 
 These propositions have truthmakers, and although the Humeans 
might take the truthmakers to take the form of regularities, those holding 
alternative views might take the truthmakers to be metaphysically real 
natural necessitation relations, or the genuinely powerful dispositional 
properties of objects. Given that the holders of the various metaphysical 
conceptions of causation will have different truthmakers for their law-
statements, it seems to me that whatever metaphysical conception you 
hold, this account of necessity in causation could potentially be appealing 
to anyone. 
 What I have said so far only ascertains when an effect is 
necessitated. I have said nothing about picking out the individual causes of 
an event whatsoever. The list of propositions O(r1), O(r2), O(r3),...O(rn) ± 
which includes both the law-statements and propositions corresponding to 
the state of affairs at t - LVDQDORJRXVWR0DFNLH¶VµLQWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHV¶DV
discussed in chapter 1. If an event O(x) is sufficient in the circumstances 
for a causally subsequent event O(y), then under my account as set out 
thus far then x seems to contribute to the necessitation of y, and of course 
this need not be the case. Stating that the laws and the state of affairs must 
together entail the effect tells us when an effect is necessitated, but it does 
not tell us which of the propositions correspond to the actual causes of the 
effects.  To discover these we have to take a closer look at which of the 
                                                          
22
 This section is inspired and partly paraphrased from the relationship between counterfactual 
dependence among events and their corresponding propositions in Lewis (Lewis: 1973). Lewis 
ǁƌŝƚĞƐ  ?dŽĂŶǇƉŽƐƐŝďůĞĞǀĞŶƚĞ ?ƚŚere corresponds a proposition O(e) that holds in all and only 
those worlds where e occurs. This O(e) is the proposition that e occurs... Counterfactual 
dependence among events is simply the corresponding counterfactual dependence among the 
corresponding prŽƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ?Lewis 1973: 186) 
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propositions representing states of affairs at t are causally relevant, and 
given my account, this will mean selecting which events contribute to the 
logical entailment. Consider the example provided at the beginning again 
EXWZLWKWKHH[WUDSURSRVLWLRQµ;RFFXUVDWW¶6RQRZZHKDYH 
Law 1:   All As are followed by Bs 
State of affairs 1: A occurs 
State of affairs 2: X occurs 
Conclusion:  B occurs 
Although X is included in the state of affairs at t in w, it does not 
contribute to the entailment of B, and thus cannot be considered causally 
relevant. Remember how in section 2.2 the unfortunate Bob died when 
struck by a tidal wave. The propositions corresponding to the total state of 
affairs at t and the law-statements would have together semantically 
HQWDLOHG %RE¶V GHDWK EXW %RE VWXEELQJ KLV WRH DW t also featured in the 
states of affairs, and so, in the circumstances, Bob stubbing his toe may 
look to contribute to his death (as it was, in the circumstances, sufficient), 
ZKHQ RI FRXUVH LW GRHVQ¶W :H FRXOG UHPRYH WKH SURSRVLWLRQV
corresponding to the toe-VWXEELQJDOWRJHWKHUDQGDVZLWKµ6WDWHRIDIIDLUV
¶DERYHWKHUHZRXOGEHQRGLIIHUHQFHWRWKHUHVXOW7KLVWKHQLVWKHPDUN
of causal relevance in my account. Once we have the total list of 
propositions O(r1), O(r2), O(r3),...O(rn) we can identify the entailment, 
and then remove any propositions that do not alter the conclusion. The 
aspects of reality corresponding to these propositions were not causally 
relevant. 
 The same may apply to laws, of course. There may be causally 
redundant laws included in the set of laws applying at any world when 
considering one particular causal event. However, as science has 
progressed the number of fundamental laws has decreased, and it may 
well end up being the case that one single fundamental law could be 
applied to any state of affairs and provide the right entailments in any 
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singular case. Whether this will turn out to be the case or not is a moot 
point, however, so long as the existing set of laws (even if unnecessarily 
large) correctly describes the evolution of the physical system. Causes can 
only be states of affairs (whether they be diachronic or synchronic), the 
laws are constants that help us pick out which of these states of affairs are 
causally relevant. 
 There may be complications, however. Consider the bullet that 
killed John F Kennedy (JFK). Now suppose I determine (fairly 
UHDVRQDEO\WKHSUHVHQFHRI WKDWEXOOHW LQ-).¶VEUDLQDW t to be causally 
relevant to his death. If the proposition corresponding to the presence of 
this bullet is O(r1) FOHDUO\ , FDQ¶W UHPRYH O(r1) from my set of 
SURSRVLWLRQV DQG UHWDLQ WKH VHPDQWLF HQWDLOPHQW RI -).¶V GHDWK DW t. 
However, now suppose I go more fine grained than this, and provide every 
minute local particular matter of fact with its own proposition.  There 
would be a proposition corresponding to the presence of every 
microscopic particle in that bullet. O(r1) would just be shorthand for all 
the propositions corresponding to all the microscopic particles in the 
bullet. Let us suppose O(r1) is the proposition representing the 
conjunction of propositions: O(r1*), O(r1**), O(r1***),... (the O(r1) list), 
where this list contains a billion members. Of course, individually, any 
member of this list FRXOG EH UHPRYHG DQG -).¶V GHDWK ZRXOG VWLOO EH
HQWDLOHG ,QGHHGPDQ\ WKRXVDQGVFRXOGEH UHPRYHGDWD WLPHDQG-).¶V
GHDWKZRXOGVWLOOEHHQWDLOHG%XWWKH\FRXOGQ¶WDOORUPRVWO\EHUHPRYHG
at the same time, as this would be to remove the bullet altogether, which 
we have already said would result in the state of affairs expressed as 
propositions not entailing -).¶VGHDWK6RZKLFKRI WKHSURSRVLWLRQV WKH
O(r1) list correspond to the causally relevant aspects of reality? If we split 
O(r1) into two propositions, O(rx) and O(ry), where the former relates to 
the left hand side of the bullet, and the latter to the right hand side. 
5HPRYLQJRQHRIWKHWZRZRXOGQRWDIIHFWWKHILQDOUHVXOWRI-).¶VGHDWK
as either one is sufficient for this effect. We have a classic case of 
overdetermination, and so following Mackie, I just have to conclude that 
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both are causally relevant. Despite the aspects of reality corresponding to 
the propositions O(r1*) etc being insufficieQW IRU %RE¶V GHDWK PDQ\
smaller lists taken from the O(r1) list refer to aspects of reality that are. 
There is a FOHDUUHVHPEODQFHWR0DFNLH¶V cases of overdetermination here, 
and so I must conclude that every member of the O(r1) list corresponds to 
a  causally relevant state of affairs.   
 Perhaps it should be mentioned that of course there will be many 
propositions representing states of affairs that really are relevant in the 
entailment of the effect-event, many of which we may not generally 
consider to be the causes. Although this will be the case, we should refer 
to the discussion provided by Mackie. Any of these propositions will 
correspond to one conjunct of the conjunction of causes sufficient for an 
effect. Any individual conjunct can correctly be identified as an inus 
condition. 
 In summary, if metaphysical necessity is required then only anti-
Humean worlds would be worlds with causation. Clearly we (as human 
beings) have a concept of causation, and if (a) our concept of causation 
requires metaphysical necessity, and (b) our world is a Humean world, 
then ours is a world without causation. However if physical necessity is all 
WKDW¶VQHHGHGDEURDGO\+XPHDQFRQFHSWLRQZRUOGVZLWKRXWPHWDSK\VLFDO
glue) could still capture causation perfectly well. It seems to me firstly that 
even if we knew this was a Humean world, we would still have a concept 
of causation that has application to it, and secondly that we can achieve 
this by requiring only physical necessity. 
2.10 Laws and Causation in Explanation 
When we are asked to explain something (and let us stick to events for the 
time being), or when we are asked why a particular event occurred, we 
generally know what kind of things to look out for in order to provide a 
response, and what kind of responses are expected. If I found P\ FDU¶V
front windscreen smashed, I could conjure up a number of possible 
H[SODQDWLRQV ³VRPHERG\ KLW LW ZLWK D EDVHEDOO EDW´ ³VRPHERG\ WKUHZ D
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EULFNDWLW´ ³DFULFNHWEDOOKLWWKHZLQGRZ´HWF These are, at least at first 
sight, ZKDW , ZRXOG FDOO µdirect causal explanatLRQV¶ ± where a direct 
explanation is one whereby given the explanans and the laws, the 
explanandum had to occur23. Each of these direct explanations could (in 
principle) be perfectly good explanations of the state of my car.   
 But these direct causal explanations are not the only explanations I 
PLJKWKDYHJLYHQ&RQVLGHUWKHIROORZLQJ³, stupidly left a 50 pound note 
RQWKHGDVKERDUG´³, stupidly OHIWWKHFDURXWVLGHDQLJKWFOXELQ%UL[WRQ´
³, stupidly parked QH[W WR D FULFNHW SLWFK´ 7KHVH DUH DOVR SRVsible 
explanations, but my parking next to a cricket pitch plus the laws did not 
necessitate my windscreen smashing, so it is not a direct causal 
explanation. It is, though, a causal explanation nonetheless. It was because 
I left a 50 pound note on the dashboard that the thief took a baseball bat to 
it... %RWK³the windsFUHHQZDVKLWE\DEDVHEDOOEDW´DQG³,VWXSLGO\OHIWD
SRXQGQRWHRQWKHGDVKERDUG´ are acceptable explanations, so we must 
recognise already that (a) not all explanations are direct causal 
explanations, and (b) there can be more than one explanation for an event. 
 It might be tempting to say that all events causally relevant to 
event X can serve as explanations for X, but from an intuitive perspective 
at least, this does not seem right. ,I , ZDV DVNHG ³ZK\ ZDV \RXU
windscreHQ VPDVKHG´ DQG , UHVSRQGHG ³%HFDXVH WZR million years ago 
P\ DQFHVWRU %REE\ DWH  JUDPV RI R\VWHUV´ , ZRXOG QR GRXEW JHW D
strange look. But if Bobby eating those oysters had not caused his feeling 
an aphrodisiac effect, which in turn caused his sexual activities that night, 
and so on, then I would not have been around 2 million years later to leave 
the 50 pound note on the front windscreen. 
 Here, though, I think we need to make a distinction between two 
differeQWZD\VRI LQWHUSUHWLQJµH[SODQDWLRQ¶7KHILUVWZD\RILQWHUSUHWLQJ
                                                          
23
 Of course, one can hit a window softly and it would not smash, or one could had bullet-proof 
glass and it would not smash, or there could be other finks/antidotes  W suffice to say, a direct 
explanation is one where the explanan plus the laws necessitate the explanandum. As a matter 
ŽĨĨĂĐƚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞŵĂǇďĞǀĞƌǇŐĞŶƵŝŶĞ ?ĚŝƌĞĐƚĐĂƵƐĂůĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? 
62 
 
µH[SODQDWLRQ¶LVWRVHHLWDVDQDFW± a response to a question, either written, 
spoken, using sign-language, or any other means of communication to 
whomever asked the why-question. The second way of interpreting 
µH[SODQDWLRQ¶ LV WR VHH LW DV MXVWDSURSRVLWLRQZLWKH[SODQDWRU\YDOXH In 
the case above, it might in fact be right to say this was an explanation in 
the second sense. The example above does seem to provide some 
explanatory information, even though eating oysters was by no means 
sufficient cause for my windscreen being smashed. However, when my 
friend asks me why an event happened, he is not looking for any old piece 
of causally relevant information ± only what Lewis would call the most 
µVDOLHQW¶ELWVRILQIRUPDWLRQLQWKHFLUFXPVWDQFes, and bits of information 
hitherto unknown by my friend. 
 Not all propositions expressing causes, then, are considered to be 
good H[SODQDWLRQVLQWKHµDFW¶VHQVHIRU their effects ± but it seems clear 
to me that causes are good candidates for explanations. But are all 
explanations causal explanations? When it comes to explaining events, 
David Lewis thinks so. For Lewis: 
LE To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history 
(Lewis 1986: 217) 
)RU /HZLV DQ HYHQW¶V FDXVDO KLVWRU\ FRQVLVWV RI WKH YDVW QXPEHU RI
perhaps infinitely long causal chains that lead to it, and when we are asked 
why an event happened, we should take it as a request for us to provide a 
part of that causal history. But this seems to rule out a number of 
intuitively plausible explanations. For example, laws might be thought to 
explain events. I might cite the law of gravity as an explanation for my 
wallet falling to the ground, for example. But Lewis can respond that 
either (a) I have failed to explain this event, as the recipient is already 
aware of this information (and hence the information is not salient), or (b) 
if it explains at all, it does so as a part of a causal explanation - µLW
provide(s) a peculiar kind of information about the causal history of the 
H[SODQDQGXP¶/HZLV   
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 Given my conclusions regarding the concept of causation, I can 
also cash out the causal conceptual analysis of explanation in terms of 
counterfactuals. For Lewis an event is explained in terms of causal 
GHSHQGHQFH ZKLFK KH WDNHV µWR EH FRXQWHUIDFWXDO GHSHQGHQFH RI D
suitably non-EDFNWUDFNLQJ VRUW EHWZHHQ GLVWLQFW HYHQWV¶ /HZLV 
216), where the antecedent explains the consequent. This counterfactual 
dependence already demonstrates how laws must play a role in 
explanation, as laws are required in order for us to judge the truth-values 
of counterfactuals; but this counterfactual account of explanation, I think, 
also captures why we thinN µWKH ODZ RI JUDYLW\¶ FDQ Verve as an 
explanation in itself. A law can, on the face of it, feature as the 
explanatory antecedent in a counterfactual where the consequent is 
dependent on the explanands. )RUH[DPSOHµLf the law of gravity failed to 
hold for the few seconds after I let go of my wallet, then my wallet would 
not have fallen to the ground¶.  
 Whether or not laws are suited to featuring in these counterfactuals 
from a metaphysical perspective, or whether it is feasible to judge the 
truth-values of these counterfactuals is another matter, but conceptually 
VSHDNLQJDWOHDVWWRDVNµZKDWZRXOGKDYHKDSSHQHGLISURSRVLWLRQp, had 
QRW EHHQ D ODZ"¶ Ls a reasonable question, so it seems to me that 
(conceptually) laws can be explanations in themselves (note that Lewis 
does not deny this, he just states that a law in an explanatory context must 
DOVRJLYHXVSDUWRIWKHH[SODQDQGXP¶VFDXVDOKLVWRU\   
 This discussion of explanation in cause and law will be continued 
in later chapters, but for the time being I would like to conclude that an 
adequate act of explaining will provide the recipient with the most salient 
piece of explanatory information - where, just as in the case of causal 
dependence, explanatory information can be cashed out in terms of 
counterfactual dependence. Arguably, all the truths upon which the 
explanandum depends have explanatory value of some sort (some weaker 
than others), but many of these pieces of information will be unsuitable for 
use in acts of explaining. 
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2.11 The Distinction Between Laws of Nature and Causal Laws, and an 
Introduction to Regularity Theory 
 
In this thesis I regularly use WKHWHUPVµFDXVDOODZ¶DQGµODZRIQDWXUH¶EXW
there is an important distinction between the two as their compatibility 
with different metaphysical theories of causation varies. This will become 
particularly apparent in chapter 3, which focuses on regularity theory of 
cause and law. 
 By causal law, in the broad sense, I mean a proposition or rule 
which all relevant object-involving causal processes abide by. For merely 
descriptive purposes, it may be helpful to think of these propositions as 
applying only to object-involving interactions, where one event seems in 
VRPHZD\WRµSURGXFH¶WKHRWKHU24.  For example, it may be a causal law 
that hydrogen combusts in the presence of oxygen and an open flame, as 
bringing a lit match to the gas seems to produce the explosion. Why this is 
the case (should there be a reason) is a matter for debate, and depends 
partly upon which metaphysical view of laws one adopts.  
 The set of causal laws is a subset of the set of laws of nature, but 
the latter is not entirely constituted by members of the former. Causal 
laws, as stated above, are rules applying specifically to object-involving 
causal processes; event a causing event b would involve a causal law. 
Laws of nature, need not directly involve causal processes (although there 
may be causal processes underlying them). It may be a law of nature, for 
example, that all ravens are black, or that all electrons have charge -1 
(note that this cannot be an analytic/de dicto truth, it must be true de re). 
This would not be a causal law, as no immediate causal process is 
involved - neither ravens, electrons, colours nor charge-values are 
processes$ODZRIQDWXUHFDQµEHWKRXJKWRIDVDXQLYHUVDOO\TXDQWified 
conditional, ׊[)[ĺ*[, which says that anything that has the property F 
                                                          
24
 tĞǁŝůůůĂƚĞƌƐĞĞƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐ ?ƉƌŽĚƵĐŝŶŐ ?ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶŝƐƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐĐůĂŝŵĞĚƚŽďĞĂŶƵŶũƵƐƚŝĨŝĞĚ
ĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞ ?ƉƌŽĚƵĐŝŶŐ ?ĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨƚŚĞĐĂƵƐĂůŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶŝƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞŵŝŶĚ ? ?ŶŽƚŝŶƚŚĞ
objects themselves 
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KDVWKHSURSHUW\*¶0XPIRUG7KLVPD\LQFOXGHWKHGLDFKURQLF
causal laws, but also synchronic, non-causal laws of nature.  
 7KHGHILQLWLRQVRIµFDXVDOODZ¶DQGµODZRIQDWXUH¶SURYLGHGDERYH
are indicative of a difference between the regularity theory of causation, 
and the regularity theory of laws of nature. As Armstrong explains 
(Armstrong 1983:11), those that support the regularity theory of causation 
must consider a causal connection to involve both the reduction of cause 
to law (that is, of the universally quantified conditional variety), and the 
reduction of laws to mere regularities. Reducing causal connections to 
nomic connections of this kind would mean acceptLQJWKDWFDXVDOµODZVDUH
QRWKLQJEXWUHJXODULWLHVLQWKHQDWXUHRIWKLQJV¶25 (ibid).  
 However, it is possible to dismiss the regularity theory of 
causation, whilst accepting the regularity theory of laws of nature, by 
denying that one can reduce cause to law; that is, by claiming that there is 
more to causation than nomic connection26. A regularity theorist of laws 
of nature could accept ׊[)[ĺ*[ to adequately represent laws 
concerning ravens and blackness and so forth, but deny that the same can 
be done for causation. The regularity theory of causation thus entails the 
regularity theory of laws of nature, but the regularity theory of laws of 
nature does not entail the regularity theory of causation. Indeed, this is 
HYLGHQWLQ'DYLG/HZLV¶VZRUN27. 
 The list of five conditions for laws set out in section 1.9, and the 
short discussion of causal laws and laws of nature that follows, is far from 
complete, but a complete list and explication of the two concepts is not 
required for the time being. I have provided these only to give some idea 
of the kind of propositions we will be considering in detail in later 
                                                          
25
 EŽƚĞƚŚĂƚ ?ŶŽŵŝĐ ?ŚĞƌĞƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽǁŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŐƵůĂƌŝƚǇƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚǁŽƵůĚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŶŽŵŝĐ ?ĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚ
to what Armstring would consider nomic. A mere regularity is not a nomic connection for 
Armstrong. 
26
 Of course, even those that deny that causal laws are reducible to laws of nature, would accept 
that the realisations of many causal laws are consistent with the universally quantified 
conditionals of the regularity theorist. 
27
 Lewis holding a regularity theory of laws, but a counterfactual account of singular causation. 
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chapters. I believe these propositions will turn out to be central to both the 
conceptual and metaphysical analyses of causation. 
2.12 Conclusions 
In this chapter I have considered a number of conceptions of causation: 
0DFNLH¶V FRQGLWLRQDO DFFRXQW  - one that picks out the actual events we 
consider to be the causes as insufficient but non-redundant part(s) of an 
unnecessary EXW VXIILFLHQW FRQGLWLRQ RI WKHLU HIIHFWV /HZLV¶V
counterfactual account that determines which events are causal by 
reference to a close possible world, in which that world is left to evolve in 
accordance with the laws of the actual world from the moment it diverges 
from actuality; and the dispositional account which states that a causal 
interaction occurs when dispositional properties are manifested under 
certain stimulus conditions. I have claimed that each of these accounts is 
closely linked with laws, and this should come as no surprise when we 
FRQVLGHU WKH IXQFWLRQ RI FDXVDO VWDWHPHQWV .LP VXJJHVWV WKH µFRPPRQ
contexts in which we engage in causal talk include: 
1) ...explain(ing) the occurrence of particular events. 
2) ...predictive usefulness 
3) ...the power to control events 
4) ...the attribution of moral responsibility, and legal responsibility; and 
5) ...use in special technical senses in physical theory. (see Kim 1973b: 
572) 
With the possible exception of 4), these functions look to be extremely 
similar to the functions we would commonly assign to laws.  
Importantly, though, it seems to me that neither in our concept of 
causation, nor in our concept of law, does metaphysical necessitation need 
to be found. 
 
 
 
67 
 
Part 2 
 
Chapter 3:  +XPH¶V Regularity Theory of Laws of Nature 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The regularity theory of laws of nature is typically split up into two 
versions: the µQDwYH UHJXODULW\ WKHRU\¶ +XPH DQG WKH µVRSKLVWLFDWHG
regXODULW\ WKHRU\ 657¶ (Lewis), otherwise known as the µEHVW V\VWems 
DQDO\VLV¶ 7KLV FKDSWHU LV LQLWLDOO\ FRQFHUQHG SULPDULO\ ZLWK WKH µQDwYH¶
version of the thesis.  
In this chapter I first take a brief look at the desiderata of a 
metaphysical account of laws of nature, and then explicate the Humean 
regularity theory of laws in more detail; problems with Humean accounts 
of laws in general, and criticisms more specific to the regularity theory of 
laws will then be outlined, and finally I propose some solutions to these 
problems. In particular I focus on the problem of induction, and argue that 
this should not be considered any more problematic for the Humean than 
it is for the necessitarian. I also show why Humean laws, contrary to the 
necessitarian claims, have significant explanatory value. However, I 
conclude that there are at least three problems which demonstrate that the 
naïve regularity theory of laws must be substantially altered if Humeanism 
is to survive in any form. 
3.2 The Desiderata for Laws of Nature 
It seems to me that we, as human beings, have a concept of laws of nature 
as well as of cause and effect; we are able to pick out the kind of 
statements that can, and those that cannot be law-statements. 
Accompanying this ability to pick out laws from non-laws come a number 
of intuitions as to what a law is - the semantic properties law-like 
propositions can instantiate, the semantic properties no law-like 
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propositions instantiate, and the role the aspects of reality corresponding 
to these law statements play in the world. Of course, it might turn out that 
not all intuitions with respect to laws are metaphysically viable, but to 
begin any discussion of laws it seems appropriate to take a look into what 
conditions we would, in general, attribute to laws of nature. In chapter 
one, following van Fraassen, I made the following suggestions: 
1. Given the variety of semantic structures genuine laws can take 
(functional, non-functional universal generalisations, symmetry 
principles, propositionally inexpressible mathematical equations) it 
would be unwise to propose a set of necessary and sufficient conditions; 
2. laws must hold universally -- omnitemporally and omnispatially; 
3. laws must be able to play certain pragmatic roles; in particular, to predict 
future occurrences, and to explain past occurrences. There is a clear link 
here with our inductive practices. A good account of laws should 
certainly help justify many of the inductive inferences we make. Again, 
as I suggested in chapter one, I believe the explanantia of particular 
events to be their causes, but nevertheless the laws should help explain 
the similarities between the causes and their effects; 
4. laws must be objective; that is, mind-independent. Laws are out there for 
us to discover, whether or not we are successful in doing so. Genuine 
law-statements are those propositions corresponding to this mind-
independent aspect of reality; 
5. no analytic truths count as laws; 
6. the vocabulary used in law statements should include only natural 
properties. 
 
In this chapter I consider some of these conditions in more detail, and 
whether or not the regularity theory of laws satisfies them.  
3.2 The Regularity Theory of Causation and Laws of Nature  
 7KHQDwYHUHJXODULW\WKHRU\RIODZVRIQDWXUHVWDWHVWKDWµµ$OO)VDUH*V¶LV
a law LII $OO )V DUH *V ZKHUH WKH ODWWHU LV D +XPHDQ XQLIRUPLW\¶
(Armstrong 1983: 13). As was briefly mentioned in chapter 2, for those 
who hold the most basic version of the regularity theory of causation there 
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is no more to causation than a nomic-connection, and furthermore that 
laws are just regularities: if all events of type-F are followed by events of 
type-G, then µDOOHYHQWVRI W\SH-F are followed by events of type-*¶LVD
law of nature - it is also, if we hold the regularity theory of causation, a 
causal law, and every instance of this regularity counts as a causal 
interaction. If placing salt in water always results in the salt dissolving, 
then it is a law that all salt which is placed in water dissolves. Any 
instance of salt dissolving when placed in water is thus a causal 
interaction. This is the view David Hume advocates.  
 Metaphysical accounts of singular causation thus become 
redundant when looking for a metaphysical account of causation. What 
determines a causal interaction for naïve regularity theorists is set by the 
criteria for causal laws. Note that this is not to say accounts of singular 
causation would be redundant in a conceptual analysis, even if we do hold 
a regularity theory of causation. It seems to me that it may well be the case 
that our concept of causation is focused on singular causation, but that 
from a metaphysical perspective, any work over and above discovering the 
best metaphysical account of laws is unnecessary. As we shall see, though, 
the naïve regularity theory fails to provide a satisfactory account of laws. 
 The naive regularity theory faces numerous objections. It would of 
course be possible to just consider only the knock-down objections and to 
reject the thesis purely on their account. However, it will be useful to look 
at each of the popular objections in turn, and demonstrate how I believe 
many of them can be resolved. A fairly exhaustive list of these objections 
is provided by David Armstrong in What is a Law of Nature, so I look at 
each of these in turn. 
3.3.1 The Problem of Induction 
One of the desiderata of laws of nature is that they should help support our 
inductive inferences; that is, we should be able to use laws to predict 
future occurrences based on past observations. Typically, one should be 
able to infer a law from previous observations, and then use this law to 
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predict what will happen were certain circumstances to arise in the future; 
that is, if we have observed all events of type-F to have been followed by 
events of type-G in the past, our theory of laws should (in suitable 
circumstances) allow us to infer a law that will justify our prediction that 
were an event of type-F to occur in the future, it will be followed by an 
event of type-G.  
 Armstrong argues that, given that WKH+XPHDQVHHVµWKHWUXHIRUP
of an inductive inference (to be) simply an inference from the observed 
cases to the unobserved cases. And, given that the law is just the observed 
plus the unobserved cases, that inference,« LV DQ LUUDWLRQDO LQIHUHQFH¶
(Armstrong 1983: 53). The Humean, according to Armstrong, is 
committed to inductive scepticism28.  
 Although this section is primarily concerned with laws of nature 
and not specifically causal laws29, the best indication of the naive 
UHJXODULW\ WKHRULVW¶V FRPPLWPHQW WR LQGXFWLYHQRQ-scepticism is found in 
+XPH¶VGLVFXVVLRQRIFDXVDWLRQ. When Hume discusses the formation of 
ideas from impressions, or our identification of causes and effects, he 
himself highlights the inductive inferences involved and the problems that 
come along with it. However, if Hume were to be (as traditional 
interpretations imply) a strict inductive sceptic, it seems he should 
conclude that any attempts to identify causes and effects are futile. This 
would be a strange opinion to attribute to Hume. After all, Hume spends 
considerable time outlining the conditions under which causes and effects 
                                                          
28
 Armstrong actually attributes this position to Hume himself, but whether or not Hume 
genuinely believed induction to be irrational is debated. Regardless of the outcome of this 
ĚĞďĂƚĞ ?ƚŚŝƐƉĂƉĞƌŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚǁŝƚŚǁŚĂƚƚŚĞ ?,ƵŵĞĂŶ ? ?ŽƌƉĞƌŚĂƉƐƌĂƚŚĞƌůĞƐƐĂŵďŝŐƵŽƵƐůǇƚŚĞ
 ?ƌĞŐƵůĂƌŝƚǇƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚ ?ƐŚŽƵůĚďĞůŝĞǀĞ ?ĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽǁŚĂƚ,ƵŵĞŚŝŵƐĞůĨďĞůŝĞǀĞĚ ? 
29
 It is possible to dismiss the regularity theory of causation, whilst accepting the regularity 
theory of laws of nature, by denying that one can reduce cause to law; that is, by claiming that 
there is more to causation than nomic connection. A regularity theorist of laws of nature could 
accept ׊x ?&ǆAP'ǆ ?ƚŽĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞůǇƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ůĂǁƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐƌĂǀĞŶƐĂŶĚďůĂĐŬŶĞƐƐĂŶĚƐŽĨŽƌƚŚ ?
but deny that the same can be done for causation. The regularity theory of causation thus entails 
the regularity theory of laws of nature, but the regularity theory of laws of nature does not entail 
the regularity theory of causation. 
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should EHLGHQWLILHG$V+HOHQ%HHEHHVXJJHVWVµ+XPH¶VUXOHVDSSHDUWR
tell us that we should seek out hidden causes; but if he is an inductive, and 
hence causal, sceptic the rules lack any normative force: no purpose is 
VHUYHGE\DFTXLULQJPRUHRUPRUHUHILQHGFDXVDOEHOLHIV¶%HHEHH 
43). It seems to me that if no inductive inferences were in any way 
justified, no such set of rules would be better than any other.  
 Whether or not Hume himself was a non-sceptic about induction is 
inconsequential. What is important is that he, as a Humean, should have 
been - if a regularity theorist wishes to identify any laws of nature (even 
with an admission of fallibility), he must be a non-sceptic about induction. 
3.3.2  Why a Regularity Theorist Must Reason Inductively to Identify Laws of 
Nature 
A regularity theorist believes that when we identify a law of nature, we do 
so by observing a constant conjunction between certain properties (the 
property of being a raven, and the property of being black, for example). 
The observed instances are, of course, constrained to our present and past 
experiences, but according to the regularity theorist, the constant 
conjunctions that make up a law of nature must hold omnitemporally and 
omnispatially. 
 It follows that if the regularity theorist is to justify his 
identification of laws, he must justify his belief that the constant 
conjunctions identified will hold across all spatio-temporal regions. He is 
making conclusions about the entirely unobserved future, from the 
partially observed past, and in so doing is committing himself to the 
rationality of inductive reasoning. 
 It may be argued that the regularity theorist need not identify laws 
of nature in order to maintain his primary beliefs about what a law is. For 
a universal regularity, l, to hold; that is, for there to be law, l, nobody 
needs to actually know, or even believe l to be a law at all. Even when a 
law is identified, the regularity theorist must accept he may be wrong. The 
regularity he thought was a law can always turn out not to be, as the 
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regularity can (as far as he knows) always break down at some point in the 
future, or may even have already broken down at some unobserved point 
in the past. So whether or not a regularity theorist identifies a regularity as 
a law has no bearing on whether it actually is a law. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that the regularity theorist attempts to identify laws, so the problem 
remains. 
3.3.3 Is the Humean Defeated by Induction?30 
The µproblem of induction arguments¶ raised by necessitarians are said to 
apply not only to the regularity theory, but to all Humean theories. Let us 
take the Humean view of laws to be the view that laws of nature are either 
regularities, or regularities described by universal quantifications that are 
part of a best system of law-statements. As I have said, like anyone, a 
Humean in the world has to rely on inductive inference to arrive at beliefs 
about which particular natural laws there are. Armstrong argues that 
Humeans have a special problem with induction: given their conception of 
law, induction is an irrational inference. I ORRNDW$UPVWURQJ¶VPHWDSK\VLF
in more detail in chapter 5, but for now it will suffice to say that for 
Armstrong, a necessary condition for the rationality of inductive inference 
is that one accepts his conception of natural laws; that is, that laws are 
higher-order facts linking first-order universals by his µQDWXUDO
QHFHVVLWDWLRQUHODWLRQ¶RUWKH N-relation. In other words, the metaphysical 
glue linking the universals, say, F and G, constitutes the non-accidentality 
of the regularity, that all Fs are Gs. Armstrong does not claim to solve the 
problem of induction as such - he just claims to show that a necessary part 
of any justification will be his conception of laws.  So Humeans miss out 
on justifying induction since for them, there is no metaphysical glue 
underlying the regularities of the spacetime continuum; that is, the 
Humean mosaic. Metaphysically speaking, there is just the mosaic. 
 In this section I argue WKDW$UPVWURQJ¶VDWWDFNRQ+XPHDQLVPIDLOV
Armstrong has not shown that one needs higher-order necessitation 
                                                          
30
 ^ĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŽƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?ĂƌĞĨŽƌƚŚĐŽŵŝŶŐŝŶ^ŵĂƌƚ ? ? ?/ƐƚŚĞ,ƵŵĞĂŶĞĨĞĂƚĞĚďǇ
/ŶĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?Philosophical Studies 
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relations to validate induction. There are two lines of argument that 
correspond to two issues in relation to induction: the old problem and the 
new problem. The first is that Humeans will have a specific problem with 
*RRGPDQ¶VQHZSUREOHPRIµgrue¶. I show that here Armstrong is simply 
confused, and indeed, liable to fall to his own objection. The second 
argument is really concerned with the old problem of induction. The 
central claim is that universally quantified statements about regularities, 
such as All ravens are black KDYH QR H[SODQDWRU\ YDOXH $UPVWURQJ¶V
argument here is marred by confusion about what we are meant to be 
explaining. When we get clear about what we are explaining, (in this case 
we are explaining facts of observation and not the colours of particular 
ravens), we see that such statements about regularities can have 
explanatory value. Furthermore we see that Armstrong himself must admit 
that they do if he is to allow for there to be explanations for many of the 
every-day events we are asked to explain. A second feature of the second 
argument concerns chains of explanation. I claim that the chain of 
explanation need not end with some strange entity like the necessitation 
relation, but can end with a more comprehensible regularity. I conclude 
WKDW WKH UHJXODULW\ WKHRULVW¶V DOWHUQDWLYH WR 1)* ZKLFK , WHUP WKH
regularity relation between universals, R(F,G), is the best explanation of 
our worldly facts, and that this provides the regularity theorist with at least 
as much right to reason inductively as the Armstrongian. 
 None of this shows that we have solved the problem of induction 
for the Humean. It jXVW PHDQV LW KDVQ¶W EHHQ GHPRQVWUDWHG What they 
cannot. I end this section with a not-implausible a priori attempt at 
providing a justification of induction in Humean terms. This attempt is 
grounded on the probabilistic justifications provided by Williams and 
Stove, but sadly, by current standards, fails due to its supposedly 
unjustified assumption of the proportionality syllogism ± however, further 
work on probabilistic justifications of induction might prove my attempt 
successful after all.  
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I said that Armstrong has two lines of objection: one for the old problem, 
one for the new. I begin with the new. 
3.3.4 Armstrong on the New Problem 
When I discuss the new problem of induction, I refer to the 
SUREOHPUDLVHGE\1HOVRQ*RRGPDQ¶VGoodman FK,,,µXQQDWXUDO¶
predicates. Goodman asks us initially to assume that if all emeralds 
observed before the year 3000 have been green, it is rational to conclude 
that all emeralds are green. He theQ LQWURGXFHVDQHZSUHGLFDWH µJUXH¶± 
an object is grue if it is first observed before the year 3000 and green, and 
blue if first observed thereafter. All observed emeralds have been green, 
but they have also been grue, so why not conclude that all emeralds are 
JUXH"2IFRXUVHWKHQZH¶GKDYHWRSUHGLFWWKDt all emeralds first observed 
after the year 3000 will be blue, and that would contradict the original 
projections. The grue problem is one that applies to the rationality of 
induction in general, and Goodman (see Goodman 1979: ch. 3) provided 
arguments to suggest we can solve the problem by accepting only natural 
predicates like green and black in law-statements ± which can be 
identified because they are the best entrenched; that is, predicates like 
green and black are routinely used by the general populusDQGµXQQDWXUDO¶
predicates like grue are not. Restricting the Humean¶V LQIHUences to this 
kind of predicate would solve the problem, but Armstrong argues that it is 
µLPSRVVLEOH WR VHH KRZ WKH QHZ SULQFLSOH >RI UHVWULFWLQJ LQIHUHQFHV WR
natural predicates@ LV WR EH MXVWLILHG¶ $UPVWURQJ  $OWKRXJK KH
VD\V QRWKLQJ PRUH DV WR ZK\ LW FRXOGQ¶W EH MXVWLILHG , DVVXPH WKH
reasoning goes something like this: Whereas Armstrong may rule out 
grue-OLNHSUHGLFDWHVDVRQO\QDWXUDOSUHGLFDWHVDUH LQ*RRGPDQ¶VZords, 
µZHOO-EHKDYHG SUHGLFDWHV DGPLVVLEOH LQ ODZOLNH K\SRWKHVHV¶ *RRGPDQ
1979:79), the Humean does not hold a law-like hypothesis, so this kind of 
response is unavailable to him. However, I believe the Humean, too, can 
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make the claim that grue-like predicates cannot be used in law-
statements31. 
 It is true that the emeralds in our sample have been both green and 
JUXH DQG VR WKH LQIHUHQFHV WR µDOO HPHUDOGV DUHJUHHQ¶ DQG µDOO HPHUDOGV
DUH JUXH¶ ORRN WR EH HTXDOO\ ZHOO VXSSRUWHG EXW ZK\ FDQ¶W WKH +XPHDQ 
also appeal to the natural/unnatural distinction? One of the most defended 
criteria for being a law-statement (for Humeans and necessitarians alike) 
is that it only includes natural predicates, so if any proponent of a view of 
laws is to have a plausible metaphysics of laws, he must be able to give an 
account of this distinction. Armstrong appeals to objective similarities in 
WKH IRUP RI XQLYHUVDOV EXW LW¶V QRW HQWLUHO\ FOHDU ZK\ XQLYHUVDOV DUH
required to pick out similarities. David Lewis (Lewis 1986: pp59-61) 
suggests that naturalness could also be seen either in terms of objective 
structural similarities, or simply just primitive naturalness, and makes no 
reference to universals whatsoever. All metaphysical theories are left with 
primitives, and it seems to me that there is no reason why a Humean 
cannot take the natural/unnatural distinction to be a primitive fact. For the 
purposes of this paper I will assume this primitive distinction between 
natural and unnatural predicates can be made, and thus the grue problem 
overcome.   
 It may be, however, that there is an implicit idea in Armstrong that 
naturalness needs to be connected to law. When we encounter the 
dispositional essentialist metaphysics in later chapters, we will see that for 
them, being a natural property is constituted by lawful relations to other 
SURSHUWLHV%LUG$UPVWURQJ¶VYLHZLVGLVWLQFWIURPWKLVYLHZSRLQW
since for him, naturalness is determined by something that is not 
inherently connected to law. His view is quidditistic, so for him, 
naturalness is entirely primitive.  In this respect, he is in the same boat as 
the Humeans in that the identity of a property is not fixed by its 
causal/nomological role. For Armstrong, then, natural properties cannot be 
picked out by their connection to laws. 
                                                          
31
 Or any other unnatural predicate for that matter. 
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3.3.4 Regularities and Explanation 
I now move to the second objection, which is firmly couched in terms of 
the old problem of induction. Armstrong argues that the rationality of 
LQGXFWLRQ LVDQHFHVVDU\ WUXWKQRW MXVWDQDO\WLFDOO\EXW IRUVRPH µGeeper 
UHDVRQ¶ $UPVWURQJ   +H SURSRVHV WKDW WKH QHFHVVLWDULDQ FDQ
rationally predict the continued uniformity of nature by inferring the 
µQDWXUDOQHFHVVLWDWLRQUHODWLRQEHWZHHQXQLYHUVDOV¶1)*, to be the best 
explanation for our observations, and that this relation justifies our 
inductive inferences. According to Armstrong, however, there is no way 
for the Humean to justify inductively derived predictions about the future. 
He claims their predictions about unobserved events are not grounded by 
LQIHUHQFHWRWKHEHVWH[SODQDWLRQ,%(EXWEDVHGVROHO\RQWKHµSDWWHUQRI
LQIHUHQFH REVHUYHG LQVWDQFHV WR XQREVHUYHG LQVWDQFHV¶ ZKHUH e (the 
observed instances) is inductive evidence for h (claims about unobserved 
instances). Armstrong suggests that the Humean reasons as follows: 
   HĺHK 
HKĺK 
3.   HĺK   [From 1, 2, by transitivity.] 
 
The inference from e to h is, according to Armstrong, to be regarded as an 
irrational inference (although I will later claim that (a) this pattern is 
common to all inductive inferences (which in my opinion can scarcely be 
questioned!), and so to say this pattern is irrational is to say that induction 
is always irrational, since it takes us from the observed to the unoberved, 
and (b) Armstrong is committed to the rationality of the pattern himself.  
 8OWLPDWHO\ WKRXJK$UPVWURQJ¶VDUJXPHQW UHVWVRQ WKHFODLPWKDW
Humean law-statements - in the form of universally quantified statements- 
have no explanatory value whatsoever, largely because they do not 
provide (what I call) WKH µPHWDSK\VLFDO JOXH¶ UHTXLUHG WR NHHS QDWXUH
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uniform. The focus of this section is to demonstrate why these conclusions 
are false. 
 )RU $UPVWURQJ¶V SDWWHUQ RI LQIHUHQFH WR MXVWLI\ his inductive 
inferences, he needs IBE to be a justified mode of reasoning. I have no 
objection to this, but first we need to look at what this principle amounts 
to, DQGKRZLWVKRXOGEHDSSOLHGLQWKHSDUWLFXODUFDVHV,¶OOEHORRNLQJDW
Peter Lipton suggests that when one is considering which is the best 
explanation for a phenomenon, one has to consider both which is the 
OLNHOLHVW H[SODQDWLRQ DQG µZKLFK ZRXOG LI FRUUHFW EH WKH PRVW
H[SODQDWRU\ RU SURYLGH WKH PRVW XQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶ /LSWRQ   :H
therefore need to establish, first and foremoVW ZKDW SKHQRPHQD ZH¶UH
DFWXDOO\H[SODLQLQJ:KHQ$UPVWURQJDVNVXV WRH[SODLQZK\³DOO UDYHQV
DUH EODFN´ KH FDQQRW EH ORRNLQJ IRU DQ H[SODQDWLRQ IRU all ravens 
(omnitemporally and omnispatially) being black, largely because this 
information is not available to him prior to the inference of a natural 
necessitation relation holding between the universals of ravenhood and 
blackness. That all ravens are black is just an implication of his 
explanation.  
 If we required a reason for all ravens being black then perhaps 
Armstrong might have a better chance of explaining this phenomenon than 
the Humean (although this is not obviously true), but a Humean GRHVQ¶W
want there to be an explanation for this over and above regularities, as for 
him the universal blackness of ravens is just determined by the distribution 
of local particular matters of fact. What requires explanation here is why 
all the ravens in our sample are black, and one must appreciate that a 
perfectly good explanation for this might not serve as an explanation for 
why raveQVµLQJHQHUDO¶DUHEODFN 
Not only do I contend that pure universally quantified statements 
concerning regularities can serve as good explanations for our 
observations, but also that they are frequently the best explanation 
available )XUWKHUPRUH LW WXUQV RXW WKDW $UPVWURQJ¶V own pattern of 
inference takes the form of HĺKwhich he himself regards as irrational. I 
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will thus argue that his argument thus fails on three counts: firstly that to 
allow for widely accepted explanations to have explanatory value he 
requires universally quantified conditionals to have explanatory value, 
VHFRQGO\WKDWDVKLVSDWWHUQRILQIHUHQFHVWDQGV$UPVWURQJ¶VDFFRXQWIDLOV
by his own standards, and thirdly because (even if we could make sense of 
the N-relDWLRQ$UPVWURQJ¶VH[SODQDWLRQVDUHQRWWKHbest explanations (he 
needs them to be if he is to appeal to IBE).   
,I $UPVWURQJ¶V PHWDSK\VLFDO YLHZ RI ODZV LV ULJKW WKHQ׊[)[ĺ*[ LV WUXH DW HYHU\ ZRUOG LQZKLFK 1)*KROGV7KH VWUDQJH
metaphysical glue that is the natural necessitation relation sticks the 
instances of universals together, such that wherever something instantiates 
the property F, it also instantiates the property G. N(F,G) thus entails the 
above universally quantified statement. If we consider the universals 
µUDYHQKRRG¶ DQG µEODFNQHVV¶ WR EH MRLQHG E\ WKH QDWXUDO QHFHVVLWDWLRQ
relation, N(R,B), we know that instances of ravens will always be black. 
But, as we shall see, not all explanations require this metaphysical-glue 
aspect ± regularities alone can often do the job.  
That a regularity can explain its instances should not be 
particularly counter-intuitive. After all, we use regularities as predictive 
and explanatory tools all the time. Take the following example: Political 
polls tend to provide us with accurate predictions of election results, and it 
seems perfectly reasonable to explain the results of the polls by appealing 
to the proportions in the total population of voters. We could look for a 
further reason for the results of the polls; perhaps one political party had 
particularly unpopular policies, but (a) the results of the polls simpliciter 
are sufficient for us to predict the election results, and (b) the proportions 
in the total population do seem to explain the results of the polls. Do the 
proportions explain why people choose to vote the way they do? No. But 
WKLVLVQRWZKDW¶VUHTXLUHGZKHQH[SODLQLQJZK\RXUSROOVSURYLGHDFFXUDWH
predictions of election results. 
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Whereas Armstrong seems to think an explanation must be 
metaphysicalO\ µPHDW\¶ - that the explanans must involve a kind of 
metaphysical glue ensuring the universals are tied together (and that his 
natural necessitation relation provides us with these kind of explanations), 
there are thousands of examples of proportions in a population being used 
to explain the proportions in a sample. If an account of what it is to be an 
explanation denies us the ability to explain proportions in samples by 
appealing to the proportions in the relevant population, then that account 
is clearly at odds with our concept of explanation.  
We can also see this when we look at explanation from the bottom 
up, to see what kinds of truths need explaining (as opposed to what kinds 
of things can explain) - here we find many explananda that Armstrong 
cannot deal with, as the explananda are not captured by relations between 
IXQGDPHQWDOSURSHUWLHV&RQVLGHU WKH IROORZLQJH[DPSOHV ³2QO\RI
the people in my street aUH IURP HWKQLF PLQRULWLHV´ ³*LUOV DW 9LFWRULD
&ROOHJH SHUIRUPHG EHWWHU WKDQ ER\V LQ WKHLU ILQDOV´ 3UHVXPDEO\ ZH FDQ
ask for explanations here, but given that there are no fundamental 
universals for the natural necessitation relations to hold between, 
Armstrong cannot provide them (and note that he cannot appeal to a 
causal explanation, as, for Armstrong, causes are just instances of laws). 
7KH+XPHDQRQWKHRWKHUKDQGFDQUHVSRQGZLWKUHJXODULWLHV³DFWXDOO\
only 20% of people in Britain are from ethnic minorities, so it should not 
EH VXUSULVLQJ WKDW RQO\  RI SHRSOH LQ \RXU VWUHHW DUH´ ³PRVW IHPDOH
students are more GLOLJHQWWKDQER\V´DQGVRRQ 
)LQDOO\ $UPVWURQJ¶V LQLWLDO REMHFWLRQ was WKDW WKH +XPHDQ¶V
pattern of inference was reducible to the µLUUDWLRQDO¶HĺK - but if we look 
DW$UPVWURQJ¶VRZQSDWWHUQRILQIHUHQFHZHFDQFOHDUO\VHHWKDWKHKLPVHOI
LV FRPPLWWHG WR WKLV SDWWHUQ DV XOWLPDWHO\ $UPVWURQJ¶V LQIHUHQFH LV DQ
inductive inference, and all inductive inferences take this form. Inference 
to the Best Explanation, although a special kind of inductive inference, is 
an inductive inference nonetheless. It is not deductively derivable from a 
formalism of the observed instances, and so it makes the jump from the 
80 
 
observed to the unobserved. In this case, the inference is not to the 
observed instances plus the unobserved instances (e+h), but from the 
observed instances to the (arguably) unobservable natural necessitation 
UHODWLRQEHWZHHQ WKH UHVSHFWLYHXQLYHUVDOV ,I WKH+XPHDQ¶V µREVHUYHG WR
unobsHUYHG¶SDWWHUQRILQIHUHQFHLVLUUDWLRQDOWKHQVRLV$UPVWURQJ¶V32.  
So far I have mainly focused on how the Humean can explain our 
observed samples; that is, the colour of the ravens we have observed, but 
we might well ask for a reason why all ravens are black - why ׊[5[ĺ%[ QRW MXVW  Ǯ  in our observed sample are ǯ. In the next section I will endorse a hierarchy of explanations, all of 
which are regularities explaining regularities lower down in the hierarchy. 
By the very nature of this hierarchy, there has to be a highest-order 
regularity, and hence a brute, unexplained explainer. This is often 
presented as an objection to the Humean, but I show that the Armstrongian 
explanatory chain also ends with a brute fact - namely the natural 
necessitation relation. I claim the explanatory chain should end with a 
regularity, and not this mysterious relation between universals. 
3.3.5 Higher-Order Regularities as Explanations 
Nicholas Everitt (Everitt 1991: 206-208) pointed out that nearly all 
regularities (but not all or else we get a regress) can be explained in terms 
of higher-RUGHUUHJXODULWLHV)RUH[DPSOHWKHODZRIQDWXUHµDOOZDWHUKDV
PDVV¶ FDQ EH H[SODLQHG E\ WKH KLJKHU-RUGHU UHJXODULW\ µDOO PROHFXODU
VXEVWDQFHV KDYH PDVV¶ 1HFHVVLWDULDQV DUH OLNHO\ Wo claim, however, that 
explaining a regularity in terms of another regularity is not sufficient, for 
when a regularity is reached for which there is no higher-order regularity 
there are no further explanations. 
 Intuitively, saying a particular cricket is JUHHQEHFDXVHµDOOFULFNHWV
DUH JUHHQ¶ LI WKLV ZHUH WKH FDVH LV QRW D VXIILFLHQW H[SODQDWLRQ IRU WKH
                                                          
32
 Let me emphasise that this is not to say that I agree with Armstrong in thinking HĺK is always 
an irrational pattern of inference. I believe that inductive reasoning is, when performed in the right 
way, perfectly rational. The conclusion h can follow from e, not by deductive logic, but by 
whatever inductive logic will turn out to be. 
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greenness of crickets. It would be far more helpful to appeal to the 
evolutionary process, whereby green crickets survive in virtue of the 
camouflage greenness provides them with. A higher order regularity like 
µDOOQRQ-FDPRXIODJHGLQVHFWVJHWHDWHQE\ELUGV¶PD\EHSURSRVHGE\WKH
regularity theorist, but once again, no real explanation is given for why 
this is the case. It seems that regularities in themselves do not have the 
explanatory power required by the necessitarian as they must always end 
in a brute fact, so explaining regularities in terms of other regularities is, at 
least at the top end of the scale, a futile exercise. 
 Everitt concedes that his appeal to higher-order regularities may be 
criticised in this way, but he continues his attack on the scientific approach 
by claiming the necessitarian also runs out of explanations at the top end 
of the scale. A useful analogy can be found in Hume where he makes a 
similar claim with respect to causation. He wrote that in following a causal 
FKDLQRIHYHQWV EDFNZDUGV µ(YHU\ OLQNRI WKHFKDLQZRX¶G LQ WKDWFDVH
hang upon another; but there would not be any thing fixed to one end of it, 
capable of sustaining the whole; and consequently there would be no 
belief nor HYLGHQFH¶Treatise: Bk 1, IV) If I take a causal chain of events, 
A-B-C-D, whereby a subsequent event can be explained by the antecedent 
event, event D can be explained by appeal to event C. But what happens 
when we get back to event A? The physicist would normally associate 
event A with the Big Bang, but how can we explain the coming about of 
WKH%LJ%DQJ"(YHULWWFODLPV,EHOLHYHTXLWHULJKWO\WKDWVRPHµYHUVLRQRI
an ontological argument frRP HVVHQFH WR H[LVWHQFH¶ (YHULWW  
would have to be accepted.  
 The analogy above focuses on causal explanation, but the same 
DSSOLHVZLWK$UPVWURQJ¶VQRPLF H[SODQDWLRQV)RU$UPVWURQJ1)* LV
supposed to explain why this F is a G, and allows us to predict that all 
future Fs will be Gs, but what explains this fact? For Armstrong, the 
natural necessitation relation, N, is a universal just like F and G, and so 
just like F and G it should be able to change its causal role across possible 
worlds; that is, in another possible world N plays the F-role and F the N-
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role. Alexander Bird shows that any attempt to solve this problem results 
in a vicious regress. Bird states that if R(F,G) denotes a regularity between 
)V DQG *V WKHQ µ1)* QHFHVVLWDWHV 5F,G) (for all F,G). We may 
V\PEROLVH WKLV 1¶15  1)* FDQQRW H[SODLQ 5)* LI LW LV MXVW D
UHJXODULW\WKDWZKHQHYHU1WKHQDOVR5¶%LUGVRZHLQWURGXFH
WKLV IXUWKHU WKLUG RUGHU QHFHVVLWDWLRQ UHODWLRQ 1¶ WR H[SODLQ WKLV
regularity. But of course then we need an explanation for why whenever 
1¶)*WKHQDOVR1)*ZKHQLWORRNVOLNHWKLVPXVWDOVREHDUHJXODULW\
VR ZH LQWURGXFH 1¶¶ DQG VR RQ 8OWLPDWHO\ LI $UPVWURQJ ZDQWV WR XVH
laws of the form N(F,G) as his explanation for Fs being Gs, he may as 
well take the initial N-relation between first order universals to be the 
primitive explanans (the function of which, I should add, we have no idea 
about). It seems to me that if Armstrong must concede that his explanatory 
chain finishes with an unexplained fact, he cannot just appeal to this 
µH[SODQDWRU\FKDLQILQLVKHV¶REMHFWLRQWRVWDPSKLVDXWKRULW\7KHUHLVWKXV
QRREYLRXVXQGHUPLQLQJRIWKH+XPHDQ¶VµLQSULQFLSOH¶DELOLW\WRH[SODLQ
the validity of induction. 
3.3.6 An Attempt by the Humean Foiled 
The Williams-Stove (Williams 1947, Stove 1986) argument from The 
Law of Large Numbers (LLN) demonstrably shows that for any finite 
population, of all the logically possible large samples in that population, 
most of those samples will have proportions that resemble the proportions 
in the total population - so given any random large sample33, it is 
statistically likely that the population from which that sample was taken 
will have proportions that resemble the proportions in the sample. It 
follows that future samples are likely to resemble past samples.  
 LLN tells us that if we choose 3000 ravens at random from a 
population of a million ravens, half of which are black, half white34, the 
                                                          
33
 /ŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚůǇ ? ?ƌĂŶĚŽŵ ?ŝŶƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞŵƵƐƚŵĞĂŶƚŚĂƚĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞƐĞůŽŐŝĐĂůůǇƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ
samples must have an equal probability of being drawn. 
34
 Note that a 50/50 proportion will give the lowest probability of a representative sample. A 
population of 100% ravens will of course give a 100% chance of a representative sample 
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statistical probability of the proportions of that sample being within 3% of 
the proportions of the total population (between 47% black and 53% 
black) is greater than 0.9 (Stove 1986: 70). Given there is a statistical 
probability of more than 0.9 of any one sample being representative of the 
population, Stove reasons that we are justified in projecting the same 
proportions found in the sample we draw on to the population as a whole - 
this supposedly provides the probabilistic justification for inductive 
inferences. Given that we need epistemic justification for induction, there 
is an implicit assumption here that, given the statistical probability of 
GUDZLQJD µUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRISRSXODWLRQ¶ VDPSOH-type is greater than 0.9, 
the epistemic probability of that sample being representative of the 
population is equally high -  Stove is assuming the proportionality 
syllogism35.  
 The calculation of the statistical probabilities is a very simple a 
priori matter. One merely calculates the number of logically possible 
3000-fold samples in the population, and then the number of these 
possible samples whose proportions of black-to-white ravens fall within 
 RI WKH SURSRUWLRQV RI WKH WRWDO SRSXODWLRQ ,¶OO FDOO WKHVH VDPSOHV
µUHSUHVHQWDWLYH VDPSOHV¶:H WKHQGLYLGH WKH ODWWHUE\ WKH IRUPHU WR JHW
our probability. It is just a mathematical truth that more of these samples 
are representative than non-representative36, and so for any random large 
sample of a finite population, one is likely to get proportions closely 
resembling the proportions of the total population. It is important to note 
that once we have a sample greater than 3000, the size of the total 
population does not have a significant effect on the proportion of 3000-
fold samples representative of the population; that is, if we have a total 
population of a hundred trillion instead of a million, the majority of 
samples will still be representative. This may sound counter-intuitive, but 
                                                          
35
 This tells us that if we know the number of Xs that are Ys in a population of Xs (where we know 
the size of the population), then our epistemic probability of a random X being a Y is the number 
of Xs that are Ys divided by the population size. If 60% of professors are men, our degree of belief 
that an unknown professor (of whom we have no further information) will be a man should be 
0.6. 
36
 Assuming an equal probability of choosing any possible sample. 
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it is easily shown to be true mathematically37. It follows (again, if we 
adopt the proportionality syllogism) that we can justify many inductive 
inferences. But can the Humean use this principle? 
 Those who uphold Humean Supervenience (which will be 
discussed in greater detail in chapter 4) believe µWKDWDOOHOVHVXSHUYHQHVRQ
the spatiotemporal arrangement of local qualities throughout all of history, 
SDVWSUHVHQWDQGIXWXUH/HZLV¶)RU+XPHDQV OLNH/HZLVDOO
contingent truths are true in virtue of these patterns of fundamental 
property instantiations and the fundamental relations between these 
instantiations, and in virtue of these alone. For the Humeans there are no 
natural necessitation relations, nor any other kind of metaphysical glue 
that ensures the uniformity of nature. But although our observations are 
just patterns of property instantiation in a restricted spatiotemporal region, 
these observations are nevertheless a sample of the population as a whole. 
If the LLN works as a means of justifying inductive inferences, it seems to 
me that we can easily apply this within a Humean framework as the LLN 
is a purely statistical device, and requires no commitment to any kind of 
necessary connections. 
 Unfortunately for the Humean, the Williams-Stove argument faces 
numerous objections that cannot (or at least have not) be overcome, and so 
the aim of finding an indubitable justification of inductive reasoning 
cannot be met without first dealing with the Williams-6WRYH DUJXPHQW¶V
problems. I will first outline these objections, and then move on to the 
more pressing question of whether or not Armstrong has more right to 
reason inductively than the regularity theorist. 
 Firstly it is argued that a probabilistic justification of induction 
requires the epistemic probabilities to be high, but the LLN can only 
demonstrably show the statistical probabilities. As I have already 
mentioned, the Williams-Stove method makes the non-trivial assumption 
that the statistical and epistemic probabilities will be the same, but Bruno 
                                                          
37
 It has been argued that infinite populations are problematic, but these will not be addressed as 
there are far stronger objections than this. 
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de Finetti (1964) argues that (at least) epistemic probability should be 
equated with strength of belief, where our degree of belief is judged by 
µKRZPXFKZHDUHZLOOLQJWREHW¶IRUWKHSUL]HRI38. The strength of our 
belief (and thus the epistemic probability of our inferences), though, is in 
force prior to the calculation of statistical probabilities, and of course this 
prior degree of belief is already (at least partly) determined by our innate 
assumption that Nature is uniform. 
 Secondly, the argument requires that the probabilities of drawing 
GLIIHUHQWVDPSOHVDUHµH[FKDQJHDEOH¶7KHSUREDELOLWLHVDUHµH[FKDQJHDEOH¶
only if for any two samples with the same proportions, the same degree of 
belief that they would match those proportions applies to both samples. 
But this is usually not the case with the kind of inductive inferences we 
make, largely because causal conditions often change during the course of 
our sampling: if the weather changes from dry and sunny to wet and 
windy during the course of a golf tournament, my degree of belief in an 
unknown individual beating his handicap will depend on when he played. 
Suppose two golfers, Ben and Jerry, both broke their handicap by 2 shots. 
Ben played when it was sunny, so my prior degree of belief was 0.6, but 
Jerry played when it was windy and raining, so my prior degree of belief 
was just 0.2. In cases like these the probabilities are not exchangeable, and 
so the Williams-Stove method cannot be applicable. 
 Thirdly, the LLN requires our sample to be a random one, but it is 
not at all obvious that we can take any observations to be random as we 
are restricted to our locations in space and time. Drawing from Giaquinto 
(Giaquinto 1986 p.614), imagine that the only ravens we have observed 
have (a) been black, and (b) located in a single valley. We have also 
observed many other species of animals (some in this valley, but some in 
others), many of which have differed in their colour from one environment 
to another. Given we know from experience that the colour of animals 
may (at least partly) vary from one habitat to another, we would probably 
                                                          
38
 Subsequent subjectivists have substituted, for this monetary assessment, bets of utility, on the 
grounds that the value of money differs from the rich to the poor. 
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QRW EH ZLOOLQJ WR EHW ODUJH VXPV RI PRQH\ RQ µDOO (or most) ravens are 
EODFN¶EHLQJDWUXHVWDWHPHQW1RZRIFRXUVHWKLVLVDQH[DPSOHZKHUHZH
already know our sample is not random, and so one might object that we 
can assume our sample is random unless we already know otherwise. But 
sadly no observational samples are truly random, as what we can observe 
is always restricted by our spatial and temporal location. Furthermore, 
even if we knew that 95% of samples are representative, what justifies us 
in assuming our sample is one of the representative ones? Perhaps this can 
just be taken as a primitive fact ± what justifies us in thinking ours is a 
representative sample is simply that most samples are (see Campbell and 
Franklin 2004). Nonetheless, I think the randomness objection should be 
taken seriously. 
 And fourthly, when we consider what it is to be an inductive 
inference, we hope that as evidence accumulates our inferences converge 
on the truth (importantly though, we should never know when we have 
obtained the truth of our inference.) According to Kelly and Schulte 
inductive reasoning has similarities with algorithmic computation, except 
WKH ODWWHU FRQIHUV FHUWDLQW\ 7KH\ ZULWH WKDW µ7KLV FHUWDLQW\ GHULYHV IURP
two factors (1) a logical guarantee that the algorithm will produce the right 
answer on each input in a specified class, and (2) the fact that the 
algorithm halts, thereby signalling to the user in an unambiguous way 
ZKDW LWVRXWSXW LV¶ .Hlly and Schulte 1995: µ7KH3UREOHPRI ,QGXFWLRQ¶
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). The LLN approach accommodates 
the uncertainty of inductive inferences by rejecting (1) in favour of the 
probabilistic approach, but this does not help us with our desire for 
LQGXFWLYH LQIHUHQFHV WR FRQYHUJH RQ WKH WUXWK $UWLFXODWLQJ .HOO\¶V
position, Vickers writes: 
Any good acFRXQW RI VFLHQWLILF UHDVRQ« PXVW FODVVLI\ DQG DFFRXQW IRU WKH
FRPSOH[LW\DQGGLIILFXOW\RILQGXFWLYHLQIHUHQFH«>3UREDELOLVWLF@PHWKRGV«DUH
incapable of accounting for complexity and the interplay of conjecture and 
refutation - logical omniscience runs roughshod over the critical distinctions. 
The probability P(h|e) of a given hypothesis h conditional on changing 
evidence e may fluctuate from close to zero to close to one as e accumulates. 
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This violates the central principle of convergence: A conjecture if false will be 
rejected at some stage, and if true will never be UHMHFWHG 9LFNHUV - µ7KH
3UREOHPRI,QGXFWLRQ¶The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)  
Kelly and Schulte provide their own account of how we should deal with 
the problem of induction, but for the purposes of this paper it is enough to 
show that probabilistic attempts to justify inductive inferences are 
insufficient, as they fail to respect the principle of convergence. 
 I have provided four major objections to the Williams-Stove 
response to the problem of induction, which have not, as far as I can see, 
been adequately answered by the Humean. But it is important to note that 
DOWKRXJKWKLVSUREDELOLVWLFDWWHPSWWRMXVWLI\WKHUHJXODULW\WKHRULVW¶VDELOLW\
to reason inductively has failed, the failure is not one that can be 
overcome by introducing necessary connections ± the objections apply to 
all probabilistic justifications.  
 It turns out that my probabilistic argument to justify the Humean¶V
right to reason inductively falls short, but thaW¶V QRW WR VD\ WKDW Iuture 
attempts at probabilistic justifications, or work on the proportionality 
syllogism, cannot prove my attempt, or a variation on it, successful after 
all. This, however, is work for another day.  
In the following sections I examine $UPVWURQJ¶VREMHFWLRQVLQPRUHGHWDLO
and conclude that these do not help motivate his governing laws.  
 
3.3.7 Regularities and Induction 
Necessitarians in general object to the Humean¶V LQGXFWLYH PHWKod by 
stating that the explanans of observed instances cannot include the 
explanandum; that is, they claim that ׊[)[ĺ*[FDQQRWH[SODLQZK\DOO
the observed instances of Fs are Gs, because ׊[)[ĺ*[LVHTXLYDOHQWWR
µDOOWKHREVHUYHG)VDQGDOOWKHXQREVHUYHG)VDUH*V¶Although these are 
truth-conditionally equivalent, I have hopefully shown that they are not 
explanatorily equivalent. 
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 Armstrong claims a natural necessitation relation between 
universals can be found via IBE to explain our observations, and that 
given N(F,G) is in some way distinct from unobserved instances, we can 
use N(F,G) to make inductive inferences about future Fs.  But the Humean 
can use the same methodology to arrive at R(F,G), where R signifies a 
regularity between the properties F and G - when R(F,G) holds between 
µUDYHQKRRG¶DQGµEODFNQHVV¶LWFDQEHVDLGWKDW³DOOUDYHQVDUHEODFN´$VD
PDWWHURIIDFWWKHUHJXODULW\WKHRULVWGRHVQ¶WQHHGWREHVREROGDVWRFODLP
that all ravens are black to justify his inductive inferences and explain his 
REVHUYDWLRQVEXWµDOOUDYHQVDUHEODFN¶ZRXOG,LPDJLQHEHFRQVLGHUHGD
EHWWHUH[SODQDWLRQWKDQµDOORUPRVWUDYHQVDUHEODFN¶DQGVRWKHUXOHVRI
IBE require us to stick to the universal generalisation.). Of course if we 
are justified in inferring that all ravens are black, then we are justified in 
making projections about the colour of future ravens.  
 R(F,G), FRQWUDU\ WR WKH PRUH µVSRRN\¶ QDWXUDO QHFHVVLWDWLRQ
relation, ($UPVWURQJ KLPVHOI ZULWHV µ7KH LQH[SOLFDELOLW\ RI QHFHVVLWDWLRQ
just has to be accepted. Necessitation, the way that one Form (universal) 
brings another along with it as Plato puts it in the Phaedo, is a primitive, 
or near primitive, which we are forced to postulate. (Armstrong 1983: 92)) 
is easy to comprehend. It is a contingent fact about all Fs which must be 
inferred through the regular observation of Fs being Gs. Inferring R(F,G) 
simply requires it to be the best explanation for our observations of Fs 
being Gs, and as I have shown, this is often the case. If N(F,G) can stand 
between observation and conclusions about the unobserved for Armstrong 
(once it has been inferred through IBE), R(F,G) can stand between 
observation and conclusions about the unobserved for the regularity 
theoriVW 7KH SDWWHUQ RI LQIHUHQFH EHFRPHV REVHUYDWLRQĺ5)* then 
5)*ĺSURMHFWLRQVDERXWIXWXUHLQVWDQFHVDQGWKLVLWVHHPVWRPHLV a 
IDUPRUHUDWLRQDOSDWWHUQRILQIHUHQFHWKDQ$UPVWURQJ¶V,WWXUQVRXWWKDWLI
$UPVWURQJ¶V PRGH RI UHDVRQLQJ YLD ,%( WR Mustify our inferences is 
acceptable, neither the necessitarian nor the regularity theorist need appeal 
to anything more than IBE and R(F,G) to justify their inductive inferences.  
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 In this section I have attempted a probabilistic argument to justify 
the regularity theorisW¶V ULJKW WR UHDVRQ LQGXFWLYHO\Xnfortunately, due to 
the general failure of probabilistic justifications of induction, this attempt 
was ultimately unsuccessful. However a complete justification of 
induction for the regularity theorist is not required to dampen the 
necessitarian arguments against the Humean. What I have shown should at 
OHDVW GHIODWH $UPVWURQJ¶V REMHFWLRQV. I have clearly demonstrated that 
$UPVWURQJ¶VSRVLWLRQIDLOVE\KLVRZQVWDQGDUGVWKDWUHJXODULWLHVFDQDQG
often do serve as perfectly good explanations; and that although it is 
important to note that I have not solved the problem of induction for the 
Humean, I have shown that the Humean has at least as much right to 
reason inductively as many necessitarians. 
 Although I believe the necessitarian arguments pertaining to 
explanation and the problem of induction can be dealt with by the Humean 
IDLUO\DGHTXDWHO\WKHUHDUHPRUHVHULRXVREMHFWLRQVWR+XPH¶VPHWDSK\VLF
which I do not think can be overcome by the naïve regularity theorist. I 
outline these below with a view to showing how they can be dealt with by 
the sophisticated Humean. 
3.4 The Problem of Single-Case Uniformities 
For Hume (in respect of causal inference), observations of single-case 
uniformities would never bring about nomological ideas, but we cannot 
ignore single-case uniformities when approaching laws from the regularity 
WKHRULVW¶VPHWDSK\VLFDOSHUVSHFWLYH 
 When considering laws of nature in connection with observations 
of single-case uniformities, whereb\IRUDQ\JLYHQSDUWLFXODUµ[¶WKHUHKDV
RQO\ HYHU EHHQ RQH LQVWDQFH RI µ[¶ LQVWDQWLDWLQJ WKH SURSHUW\ ) DQG WKDW
SDUWLFXODUµ[¶DOVRLQVWDQWLDWHGWKHSroperty G, the proposition ׊x()[ĺGx) 
is true. However, this would bring about an enormous number of 
counterintuitive laws. It would be a law of nature, for example, if there 
had only ever been one person named William Shakespeare (the 
SOD\ZULJKW WKDW µDOO SHUVRQV QDPHG :illiam Shakespeare are 
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SOD\ZULJKWV¶Laws of this kind would certainly not usually be thought of 
as laws of nature, but without further development, the proponents of the 
naive regularity theory of laws of nature cannot deny their law-status. 
3.5.1 Non-Existent Subjects and Functional Laws 
A further problem is that the proposition ׊x)[ĺGx) is always true if no 
particulars ever instantiate the property F, for this proposition effectively 
WUDQVODWHVDVµHLWKHUWKDWWKLQJLVQRWDQ)RULIWKDWWKLQJLVDQ)LWLVDOVRD
*¶$UPVWURQJ2IFRXUVHLIWKHUHDUHQR)VWKHQWKHproposition 
is always true, potentially providing us with contradictory laws of nature. 
)RU H[DPSOH WKH SURSRVLWLRQ µ$OO XQLFRUQV DUH  PHWHUV WDOO¶ DQG µ$OO
XQLFRUQVDUHPHWHUVWDOO¶ZRXOGERth be laws of nature.  
This may lead us to add the condition that laws of nature should 
only apply to existent subjects; that is, a law of nature only takes the form ׊x)[ĺGx) if at some point in time there exists an instance of F. 
However, the extension of statements of uniformity to require existential 
quantification if they are to be laws would arguably have the unwanted 
knock on effect on the many functional laws we would like to include as 
laws of nature.  
3.5.2. Functional Laws 
Functional laws of the form X=F(Y), where X and Y stand for variable 
properties in a certain functional relationship, are common in modern 
science, but it is not clear that regularity theorists cannot accommodate 
them ,I ODZV XQGHU WKH UHJXODULW\ WKHRU\ PXVW EH IRUPHG µLQVWDQWLDOO\¶
then it seems in order to construe a functional law, all possible instances 
of the variables must be realised. 
 The law F=Ma is a functional law quantifying the relationship 
between mass, force and acceleration. The force being exerted on an 
object is directly proportional both to the mass of an object and to the rate 
at which that object is accelerating. By using the law F=Ma, we can 
calculate the force required to accelerate an object of one billion kilograms 
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at 1 m/s2 to be one billion Newtons. But suppose that no object has ever 
had the mass of exactly a billion kilograms. Does this mean (under the 
naive regularity view) that we cannot justifiably calculate the force 
required to accelerate this object?  
 Functional laws provide no indication of what instances have been 
UHDOLVHG EXW ZK\ VKRXOG WKH\ QHHG WR" ,I WKH SURSRVLWLRQ µDOO UDYHQV DUH
EODFN¶ ZHUH D JHQXLQH ODZ RI QDWXUH LW ZRXOG VKRZ DQ
omnitemporal/omnispatial relationship between instances of properties 
ZLWKLQ D V\VWHP QDPHO\ UDYHQV DQG EODFNQHVV 7KH ODZ µDOO UDYHQV DUH
EODFN¶SURYLGHVQRLQGLFDWLRQRIZKLFKLQVWDQFHVVDWLVI\WKHODZRQO\WKDW
no instances of ravens violate the law. For the Humean, the identification 
RI WKH ODZ RI QDWXUH µDOO UDYHQV DUH EODFN¶ FDQ FRPH IURP QRWKLQJ PRUH
than the observation of many ravens and inductive reasoning, and this 
seems to apply to functional laws as much as it does to non-functional 
ones. We observe the relationship between the two variables in question 
over time, and see that every instance observed conforms to a certain 
pattern, quantifiable into a specific functional relationship. Although the 
values for (unrealised cases of) Y may not be demonstrably entailed by X, 
this value can be inferred by inductive reasoning. The regularity theorist 
just argues that the counterfactuals are supported by the functional law, 
and what justifies the inference to the functional law is that mysterious 
logic which holds betZHHQ DQ LQGXFWLYH DUJXPHQW¶V SUHPLVHV DQG LWV
conclusion (see Suchting: 1968). We can, on this basis, infer a functional 
law ± the question becomes, what function do we choose? 
 Unfortunately for the naive regularity theorist, for any given 
relationship between two variables there is an infinite number of equally 
viable functional laws. With the law X=F(Y), F (the function) could be 
inferred by drawing a line on a graph (that plots the corresponding values 
of the variables) passing through all the instantiated values. We would 
naturally draw a straight line (see b) in the case of direct proportionality, 
EXW ZK\ VKRXOG ZH GR WKLV" 'UDZLQJ HUUDWLF µVTXLJJO\¶ OLQHV WKDW DOVR
pass through all the instantiated values (see a), would represent functional 
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relationship equally consistent with our data. How could we possibly 
know which functional relationship is the right one to hold, other than by 
mere intuition? 
 
Perhaps I could claim, as a naive regularity theorist, that both functional 
laws are in fact real laws in nature, corresponding to the same set of 
HYHQWV ,I , GR WKLV KRZHYHU , GHILQLWHO\ FDQ¶W PDNH WKH FRXQWHUIDFWXDl 
claims I might want to. I cannoW VD\ WKDW³if there were a object of mass 
one billion kilograms (when there had been no instantiations of an object 
of this mass being accelerated at 1 m/s2) it would require a force of one 
billion Newtons to act on it to accelerate that mass at 1 m/s2´, as I would 
have no justification for applying the F=Ma functional law over any other 
functional law consistent with the already instantiated instances. Claiming 
them both to be laws is not a viable option if I want either to be useful.  
As David Armstrong puts it: 
The difficulty for the naïve regularity theory is this. It seems natural to think 
that, although many possible functions are compatible with the data, there is in 
fact just one function which constitutes the law which actually governs the 
situation. But the relevant set of Humean uniformities do not logically determine 
what that function is. (Armstrong 1983: 38) 
X 
Y a 
b 
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,IZHFDQ¶WFKRRVHRQHIXQFWLRQRYHUDQRWKHUWKHQWKHUHJXODULW\WKHRULVWV¶
attempt to support counterfactuals using functional laws will fail. It seems 
to me, though, that although the kind of logical entailment Armstrong is 
looking for is absent, it is not unreasonable to think that some functions 
passing through the actualised instances of a functional law are primitively 
simpler than others. The straight line is, it seems to me, primitively 
simpler than the squiggly line. Primitive objective simplicity and inductive 
logic may give the Humean some confidence in their right to infer the 
right functional laws. Supporting counterfactuals, however, remains an 
issue for the naïve regularity theorist HYHQ LIZH¶UHKDSS\ to accept this 
objective primitive simplicity answer to the functional laws problem. 
3.6 Supporting Counterfactuals 
One of the most important criteria for laws of nature is that they can be 
used to support subjunctive conditionals/countHUIDFWXDOV , GRQ¶W want to 
be able to say39just WKDW³DOOUDYHQVDUHEODFNH[SODLQVZK\WKLVUDYHQZDV
REVHUYHGWREHEODFN´,DOVRZDQWWREHDEOHWRVD\WKDW³ZHUH,DUDYHQ,
ZRXOGKDYHEHHQEODFN´&ULWLFVRIWKH naive regularity theory of laws of 
nature claim that regularity theory laws are unable to support these 
counterfactual claims. 
3.6.1 Counterfactuals with no Instances 
Michael Tooley (Tooley 1987: 50), in a paper discussing reductionism 
with respect to laws, asks us to consider a psychophysical law connecting 
neurophysiological states to phenomenological states incapable of being 
derived from any other laws. The law relates to a certain brain state giving 
rise to an experience of a particular shade of purple, and applies only to 
sentient beings on Earth.  
 Let us assume that in world, w, that specific shade of purple is 
observed at time t. What happens when, in another possible world, w*, 
identical to w until time t-1, just before the first sentient being would have 
                                                          
39
 ŐĂŝŶ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞƐĂŬĞŽĨĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ?ĂƐƐƵŵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ?ĂůůƌĂǀĞŶƐĂƌĞďůĂĐŬ ?ŝƐĂůĂǁ ? 
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gazed upon a purple object (leading to the first experience of that shade of 
purple), w* LVGHVWUR\HGE\WKH6XQ":RXOGWKHFRXQWHUIDFWXDOµLIWKH6XQ
had not destroyed the Earth, the sentient being would have experienced 
SXUSOH¶KROG" 
 Tooley asserts that the counterfactual should hold in w*, but 
accorGLQJ WR WKH UHJXODULW\ WKHRULVW µWKH FRXQWHUIDFWXDO FDQQRW EH WUXH
XQOHVV WKH DSSURSULDWH SV\FKRSK\VLFDO ODZ REWDLQV¶ The fact that the 
counterfactual should hold WKRXJK LV DPHUH LQWXLWLRQRQ7RROH\¶VSDUW
There is no reason why the Humean must have this same intuition. For the 
Humean w* would have different laws, so why should the counterfactual 
be true. His argument is grounded by anti-Humean intuitions, so perhaps 
7RROH\¶VDUJXPHQWVKRXOGQ¶WRYHUO\FRQFHUQWKH+XPHDQ. 
  
3.6.2 Counterfactuals with Instances 
As we have seen, a regularity theory law is constituted by its instances; 
WKHUH LV QRWKLQJ PRUH WR WKH ODZ µDOO UDYHQV DUH EODFN¶ WKDQ WKH WRWDO
population of ravens and their colours. But all the actual ravens being 
black does not metaphysically necessitate that, were there an extra raven, 
it too would be black.  
 The necessitarian would argue that, given this is the case, there is 
no reason why were there to be an additional raven, it would be black, as 
for the Humean the laws supervene on their instances and not vice versa. 
,QRWKHUZRUGVLIWKHUHZDVDQH[WUDUDYHQWKHUH¶VQRWKLQJVWRSSLQJLWIURP
being red, despite it being a law (as it stands) that all ravens are black. 
Again though, this argument from the necessitarian simply assumes that 
the Humean has no viable means of supporting such counterfactuals, 
relying on his intuition that laws govern instances. Hume, however, gives 
us no indication of how we should deal with this problem. We shall see 
ZKHQZHORRNLQWR/HZLV¶VPRUHVRSKLVWLFDWHG+umeanism, though, that a 
viable means of judging counterfactuals can be found.  
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3.7 Accidental versus Non-Accidental Regularities 
7KHµDOOPHQFDOOHG:Llliam Shakespeare are playwrights¶H[DPSOHFDPH
out as a law because it was a single-case uniformity. This is also an 
example of an accidental regularity, but there are many accidental 
regularities that are not single-case uniformities. Reichenbach famously 
gives the example that all lumps of gold are smaller than a cubic mile 
(there are many lumps of gold!), contrasting this with the fact that all 
lumps of plutonium are smaller than a cubic mile. The former is 
accidental, the latter is non-accidental, as a lump of plutonium that large 
would greatly exceed its critical mass. This problem of accidental 
regularities poses a serious problem for the naive regularity theorist. A law 
must be more than just a regularity, DV ZLWKRXW DQ H[WUD FRQGLWLRQ LW¶V
impossible to pick out the genuine laws from the accidental regularities. 
The naïve regularity theory of laws of nature, it turns out, is subject to 
some insurmountable objections. This does not, however, rule out all 
Humean metaphysics.  
3.8 Conclusions 
In this chapter I have outlined the most basic version of the regularity 
theory of laws and the most common objections to the thesis. Although, as 
I demonstrated, the problem of induction is no more problematic for the 
Humean than it is for Armstrong40, the problems posed by single-case 
uniformities, non-existent subjects, counterfactuals and accidental 
regularities seem to rule out the naive regularity theory of laws of nature 
as a plausible Humean account of laws. As LQ +XPH¶V PHWDSK\VLFV RI
causation an instance of causation is just an instance of law, the problems 
with the Humean naive regularity theory of laws are also problems for his 
account of causation.  +RZHYHUWKHUHKDYHEHHQDWWHPSWVWRµVRSKLVWLFDWH¶
the regularity theory to overcome these problems. The sophisticated 
version is the topic of the next chapter. 
                                                          
40
 I shall later argue that it is no more problematic for the Humean as it is for the other 
necessitarian theories, either  W but this is work for another chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Sophisticated Regularity Theory 
 
4.1.1 David Lewis on Causation 
Lewis (1973) provides a counterfactual analysis of causation that avoids 
discrimination as to which events are generally considered to be causes 
(that is, the inus conditions we would normally take to be the cause, rather 
than other causally relevant factors), and concentrates on an unselective 
µEURDG DQG QRQ-GLVFULPLQDWRU\ FRQFHSW RI FDXVDWLRQ¶ Lewis 1973: 162). 
$OWKRXJK /HZLV DVVHVVHV KLV FRXQWHUIDFWXDOV WKURXJK µFRPSDUDWLYH RYHU-
all similarity betZHHQ SRVVLEOH ZRUOGV¶ (ibid), b\ RXWOLQLQJ /HZLV¶V
counterfactual account, the strong link between cause and law that I 
advocate should again become apparent.  
 In chapter 2 I concluded that when one is looking for the cause, X, 
of an event, Y, one should ignore the set of minimally sufficient 
conditions that were possible, but not actualised, and we should consider 
only whether X µLQ WKH FLUFXPVWDQFHV¶ZDVQRQ-redundant and sufficient 
IRU</HZLV¶VDFFRXQWSURYLGHVXVZLWKDPHDQVIRUHYDOXDWLQJZKHWKHU;
was necessary and/or sufficient for Y, and hence a means of judging 
whether X was the cause of Y. Crudely, if X occurred and Y occurred in 
our world, to determine whether X was the cause of Y, his method 
requires one to consider the closest possible world to ours where X does 
not occur, and consider whether Y occurs in that world. If Y does not 
occur in the closest possible non-X world, then X is determined to be the 
cause of Y.  
 Whether or not Y occurs in this closest of possible non-X world 
depends on how that world would evolve in accordance with the laws of 
nature of our world. On the face of it, this analysis may look to be 
unsatisfactory for those who wish to deny the reality of other possible 
worlds, but as Van Fraassen states, µRQH PD\ WDFLWO\ UHDG µZRUOG¶ DV a 
µPRGHO RI RXU ODQJXDJH¶¶ 9DQ )UDDVVHQ 9: 45) and get the same 
97 
 
results; so /HZLV¶V DQDO\VLV ZRUNV HTXDOO\ ZHOO LI ZH FRQsider possible 
worlds to be simply complete descriptions of the way the world could be. 
 Lewis thus presents his counterfactuals and counterfactual 
dependencies as follows: 
1. µA ฀฀฀ C  (if A were true then C would be true) is true at a world (w) iff (1) 
there are no A-ZRUOGVLQZKLFKFDVHLW¶VYDFXRXVO\WUXHRUVRPHA world 
where C holds is closer (to w) than is any A-world where C GRHV QRW KROG¶
(Lewis 1973: 164).  
2. Although there need not be one or more closest possible world, if there were A 
฀฀฀ C would be non-YDFXRXVO\ WUXH LII µC holds in all the closest A-ZRUOGV¶ 
(ibid). 
3. If A is true in the actual world, our world is the closest A-ZRUOGµ6R$฀฀฀ C is 
true iff C is. Here A ฀฀฀ C implies the material condition A฀&¶ (ibid).. 
It is also worth noting that there can be counterfactual dependencies upon 
large families of alternatives, as is often the case in measurements. For 
example: Rs (the family if possible propositions R1, R2, R3...) depend on 
Ps (The family of possible propositions P1, P2, P3...) if the Rs are the 
possible readings of a barometer and the Ps are the possible corresponding 
air pressures (see Lewis 1973: p165). 
4.1.2 Causal Dependence 
For Lewis, causal dependence is to be judged through considerations of 
counterfactual dependence, but this has been characterised in terms of 
propositions, whereas causal dependence holds between events. This is 
XQSUREOHPDWLFKRZHYHUDVµWRDQ\SRVVLEOHHvent e there corresponds the 
proposition O(e) that holds at all and only those worlds where e occurs. 
Counterfactual dependence among events is simply counterfactual 
GHSHQGHQFHDPRQJWKHFRUUHVSRQGLQJSURSRVLWLRQV¶Lewis 1973: 166). 
 He concludes that where neither events e nor c occur, e depends 
causally on c iff e would have occurred if c had occurred; and if both c 
and e occur then e depends causally on c iff, if c had not occurred then e 
would not have occurred. 
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4.1.3 The Transitivity of Causation 
For /HZLV µFDXVDO GHSHQGHQFH DPRQJ DFWXDO HYHQWV LPSOLHV FDXVDWLRQ«
but causation must always be transitive whereas causal dependence may 
QRW EH VR WKHUH FDQ EH FDXVDWLRQ ZLWKRXW FDXVDO GHSHQGHQFH¶ Lewis 
1973: 167). This distinction is important as it is supposed to deal with 
counter-examples to the counterfactual account where, in the closest 
possible non-c world, e would still have occurred despite it clearly being 
the case in our world that c was the cause of e. If Bob took suicide pill X 
from a pot of pLOOV DQG GLHG LW ZRXOG EH DEVXUG WR FODLP WKDW ; KDGQ¶W
NLOOHGKLPEHFDXVHLIKHKDGQ¶WKDYHWDNHQSLOO;KHZRXOGKDYHWDNHQSLOO
Y from the same pot, and that would have had the same effect. X clearly 
NLOOHG%REGHVSLWHWKHFRXQWHUIDFWXDOµLI%REKDGQRt taken X Bob would 
QRWKDYHGLHG¶EHLQJIDOVH%\ LQWURGXFLQJ WUDQVLWLYLW\ LQWRFDXVDWLRQ WKH
causal chain can be identified between Bob taking the specific pill X and 
%RE¶V GHDWK ZKHUH HDFK HYHQW LQ WKH FDXVDO FKDLQ LV FRXQWHUIDFWXDOO\
dependent on the event immediately prior to it in the chain. X can then be 
LGHQWLILHGDVWKHFDXVHRI%RE¶VGHDWK41. 
4.2.1 /DZVLQ/HZLV¶V&RQGLWLRQDO$QDO\VHV 
Lewis has presented a conditional analysis of causation close to the 
conceptual analysis provided by Mackie, in which he, too, argues that 
causal dependence should be analysed in terms of counterfactual 
dependence /HZLV¶V approach looks plausible, but given that his 
metaphysical assessment of counterfactuals is carried out by considering 
which possible worlds are closest, how GRHV /HZLV¶V FRXQWHUIDFWXDO
conditional account of singular causation rely on laws of nature? The 
answer to this lies both in the assessment of what considerations come into 
play when identifying the closest possible worlds, and the criteria Lewis 
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 dŚĞƌĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƉƌŽďůĞŵƐǁŝƚŚ>ĞǁŝƐ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ?ĨŽĐƵƐƐŝŶŐŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌŽŶ
problems arising through cases of pre-ĞŵƉƚŝŽŶ ?/ƐŚĂŶ ?ƚĞŶƚĞƌŝŶƚŽƚŚŝƐŵŝŶĞĨŝĞůĚ ?ďƵƚĨŽƌĂŐŽŽĚ
accŽƵŶƚƐĞĞWĞƚĞƌDĞŶǌŝĞƐ ?ĂƌƚŝĐĂůŝŶThe Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-counterfactuals/) 
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imposes when deciding what events occur when the possible worlds are 
OHIWWRµUXQRQ¶ 
 So how do we determine which of the possible non-X worlds is the 
closest? My hypothesis would certainly be supported if the laws of the 
closest non-X world, w*, must be the same laws as those of the actual 
world - but Lewis must deny this, so he claims that similarity of laws is 
µZHLJKW\ EXW QRW VDFUHG¶ 7KH VLPLODULWLHV RI SDUWLFXODU IDFW EHWZHHQ
worlds must also be taken into consideration, as an exact match over a 
large spatioWHPSRUDOUHJLRQLVDOVRDQLQGLFDWLRQRIFORVHQHVVµ,WPD\EH
ZRUWK D VPDOO PLUDFOH WR SURORQJ RU H[SDQG D UHJLRQ RI SHUIHFW PDWFK¶
(Lewis 1973: 164). GLYHQ /HZLV¶V DFFRXQW RI ODZV D VPDOO PLUDFOH
(judged by the laws of our world) could lead to very different laws in this 
close possible world. 
 Although having the same or very similar laws in a world 
contributes positively to the closeness of that world to the actual world, it 
is not necessarily the case that the closest possible non-X world will be a 
world with the same laws as the actual world. As it turns out, in the closest 
possible non-X world, w*, the laws of our world will almost certainly 
need to be broken in w* for X not to occur, but ± and herein lies the rub - 
µthe (counterfactual) analysis requires that (w) evolve thereafter in 
accordance with the actual laws¶42 (Lewis 1986: 43). /HZLV¶V account of 
singular causation in terms of counterfactual conditionals is, I think, very 
appealing, and laws remains absolutely central in determining which 
events are causal and which are not. ,I/HZLV¶VDFFRXQWRIODZVRIQDWXUH
turns out to be unacceptable, then so will his account of causation.  
  Lewis holds what is sometimes known as The Sophisticated 
Regularity Theory (SRT) RU WKH µZHE-of-lawV DFFRXQW¶ VHH 3VLOORV
2002), which retains the non-necessitarian nature of the naïve position, 
whilst dealing with some of the major objections against naive regularity 
theory we came across in the previous chapter. The greatest benefit of 
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SRT over the naive version is arguably its ability to distinguish accidental 
from non-accidental laws, but another benefit is that the practice of 
discovering the laws in the SRT matches nicely with scientific practice. 
Before the SRT can be spelt out in more detail, though, I must outline the 
SULQFLSOH XSRQ ZKLFK /HZLV¶V HQWLUH PHWDSK\VLFV LV EDVHG ± Humean 
Supervenience.   
4.2.2 Humean Supervenience 
Lewis RQFHFODLPHGWKDWKLVOLIH¶VZRUNFRXOG probably be summed up as a 
defence of Humean Supervenience. This is the claim that everything 
contingently true of a world like ours (a temporal-parts-world) is true in 
virtue of the patterns of fundamental property instantiation (and the 
fundamental relations that hold between them) in the mosaic discussed in 
the previous chapter ± as Bigelow puts it, µWUXWK VXSHUYHQHV RQ EHLQJ¶
(Bigelow 1988: 132). The doctrine of Humean Supervenience is µthat all 
else supervenes on the spatiotemporal arrangement of local qualities 
throughout all of history, past present and future (Lewis 1994: 474)¶)RU
Lewis, then, all contingent truths are true in virtue of these patterns of 
fundamental property instantiations, and the fundamental relations 
between these instantiations, and in virtue of these alone. It is thus a 
distinctly Humean thesis; that is, one devoid of metaphysical necessity.  
4.2.3 Lewisian Properties 
/HZLV¶VSURSHUWLHVDUHTXLGGLtistic; that is, their identities are not fixed by 
their causal/nomological roles, but by the quiddities they primitively 
possess. Lewisian properties are therefore categorical.  
 For Lewis, properties are sets of individuals43. The property of 
being red is the set of all the red things in this and all other possible 
worlds, and to instantiate the property of redness is to be a member of this 
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 In Work on a New Theory of Universals (Lewis 1983b) Lewis defines properties as classes of 
individuals, but he makes a point of rejecting this in favour of sets of individuals in On the 
Plurality of Worlds. See Lewis On the Plurality of Worlds Blackwell Publishing 2001 (first 
published 1986) pp48-53 
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set. As a modal realist Lewis is able to use this ontology of properties to 
account for contingent truths. It is a contingent truth that all ravens are 
black because there are non-black members of the set of ravens (as the set 
of ravens includes not only the ravens of the actual world, but also the 
ravens that exist in other possible worlds (many of which are not black)).  
 As there are infinitely many possible worlds, there are infinitely 
many sets of things. Some of these sets include only three things in our 
world, some include trillions across many possible worlds. Some members 
of properties (sets of objects) bear very little or no resemblance to one 
another (take the set of me, a brick, and a quark, for example). Properties 
are thus abundant (just think about how many sets of things there could be 
when you take the objects in this and all other possible worlds. It is 
inconceivable!). But most of these abundant properties are not the kind of 
properties we are accustomed to talking about ± properties like colours, 
charge, mass etc... Lewis calls the properties we usually consider to be the 
natural properties, µVSDUVH¶ SURSHUWLHV µ6KDULQJ >VSDUVH SURSHUWLHV@
makes for qualitative similarity, they carve at the joints, they are intrinsic, 
they are highly specific, the sets of instances are ipso facto not entirely 
miscellaneous, there are only just enough of them to characterise things 
FRPSOHWHO\ DQG ZLWKRXW UHGXQGDQF\¶ /HZLV   7KH SURSHUW\ RI
charge -1, then, is still just the set of all the things across possible worlds 
with charge -1, but it has the special status of being sparse.  
 Sparse properties (individual sparse properties as specific sets of 
individuals) are members of the set of all properties (the set of all possible 
sets of individuals), but they are special in the sense of being the kind of 
SURSHUWLHVZHXVHLQVFLHQFHDQGRUGLQDU\ODQJXDJH/HZLVZULWHVWKDWµZH
need no other entities [over and above the abundant properties], just an 
LQHJDOLWDULDQ GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH RQHV ZH¶YH DOUHDG\ JRW :KHQ D 
property belongs to this small minority, I call it a natural property¶Lewis 
2001: 60). Sparse properties, then, are just properties that, in a sense, glow 
in the dark ± there is some special significance to them, but they sets of 
particulars just like the abundant properties. There is a further distinction 
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to be made, however. The property of being a raven is a sparse property 
(on the face of it any property we have a name for is likely to be sparse). 
However it is not as natural as the property of having charge -1. Lewis 
thus allows for degrees of naturalness. Some properties - the ones that all 
and only their members would instantiate a single universal, were a theory 
of universals tenable - are perfectly natural. (See Lewis 1983: 344-346) 
For Lewis, the real universals (were universals a tenable theory of 
properties) would be those properties of fundamental physics.  
 As we saw, Lewis names some of the qualities of natural 
properties, but one may question what really distinguishes these from the 
very unnatural properties; that is, is there anything in their nature that 
makes them more or less natural? The DQVZHULVDVLPSOHQR/HZLV¶V is a 
nominalist account: according to Lewis, whether a property is unnatural, 
natural or perfectly natural is primitive matter, where either the predicate 
µQDWXUDO¶ LV LWVHOI SULPLWLYH RU LI WKLV LV XQDFFHSWDEOH SHUKDSV what 
distinguishes them is µSULPLWLYH REMHFWLYH UHVHPEODQFH DPRQJ
WKLQJV¶(ibid); either way, there is no special metaphysical distinction 
between natural and unnatural properties. 
4.3.1 /HZLV¶s Best Systems Analysis of Laws 
In the preceding chapter I outlined some of the major difficulties facing 
the naïve regularity theorist. The major unresolved issues arose from the 
problems found when trying to support counterfactuals, and when trying 
to distinguish laws from accidental regularities. Lewis makes important 
changes to the regularity theory of laws, whilst retaining its non-
necessitarian ideal, in order to solve these destructive problems. Along 
with Mill and Ramsey, Lewis develops a best systems analysis of laws. 
This system is also sometimes known as the web-of-laws (Psillos 2002: 
137-159), or the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account. Mill writes: 
According to one mode of expression, the question, What are the laws of nature? 
May be stated thus: What are the fewest and simplest assumptions, which, being 
granted, the whole existing order of nature would result? Another mode of 
stating it would be thus: What are the fewest general propositions from which all 
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the uniformities which exist in the universe might be deductively inferred? (Mill 
1911: 207) 
Lewis construes it slightly GLIIHUHQWO\ 8QGHU /HZLV¶V DFFRXQW WKH LGHDO
set of laws would be the set of regularities holding between perfectly 
natural properties and relations that (a) provides all the information about 
the world - entailing DOOWKHZRUOG¶VWUXWKV; and (b) is the simplest possible 
set of regularities.  
Given that the properties in these regularities have to be perfectly 
natural, satisfying both (a) and (b) is, in most cases, impossible44. All the 
information about the world could be gathered only LI DOO WKH ZRUOG¶V
truths were laws, and this surely cannot be right. Similarly, the simplest 
regularity would provide us with only a tiny fragment of information 
about the world. Given the impossibility of satisfying both (a) and (b) in 
most worlds, the best systems analysis cannot ask for this, and so Lewis 
concludes that a µFRQWLQJHQW JHQHUDOL]DWLRQ LV D ODZ LI DQG RQO\ if it 
appears as a theorem (or axiom) in each of the true deductive systems that 
DFKLHYHVDEHVWFRPELQDWLRQRIVLPSOLFLW\DQGVWUHQJWK¶Lewis 1973: 73). 
The laws turn out to be the regularities holding between perfectly natural 
properties and relations between them derivable from this ideally simple 
and strong (and simple and as informative as possible) description of the 
world. 7KH SDUDPHWHUV RI /HZLV¶V FRQFHSWLRQ RI ODZV DUH WKHUHIRUH IDU
better defined than that of the naive regularity theorist. 
 Unlike the naive regularity theory of laws, the best systems 
analysis prevents any old regularity counting as a law. Accidental 
UHJXODULWLHV OLNH µDOO SHRSOH FDOOHG :LOOLDP 6KDNHVSHDUH DUH JUHDW
SOD\ZULJKWV¶ZLOOQRW come out as laws of nature - firstly because it would 
not form part of or be derivable from the best system, and secondly 
because µEHLQJ FDOOHG :LOOLDP 6KDNHVSHDUH¶ LV QRW D SHUIHFWO\ QDWXUDO
SURSHUW\5HJXODULWLHVLQYROYLQJµJUXHOLNH¶properties are also ruled out as 
they are primitively unnatural. 
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 Perhaps both these criteria could be satisfied in some very uninteresting, simple worlds.  
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 Not only do the fundamental laws or axioms of the best system 
count as laws, but so do any propositions that logically follow from these 
axioms. On the face of it this is great, as many of the statements we accept 
as law-statements do not express the basic laws, but something less 
fundamental. The sWDWHPHQWµDOOHOHFWURQVKDYHFKDUJH-¶GRHVQRWH[SUHVV
one of the fundamental laws in our world45, but it is widely accepted as a 
law nonetheless. To deny this law-status would at the very least be 
counter-intuitive. Unfortunately we probably end up with far more laws 
WKDQZH¶d like, but this is a bullet the sophisticated regularity theorist must 
just bite. 
4.4 Does the Best Systems Analysis Solve the Problems of the Naive 
Regularity Theory?  
In this section I turn back to the remaining knock down objections to 
+XPH¶V QDwYH UHJXODULW\ WKHRU\ QDPHO\ WKH SUREOHPV SRVHG E\ QRQ-
existent subjects, functional laws, and counterfactuals with no instances) 
WRVHHZKHWKHU/HZLV¶VDFFRXQWIDUHVDQ\EHWWHU 
4.4.1 Non-Existent Subjects 
One of the problems with taking laws to be universal generalisations 
without further restrictions was that we could end up with an infinite 
number of incompatible laws. Where a law takes the form ׊x()[ĺGx), if 
there are no Fs in a world then the proposition is true for any G. I gave the 
H[DPSOH WKDW LWFRXOGEHD ODZWKDW µDOOXQLFRUQVDUHPHWUHV WDOO¶DQGD
ODZWKDWµDOOXQLFRUQVDUHPHWUHVWDOO¶LQWKHVDPHZRUOG%XWWKLVFDQQRW
be true once ZHLPSRVH WKHVRSKLVWLFDWHGUHJXODULW\ WKHRULVW¶VREMHFWLRQV
7KHEHVWV\VWHPPXVWEHDFRKHUHQWVHWDQGVRLW¶VORJLFDOO\LPSRVVLEOHIRU
regularities derivable from that set to contradict one another. 
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 WĞ ?ƌĞƵŶƐƵƌĞǁŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůůĂǁƐĂƌĞ ?ŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ďƵƚǁĞ ?ƌĞůŽŽŬŝŶŐƚŽƵŶŝĨǇƋƵĂŶƚƵŵ
mechanics and general relativity to form one uniform theory of quantum gravity. This would be a 
regularity from which all other laws could be derived. Even if there is no such regularity, laws like 
all electrons have charge -1 are not going to be fundamental in our world 
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 One interesting point to note, however, is that regularities with no 
instances can appear as laws in the best system. It is not logically 
impossible (in fact it is probably quite common) for laws without 
instances to be derivable from the best system. 
4.4.2 Counterfactuals with no instances 
 In section 3.6 we looked at MichaeO 7RROH\¶V REMHFWLRQ WR WKH QDLYH
regularity theory, in which he asked us to consider two worlds (w and w*) 
identical up until time t-1. In w at t a psychophysical law connecting 
neurophysiological states to phenomenological states determines that an 
individual gazes upon a purple object and experiences the phenomenological 
VWDWH µSXUSOH¶ 1R SXUSOH REMHFW KDG HYHU EHHQ REVHUYHG EHIRUH %XW LQ w* no 
individual ever gazes upon a purple object, because the Sun destroys the Earth at 
t-1. At w* the psychophysical law that obtains at w is not derivable from the best 
system, and so it seems the counterfactual µLI WKH 6XQ KDG QRW GHVWUR\HG WKH
(DUWKWKHVHQWLHQWEHLQJZRXOGKDYHH[SHULHQFHGSXUSOH¶ does not hold. 
  This looks problematic for LeZLV ,I WKH SV\FKRSK\VLFDO µODZ¶ LV QRW
derivable from the best system at w, then it is not a law at w, and Tooley would 
be right. However, as I suggested in 3.6, I think Lewis can just bite the bullet 
here, and claim either that (a) nature would have to be very unkind for this law 
not to be derivable from the best system given that the local particular matters of 
fact match perfectly at w and w* until t-1, and (b) if it turns out that this micro-
physical law is not a law, then so be it. A Humean need not find this outcome 
overly counterintuitive. 
4.4.3 Functional Laws 
 As we saZ DOWKRXJK WKLV LV QRW H[SOLFLW LQ +XPH¶V ZRUN WKH QDLYH
regularity theorist would have to deal with functional laws by invoking 
something like primitive simplicity (as given just the rules of the naive 
version, we have no reason to assume the right function to be inferred 
below is the straight line, or the squiggly one).  
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 Looking at the graph we can see that all the nodes are in a position that 
would satisfy the equation F=ma (denoted by a), but they would also 
satisfy whatever equation would be required to draw the function denoted 
b. Whereas the naïve regularity theorist has to make ad hoc additions to 
his thesis to choose a over b, it is very likely that for Lewis a would 
always come out as the function we must choose, as (unless nature is 
unkind) only a will ever be derivable from the best system. Using a and 
the criteria for closeness of possible worlds, the sophisticated regularity 
theorist can now VXSSRUWWKHFRXQWHUIDFWXDOµLIWKHUHKDGEHHQDIRUFHRI 
Newtons acting on an object of mass 1,000,000kg, then that object would 
have accelerated at 5 x10-6m/s2¶ 
 I have hopefully now shown that the objections raised against the 
naive version of the regularity theory do not pose so much of a threat 
against SRT. However there are further objections more specifically 
aimed at SRT that need to be addressed. 
4.5 New Problems for the Humean 
Although the sophisticated Humean overcomes the problems faced by the 
naïve regularity theory, the SRT faces a number of additional objections: 
F 
ma b 
a 
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4.5.1 7KHODZVDUHµSV\FKRORJLVWLF¶ 
As the best systems analysis is grounded on laws being derivable from the 
V\VWHPVRI UHJXODULWLHV µDFKLHYLQJ WKHEHVWFRPELQDWLRQRIVLPSOLFLW\Dnd 
VWUHQJWK¶, it would be best if we had some objective, language-
independent way of measuring and finding the right balance between 
them. If no such standard exists, then different standards will sometimes 
come up with different fundamental laws. What the true law-statements 
are would become dependent on our interpretations of simplicity and 
strength and the balance between them, but one of the main criterion we 
generally want to uphold is that laws should be mind-independent. 
According to Daniel Nolan, µLewis does not tell us what [the] objective 
VWDQGDUGV DUH EXW KH FODLPV WKHUH DUH VXFK VWDQGDUGV WR EH GLVFRYHUHG¶ 
1RODQ   ,I 1RODQ LV FRUUHFW WKHQ WKH µODZV WXUQ RXW WR EH
SV\FKRORJLVWLF¶REMHFWLRQGRHVQ¶WZRUNEXWLQ/HZLV¶VRZQZRUGVVXJJHVW
he does accept the possibility that there might be two equally reasonable 
standards of the balance between simplicity and strength. However, he 
FRQFOXGHV WKDW µLI QDWXUH LV NLQG WR XV WKH SUREOHP QHHGQ¶W DULVH >+H
supposes] our standards of simplicity strength and balance are only partly 
a matter of psychology... if nature is kind, the best system will be robustly 
EHVW ,¶GEODPH WKH WURXEOHRQXQNLQGQDWXUHQRWRQ WKHDQDO\VLV DQG ,
VXJJHVWZHQRWFURVVWKHVHEULGJHVXQOHVVZHFRPHWRWKHP¶/HZLV94: 
479). Of course in some worlds, these bridges may need to be crossed! 
4.5.2 6\VWHPVWKDWDUHµ(TXDO%HVW¶  
There is a similar objection which holds even if there is just one objective 
standard of simplicity and strength and balance. It is possible, although 
unlikely, that two distinct systems of regularities might come out as equal 
best on this objective scale. In which case choosing between one set of 
laws and another would again be a purely psychological matter. We surely 
cannot conclude that both systems provide us with the laws of that world, 
because one set of laws could determine some regularities to be laws that 
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the other rejects as laws46/HZLV¶VUHVSRQVH is simply that we would have 
WRFRQFHGHWKDWWKHODZVFRPLQJRXWRIWKHµEDUHO\-best systems would not 
YHU\ ZHOO GHVHUYH WKH QDPH RI ODZV¶ibid), but somehow this feels 
XQVDWLVIDFWRU\ ZKHQ ZH¶UH ORRNLQJ IRU D ZKROO\ REMHFWLYH PHWDSK\VLFDO
analysis of laws. Nevertheless, I tKLQNWKDW/HZLV¶VWKRXJKWWKDWVcience is 
extremely unlikely to give us contradictory best systems even if we use 
different standards is probably right. Given the confidence with which we 
can make this assumption, trying to work out what these standards are at 
WKLV WLPH LV XQQHFHVVDU\ $V IDU DV ,¶P FRQFHUQHG although it is hidden 
from us, we may as well take it that there is a primitive objective standard 
that can be applied, and furthermore that in most worlds, this standard will 
provide us with only one set of laws. 
4.5.3 The laws do not determine the instances 
 Once again we come across the objection that laws are supposed to 
metaphysically determine the regularities and their instances, not the other 
way around. If, as the objector would claim, laws must govern the way 
things in the world behave47, then the best systems analysis does not give 
us laws, as they clearly do not satisfy this condition. In contrast, 
$UPVWURQJ¶V QDWXral necessitation relation between universals plays 
SUHFLVHO\WKLVUROHµ7KLV)LVD*¶ZRXOG be metaphysically determined by 
the pre-existing necessitation relation holding between Fs and Gs (the 
law). If we ZDQW /HZLV¶V ODZV WR GHWHUPLQH WKHLU LQVWDQFHV then the 
instances of Fs being Gs would need to be metaphysically determined by 
WKH SURSRVLWLRQ µDOO )V DUH *V¶ DQG RI FRXUVH D SURSRVLWLRQ FDQQRW
determine a state of affairs. 
 However, it seems to me that the sophisticated Humean need not 
deny that instances of laws are determined. What they would deny is that 
WKH WHUP µGHWHUPLQHG¶ UHTXLUHV WKHUH WR EH metaphysical necessity - F is 
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 Lewis originally thought that the laws would be the law-regularities common to the best 
systems of all the reasonable standards for simplicity strength and balance (Lewis 1973: 73), but 
he later rejects this view (Lewis 1994: 479). 
47
  ?'ŽǀĞƌŶŝŶŐ ?ŚĞƌĞĐĂŶďĞƚĂŬĞŶĂƐ ?ŵĞƚĂƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůůǇŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚĂƚŝŶŐ ? ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞǇŶĞĞĚŶŽƚďĞ
taken as equivalent (as we shall see when we look at the dispositional analyses). 
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physically determined WREHD*LIµDOO)VDUH*¶V¶LVD law of nature, and 
the Humean has an account of laws. It is true that µthis electron has charge 
-¶ is partially determined by electrons millions of light years away and 
thousands of years in the future having charge -1, as the law itself depends 
upon these facts,  but, says the Humean, so what? As Beebee writesµODZV
are LQ SDUW IDFWV DERXW WKH IXWXUH¶ %Hebee 2000: 578). When the anti-
Humean says that laws determine the events, they are ultimately talking 
about a different kind of determination: one that requires metaphysical 
necessity. When they object that the best systems analysis of laws has no 
metaphysical necessity, no Humean will be troubled, as Humean 
Supervenience tells us that all truths in our world supervene on the 
spatiotemporal arrangement of local qualities. All the objection amounts 
to is an expression of anti-Humean intuition (and presumably Lewis does 
not have these intuitions!). 
4.5.4 We Can Neither Discover nor Use the Laws 
It is also argued that JLYHQ /HZLV¶V FRQFHSWLRQ RI ODZV ZH FDQQRW
discover what the laws are, nor use them in predictions. I hope I dealt with 
this objection in chapter 3 when offering a defence of Humeanism against 
the problem of induction. Ultimately, Armstrong and other necessitarians 
have access only to the same information (regularity observations) as the 
Humean, so they have to infer their laws inductively, too. If they wish to 
LQYRNHLQIHUHQFHWRWKHEHVWH[SODQDWLRQWRGRWKLVWKHQWKDW¶VILQHEXWWR
use it as an objection to Lewis they have to show that their explanation of 
the REVHUYDWLRQVLVDEHWWHUH[SODQDWLRQWKDQWKH+XPHDQ¶V, and given the 
discussion in section 3.3, we have good reason to think otherwise. 
4.5.5 Counter Examples 
 Tooley, Carroll and Menzies (cited by Beebee 2000: 584) try to refute the 
best systems analysis by providing a counter example. They attempt to 
provide us with two very simple worlds that precisely match in local 
particular matters of fact, but obviously differ in their laws. Each world 
has (only) one particle and one field (call the particle in world w X1, the 
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field in w Y1, the particle in world w* X2, and the field in w* Y2). In w 
we are asked to accept that it is a law that all X-particles, when they enter 
a Y-field, have spin-up, but in w* , we are told, it is a law that once an X-
particles enters a Y-field, it has spin-down - but neither X1 nor X2 ever 
enter into the Y-fields of their respective worlds. If this situation is 
possible, then the best systems analysis must be wrong, as w and w* must 
have the same laws DVWKHLUµPRVDLFV¶PDWFKSUHFLVHO\. 
  But this counter example does not work. If we take the complete 
description of w and w* WRLQFOXGHLWVODZVWKHQµby its own lightsLWLVQ¶W
as if the Ramsey-Lewis view entails that w and w* DUHSRVVLEOH¶%HHEHH
2000: 584). To re-state my defintion in 4.2.1, the laws are regularities 
holding between perfectly natural properties and the relations between 
them derivable from the ideally simple and strong (and simple and as 
informative as possible) description of the world. The vacuous laws 
proposed by Tooley, Carroll and Menzies do not qualify as laws in this 
ZRUOG XQGHU /HZLV¶V DFFRXQW, as they are not derivable from the ideally 
simple and strong description of the worlds. 
4.6 Categorical Properties and Quidditism 
In previous chapters I have said little about categorical properties except 
that these are non-powerful, non-potent, non-dispositional properties. 
They provide no driving force for particulars to move, they provide no 
µQHFHVVDU\ FRQQHFWLRQV¶ µRRPSK¶ µELII¶ RU µPHWDSK\VLFDO JOXH¶ RU DQ\
other of the seemingly endless list of what I consider simply to be virtual 
synonyms in the necesssitarian vocabulary). There is more to say about 
categorical properties, however, than what they are not, so in this section I 
shall give a positive account of what it is to be a categorical property. 
 A categorical property is a property whose nature is quiddistic48; 
so the identity of that property is a brute fact, not fixed by its causal or 
nomological role, but by the quiddity it possesses. µ3DUDGLJPDWLFDOO\ D
                                                          
48
 In section 7.3.3 I will explore the possibility that there are some categorical properties with 
non-quiddistic natures. 
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categorical property is thought to be a property whose identity is fixed by 
DTXLGGLW\¶%DUNHU  
 ,I ZH DFFHSW TXLGGLWLVP µWKH DFFHSWDQFH RI SULPLWLYH LGHQWLW\
between fundamental qXDOLWLHVDFURVVSRVVLEOHZRUOGV¶%ODFNLW
is a primitive fact that property F plays dispositional role49 D in the actual 
world, and in many other possible worlds property F will play entirely 
different dispositional roles, or perhaps even more than one dispositional 
role. In the closest possible worlds, F will play the same role as it does in 
the actual world, as we look for match of both laws and particular matters 
of fact, but there will be more possible worlds in which F does not play 
the D-role than worlds in which it does.50 
4.6.1 Quidditism in Sophisticated Humeanism 
As we have seen, for Lewis a property is a set of spatiotemporally located 
instances, where its instances are members of the property. Given his 
Humean supervenience, /HZLV¶V ODZs supervene upon local particular 
matters of fact, and the dispositional role of each of these local particular 
matters of fact is not fixed outside of the metaphysically contingent laws 
that hold in virtue of the Humean mosaic.  
 Where a property is a set of particulars, there are some properties 
ZKHUHE\ DOOPHPEHUVRI WKH VHW LQ WKH DFWXDOZRUOGSOD\ WKH µEODFNQHVV¶
UROHEXW LQRWKHUSRVVLEOHZRUOGV WKH\SOD\ WKH µFKDUJH -1¶ UROH/HZLV¶V
properties are thus quidditistic. The property F is the set of all the actual 
and possible objects in the F-set, whose dispositional role in any world is a 
brute fact determined by the Humean mosaic. F could therefore play the 
blackness-role in the actual world, w, and the redness role in w*. In fact, 
the property F need not even be a colour in other possible worlds - it could 
play the dispositional role of µPDNLQJ D QRLVH ZKHQ VFUDWFKHG¶ RU DQ\
                                                          
49
  ?ŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂů ?ŚĞƌĞƚĂŬĞƐƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ?ŝƚƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽƚŚĞŬŝŶĚŽĨĐĂƵƐĂůƌŽůĞƚhe 
property plays but implies no metaphysical glue. 
50
 Note there will be an infinite number of worlds in which F plays the D-role and an infinite 
ŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨǁŽƌůĚƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŝƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚ WƐŽƉĞƌŚĂƉƐƚŚŝƐ ?ŵĂŶǇŵŽƌĞ ?ŝƐƚŚĞƐĂŵĞŬŝŶĚŽĨĐůĂŝŵĂƐ
there being more natural numbers than odd numbers. This is unimportant for the purposes of 
this chapter, however. 
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other role for that matter. Similarly, the property G that plays the 
dispositional role of gravitational attraction in our world could, in w*, be 
the property playing the dispositional role F plays in our world.  
 ,Q OLJKW RI WKHVH LPSOLFDWLRQV 0XPIRUG ZULWHV WKDW µ>+DYLQJ D
quiddity] allows that F and G could swap their entire causal roles and yet 
still be the same properties the\ZHUH¶ (Mumford 2004: 104), we also see 
in Black µLewis explicitly allows... a world isomorphic with ours, but 
ZKHUHRQHRIWKHTXDUNFRORXUVKDVWUDGHGSODFHZLWKRQHRIWKHIODYRXUV¶ 
(Black 2000: 92) DQG DJDLQ LQ %LUG  µ4$ )RU DOO IXQGDPHQWDO
univHUVDOV)DQGSRZHUV;WKHUHLVDZRUOGZKHUH)ODFNV;¶ (Bird 2007: 
71). As Bird points out there is no obvious logical contradiction in holding 
the view that properties can swap powers, so the objection must be simply 
that this is extremely counter-intuitive. But counter-intuitiveness is not 
necessarily a proof that the thesis is wrong. 
 Bird admits that counter-intuitiveness alone does not prove 
categoricalism about properties false, even if it does motivate the search 
for another option. In light of this he provides a further objection that he 
believes shows the thesis to be undeniably false. It seems to be a further 
consequence of properties having quidditistic natures that in the same 
world two distinct properties could play the same dispositional role. This 
looks to follow from categoricalism, as, LIDSURSHUW\¶VLGHQWLW\LVDEUXWH
fact (and in no way fixed by its dispositional role), there is nothing to stop 
two properties, F and G, playing the same role in the actual world (two 
distinct sets can share members).   
 %LUGZULWHVWKDWDFFRUGLQJWRTXLGGLWLVPµ2QHDQGWKHVDPHZRUOG
w is such that (i) at w, universal F has powers {C1, C2,...}; (ii) at w, 
XQLYHUVDO * KDV SRZHUV ^& &` LLL )*¶ %LUG   ,Q WKLV
ZRUOGLWZRXOGIROORZWKDWLWZHUHDODZWKDWµ$OO)VDUH+V¶LWZRXOGDOVR
EHDODZWKDWµ$OO*VDUH+V¶7KLVLVSUREOHPDWLF%LUGVXJJHVWVEHFDXVH
where it is a law that all ravens are black, where both Fs and Gs are 
universals denoting ravens, and H is the universal playing the blackness-
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role51ZKHQZHVHHDEODFNUDYHQµWKHUHDUHWZRSRVVLEOHH[SODQDWLRQVIRU
WKLV¶ DOO)VDUH+VDQGDOO*VDUH+V:HFRXOGQHYHUNQRZZKLFK ± it 
could even be both! Bird argues that given this possibility of multiple 
UHDOLVDELOLW\RXUWHUPµUDYHQ¶FDQQHYHUUHIHU (See Bird 2007: 76-77). 
4.6.2 Against Against Quidditism ± Another Humean Position? 
I would like at this point to present a tentative response on behalf of the 
nominalist quidditist. The quidditist may, on the face of it, be able to claim 
WKDW%LUG¶V (QA1) is false of what he calls fundamental universals. We saw 
that Lewis makes the distinction between sparse and abundant properties ± 
unnatural, natural and perfectly natural properties. One nominalist account 
of the distinction between natural and unnatural properties is to say that 
the perfectly natural properties are the sets of individuals wherein their 
members across all possible worlds are all and only those particulars that 
are primitively qualitatively similar in the relevant respect52; another is to 
take the sets of natural properties to be primitively natural (see Lewis 
1983b: 344). µ1DWXUDOSURSHUWLHVZRXOGEHWKHRQHVZKRVHVKDUing makes 
IRUUHVHPEODQFHDQGWKHRQHVUHOHYDQWWRFDXVDOSRZHUV¶ibid).  
Properties are sets of their instances across all possible worlds, and 
the natural properties are those usually associated causal powers ± these 
sets, for Lewis, are glow in the dark sets, although we are never really 
enlightened any further. Here are three possible ways in which we might 
associate a property with a causal power: 
(i) The perfectly natural properties are sets whose instances in our 
world each play a role associated with a single causal power in our 
worldZKHUHDOOWKHSURSHUW\¶VLQVWDQFHVDUHORFDWHGLQRXUZRUOG 
(ii) The perfectly natural properties are the sets of instances associated 
with a single causal power in our world, and instances associated 
with single causal powers in other possible worlds, but perfectly 
                                                          
51
 My example. 
52
 Lewis acknowledges the technical difficulties with this, but claims they can be solved (albeit at 
Ă ?ĚĂƵŶƚŝŶŐƉƌŝĐĞŽĨĐŽŵƉůĞǆŝƚǇĂŶĚĂƌƚŝĨŝciality of our primitive)  
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natural property F in our world may be associated with a different 
causal power in our world than it is in other worlds. (So F might 
play the charge role in our world but the mass role in another. Both 
are relevant to causal powers.) 
(iii) The perfectly natural properties are the sets of instances associated 
with causal powers in our world, and the same causal powers in 
other worlds. 
Now if either (i) or (ii) were the correct interpretation, then the set of 
objects across  all possible worlds that all play the charge role (which is of 
course a property) would not be the natural property corresponding to 
the charge role in our world. This seems odd as it would indeed allow for 
WKHSHUPXWDWLRQRIDSURSHUW\¶VFDXVDOUROHDFross worlds, but nonetheless 
possible given that the identity of properties is not fixed by their causal 
roles.  
Lewis states the relation between instances of a property could be 
one of primitive resemblance - but what is meant by primitive 
resemblance? Given what we are trying trying to achieve by invoking the 
naturalness of properties (which is essentially to give us the properties we 
can use in laws), why not think any one member of a property resembles 
any another in the way we would normally use the term; that is, it is a 
primitive fact that the objects constituting a natural property look 
similar/behave in similar ways. Now, the resemblance of the members of 
these properties stretches across possible worlds, so why restrict our 
interpretation of resemblance to the actual world? :K\ VKRXOGQ¶W we 
allow the Humean to say that the instances of a perfectly natural property 
in our world also resemble (in our sense of appearance and causal role) its 
instances in other possible worlds? Lewis-style glow in the dark sets turn 
out to be the sets whose members are all and only the objects, actual and 
possible, whose members primitively resemble one another. This is not to 
say that it is in virtue of their primitive resemblance that they are the 
natural properties ± it just happens to be the case that the natural properties 
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are these sets. The identity of the natural properties is fixed primitively; 
that is, by a quiddity. 
 Under this quidditistic view, it is not possible for P to be the 
perfectly natural property corresponding to the property of charge -1 if it 
plays the repelling protons-role in the actual world (the charge -1-role), 
but the attracting protons-role in another, for this would violate the 
resemblance of the members of the property in the charge-respect. Lewis 
WHOOV XV WKDW µVKDULQJ RI WKH >VSDUVH RU QDWXUDO SURSHUWLHV@ PDNHV IRU
qualitative similarity... and there are only just enough of them to 
FKDUDFWHULVH WKLQJV FRPSOHWHO\ DQG ZLWKRXW UHGXQGDQF\¶ /HZLV b: 
60). If we allow the identity of natural properties to be fixed primitively, 
but it turns out that this primitive naturalness coincides with brute 
qualitative similarity, the quidditism arguments presented against Lewis 
would not hold much weight (at least not at the fundamental level). Bird 
argues that we have two explanations for all ravens (Fs and Gs) are black 
(H) ± all Fs are Hs, and all Gs are Hs ± but given (a) that the explanation 
must be a law, and (b) laws only include natural properties, only one of 
those explanations can be the right one, as only one of them is a law (the 
RQHRQO\LQFOXGLQJQDWXUDOSURSHUWLHV2XUWHUPµUDYHQ¶UHIHUs ± it refers 
WRWKHQDWXUDOSURSHUW\µUDYHQ¶ ± that is, the only set of all the actual and 
possible ravens.  
In short, given the nominalist exposition of the nature of a natural 
property, the nominalist might argue that it does not make sense to claim 
that a natural property-term does not refer (as more than one property play 
HDFKµQDWXUDO-property-UROH¶, because it is a de re necessary truth that only 
one of them can be a natural property; that is, the set of all the actual and 
possible particulars that resemble one another in that particular natural 
property-respect. Before applying the objections presented in the previous 
section, then, the proponent of the quidditism objection must first show 
that Lewis cannot draw the distinction he does between natural and 
unnatural properties DV ,¶YH SUHVHQWHG LW, and LW¶V QRW REYLRXV WKDW WKH
proponent of this objection can. 
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A number of issues will be raised here, though: firstly, to escape 
this quidditism objection my Humean is linking natural properties to 
causal roles (this is ultimately what happens when we start talking about 
brute similarities). Why should this be the case? The Humean can answer 
only that it is a primitive fact. Again, this is not a knock-down objection, 
but nonetheless we are introducing more and more scary primitives into 
this Humean metaphysic. At least, though, we have replaced the spooky 
µJORZ LQ WKH GDUN VHWV¶ ZLWK ZKDW , FRQVLGHU WR EH the more attractive 
µSULPLWLYH VLPLODULW\¶  
One might claim that linking a property to its causal role 
undermines the entire Humean project. In all possible worlds, if an object 
has charge -1, then it repels objects of charge +1. The whole point of 
Humeanism seemed to be the denial of this fact. However, it seems to me 
that at its core, Humeanism is about the denial of necessary connections in 
the objects ± a deQLDORIPHWDSK\VLFDOJOXHRIµRRPSK¶DQGµELII¶DQGVR
on. This characterisation of Humeanism still does not have any of these 
components in its ontology. It still has just particulars, and sets of 
particulars. There is no glue. 
  The necessitarian might also respond that without invoking 
universals or tropes, this position is still quidditistic (which the Humean 
would embrace, incidentally), and by the very nature of quidditistic 
ontologies, causal-role permutation for properties is possible. They will 
argue that you cannot take natural properties to be those that do not 
permute their causal roles across possible worlds, as this violates 
quidditism about properties. But this, I think, is to confuse what 
quidditism is all about. Quidditism is a thesis about what fixes the identity 
of a property, not about causal-role permutation, whereby the nature of a 
property¶V LGHQWLW\ LV IL[HG SULPLWLYHO\ DQG is entirely independent of 
modal facts. This is true of all ontologies in which properties are sets of 
particulars. One cannot look at the abstract entity that is a set, and from its 
nature tell what its powers are. The identity of the property is thus still a 
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primitive fact, and it is the fact that the members of the glow in the dark 
sets are primitively qualitatively similar.  
4.6.3 De Dicto Responses 
Bird presented his arguments as an ultimate refutation of quidditism - but 
Harold Noonan has recently published a paper showing %LUG¶V DUJXPHQW
to fail due to a conflation of de re and de dicto necessary truths (Noonan 
2010). Bird claims:  
(QB2) One and the same world w  is such that (i) at w  a property F has  powers 
C1, C2, ...; (ii) at w property G has powers C1, C2, ...; (iii) F is not a G (Bird 
2007: 75)  
But Noonan argues that, just as under haecceitism even though two men x 
and y might swap all their accidental properties (whilst keeping the same 
essential properties) and retain their identity, it does not follow that x 
could have all y¶V SURSHUWLHV DQG y retain his own properties. This is 
because although x and y can retain identity whilst swapping their 
properties, it is a de dicto necessary truth that QRµWZRPHQFDQRFFXS\WKH
same place(s) at (all) the same time(s)... Mutatis mutandis if property¶V 
identity is independent of powers in the sense implied by (QB1), i.e., that 
in distinct worlds distinct properties have the same powers, it does not 
follow that two properties can possess all the same powers in the same 
ZRUOG¶1RRQDQ 
 Bird is making a jump from the de re claim that where two 
properties (sets of particulars) play the same role in a single world, to the 
claim that ³WKHSURSHUW\WKat plays the EODFNQHVVUROH´GRHVQRWUHIHU%ut 
as the de re claim is perfectly consistent with it being a de dicto necessary 
truth (and Humeans have no issues with de dicto necessities) that no two 
properties can have the same causal powers in a single world, %LUG¶V
argument is fallacious. 
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Chapter 5 $UPVWURQJ¶V*RYHUQLQJ&RQFHSWLRQRI/DZVRI1DWXUH 
 
$UPVWURQJ¶V Yiew has received much criticism. Objections have been 
raised that I feel successfully refute the position, so in this chapter I will 
first provide a synopsis of the position, and then show why it is untenable 
by outlining these objections. This work is important, though, as I will 
ultimately demonstrate that the dispositional essentialist positions 
collapses into a new form of Armstrongianism, and so the same arguments 
presented in this chapter can ultimately be used to refute dispositional 
essentialism.  
 µ$UPVWURQJLDQLVP¶ is motivated by a conceptual assumption: 
namely, that the spatiotemporal distribution of properties should be 
determined by governing laws, rather than laws supervening on their 
instances. Armstrong wants a metaphysical conception that solves all the 
problems with the Humean positions: one that explains past regularities, 
allows us to make inductive inferences, provides support for judging 
counterfactuals (all of which I claim are not problematic for the Humean, 
anyway) DQG ZKHUH ODZV µJRYHUQ¶ WKHLU LQVWDQFHV As we have already 
seen, for many (all of them anti-Humeans!) there is an intuition that laws 
govern - in a metaphysically meaty sense - so it is worth showing why 
$UPVWURQJ¶Vgoverning conception of laws as relations between universals 
fails, and thus motivates the search for an alternative anti-Humean 
position. In the next section, though, I shall provide a little more detail 
about what the Armstrongian view is, and why its proponents think it 
should be adopted. 
5.1 The Theory 
Unlike the sophisticated Humeans, Armstrongians reject nominalism 
about properties in favour of universals. Armstrong adopts the following 
views: 
1. That all natural properties are universals;  
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2. Immanent realism about universals; that is, one and the same universal 
is wholly present in each instantiation of it, but it exists only in its 
instances. (7KHXQLYHUVDOµFKDUJH¶therefore exists only where there is 
an instance of charge; this clearly contrasts with the view that they 
exist transcendentally.); 
3. That there is a hierarchy of universals. Examples of first order 
XQLYHUVDOV ZRXOG EH µUHG¶ DQG µFKDUJH -¶, but there are also second 
order relations between first order universals, and so on; 
4. There are second-order natural necessitation relations, N, that hold 
between two (or more) first order universals, denoted N(F,G). Where 
N(F,G) holds in a world, it is metaphysically necessary that all Fs are 
Gs ± N(F,G) is a law of nature.   
In light of these claims, Armstrong would posit that there are no laws in 
worlds where there are no instances of the second-order universal, N, 
standing between two first order universals. This, I suppose, is intuitively 
appealing for those without Humean intuitions. Necessitarians may well 
want to claim that where there are no necessary connections between 
distinct existences (in the objects) in a world qualitatively similar to ours, 
there are no laws53 - Armstrong¶VSRVLWLRQLIWHQable, provides us with the 
requisite metaphysical necessity to satisfy these claims. 
Suppose in world w the states of affairs: µN(F,G) and x is F¶ is 
actualised. It follows that x is also G. Although N, F and G are all 
universals whose causal/nomological roles are contingent (as N(F,G) 
holds only contingently in any world), it is still true that in all possible 
ZRUOGV LQZKLFK µ1)*DQG x LV)¶ LV WUXH µx is also G¶. We therefore 
have necessary connections between distinct existences, despite the 
properties themselves having no fixed transworld causal role.  
                                                          
53
 This intuition arises from our concept of causation/law in which necessary connection plays an 
integral role. However as we discussed in the opening chapters, necessary connection can be a part 
of our concept of causation, but need not a part of our metaphysics of causation. 
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According to Armstrong, then, non-accidental regularities differ from 
accidental regularities, because laws involve a natural necessitation 
relation between the universals. So: 
1. Armstrongianism provides a viable way of distinguishing between 
accidental and non-accidental regularities; 
2. It provides a means of supporting counterfactuals; 
3. There are explanations for uniformities. µ>8QOLNH ZLWK WKH UHJXODULW\
theorist],the modal character of laws is explained¶ 0XPIRUG 
87);54  
4. Laws govern. 
If the view works, it satisfies all the desiderata for the necessitarian. 
5.2  Causation in Armstrongianism 
Armstrong (1983) initially claims that the link between cause and law in 
his view is just de facto. But unsurprisingly there is a far stronger 
connection than this. For the naive regularity theorist a cause is just an 
instance of a regularity (which equates to an instance of law). As we saw, 
this view of course failed for numerous reasons. Armstrong, however, also 
sees a cause-effect relation to be an instance of nomic-connection. Unlike 
the naive regularity theorist, the holders of the Armstrongian view do not 
take every UHJXODULW\WREHDODZ7KHLUODZVDUHµVWURQJODZV¶+HDWKHFRWH
and Armstrong 1991: 69); that is to say the only regularities that actually 
count as laws are those where the natural necessitation relation sits 
between the relevant properties. 
What MXVWLILHVWKHLUEHOLHILQWKLVµFDXVHDVLQVWDQFHRIODZ¶YLHZLV
they say, the repeatability of causal interactions. When we observe what 
                                                          
54
 I cannot agree with Mumford here. Lewis has a very clear conception of modality based on his 
view of laws, properties and modal realism. With SRT the laws are contingent upon the 
VSDWLRWHPSRUDOORFDWLRQRIORFDOSDUWLFXODUPDWWHUVRIIDFW7KHµPRGDOFKDUDFWHURIODZV¶KDVEHHQ 
thoroughly explained! 
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we think is a causal process where event c looks to be the cause of event e, 
in science we try to isolate the more specific properties involved in the 
causal interaction. We make small adjustments to the circumstances in 
which c originally occurred and see whether e still occurs. To take a very 
simple example, if I dropped a cold cube of glass into a glass of water and 
the water got colder, using scientific method to determine precisely what 
SURSHUW\ RI WKH µPDFUR-FDXVH¶ caused the water to get colder, I would 
UHSHDWWKHH[SHULPHQWZLWKVPDOOFKDQJHV,¶G  try dropping a cube of 
glass with a higher temperature into the water and re-measure the 
temperature of the water. I would then drop a cube of iron at the same 
temperature as the original cube of glass into the water and see if the water 
got colder, and then a spherical block of the warmer glass into the water 
and see if the water got colder... We could eventually conclude that the 
relevant property was the temperature of the substance dropped in the 
water.  
 Once these experiments have been conducted and the relevant 
properties isolated, we can repeat the experiment many times, and just as 
Kripke finds that it is a posteriori necessary that water is H2O, so it is 
discoverable a posteriori that there is natural necessitation relation 
between the identified cause-property and the identified effect-property. 
As every causal interaction is an instance of one (or more) universal 
followed by an instance of another (or more than one) universal where the 
universals involved are linked by the natural necessitation relation, we can 
say that every causal sequence is an instantiation of a law. 
 It does not follow, of course, that every instance of law is an 
instance of causation. Instances of synchronic ODZVOLNHµDOOHOHFWURQVKDYH
charge -¶ZRXOGQRWEHLQVWDQFHVRIcausation, so extra conditions need to 
be assigned. Regardless of what these conditions are though, all causes are 
instances of laws, and so again the strong connection between cause and 
law is evident in the Armstrongian conception 
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5.3  The Supposed $GYDQWDJHVRI$UPVWURQJ¶V0HWDSK\VLF    
I will now take a look at the implications of the Armstrongian view as set 
out in section 5.2 (starting with number 4). As Helen Beebee points out, 
Armstrongians often claim that: 
The prevalence of the view that laws play a governing role suggests a quick 
refutation of Humeanism: if it is a conceptual truth that laws govern, then 
 Humeanism, which accords laws no such status, must be false on 
conceptual grounds... According to this line of argument, Humeanism is based 
on a conceptual error: that of thinking that it is conceptually possible for 
something that does QRWJRYHUQWREHDODZ¶%HHEHH 
Laws, according to the Humean, are true descriptions of the world in 
terms of regularities (with the various restrictions imposed by the best 
systems analysis), but if the concept of law requires laws to govern in the 
stronger sense; that is, one that includes metaphysical necessity, then 
Humean µlaws¶ just cannot be laws. $UPVWURQJ¶V QDWXUDO QHFHVVLWDWLRQ
relation, on the other hand, gives laws precisely the kind of governing role 
our concept of law is held to require. 
 It is, I think, important to note that even if this were the case, the 
main implication would be that the Humean ontology would be one 
without laws. The world could still be a Humean mosaic, where all truths 
supervene on local particular matters of fact - so this objection does not 
rule out the basic Humean ontology. However, there are further unwanted 
implications for the Humean, for without laws, the Lewisian 
counterfactual account of causation cannot function.  Given my success 
theory position when it comes to the conceptual analysis of cause and law, 
though, if there turns out to be no laws in the world, then something has 
gone wrong with the analysis of the notion of laws. 
 The Humean must admit that their laws do not play a governing 
role ± DW OHDVW LQ WKH VHQVHRI µPHWDSK\VLFDOO\ JRYHUQLQJ¶. So we cannot 
attack the objection on these grounds. The question is, though, does the 
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concept of law really involve a governing aspect55. I discussed this issue 
in chapter 2, concluding that this particular de dicto argument against 
Humeanism was inadmissible, but to emphasise why I think it is perfectly 
plausible for laws not to govern their instances, we can look to Helen 
%HHEHH¶V:  
 Beebee argues that this governing aspect of laws probably derives 
from aspects of prescriptive laws, unrelated to the kind of metaphysical 
endeavour we are currently engaging in ± for example, the State governs 
our actions in such a way that if we break the law then we are held 
DFFRXQWDEOHIRULW%XWFODLPV%HHEHHµa priori reflection on the nature of 
natural laws by themselves does not yield any requirement to think of 
them as playing a governing role56¶%HHEHH The trouble with 
WKHµODZVPXVWJRYHUQ¶REMHFWLRQ, then, is simply that those who believe a 
governing role is central to the concept of law are just asserting their own 
µODZV PXVW JRYHUQ¶ intuition. Why should the Humean, who does not 
share these intuitions, concede that any arguments resting on the 
conceptual claims of the anti-Humean are at all troublesome? As we have 
seen, the sophisticated Humean thinks he can use his laws to support all 
WKHFULWHULDODZVQHHGWRµ/DZVJRYHUQ¶ is not one of these conditions, and 
because he can provide a more ontologically parsimonious metaphysic 
whilst avoiding the necessitarians¶ appeal to some entity of which we have 
no positively contentful idea of, the Humean account of laws as purely 
GHVFULSWLYHHQWLWLHVLVDFFRUGLQJWRWKH+XPHDQ¶VLQWXLWLRQVDERXWODZV at 
least, far more appealing.  
 With respect to the first three µbenefits¶, we should remember that 
the sophisticated Humean satisfies them all, without postulating the N-
relation. Not only that but with respect to claim 2, as I have already 
argued, regularities in themselves are often the best explanations for our 
observations.  
                                                          
55
 Interestingly some proponents of the dispositionalist ontology also deny this (Bird 2007: ch.9.) 
56
 My emphasis 
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 Not much headway made so far. But let us suppose (quite 
incorrectly!) WKDW $UPVWURQJ¶V QHFHVVLWDWLRQ UHODWLRQ LV VRPHKRZ EHWWHU
than sophisticated Humeanism in so far as it provides better explanations 
of our observations, more of a right for us to reason inductively, and so 
forth. These virtues alone cannot be sufficient for us to accept the theory ± 
it has to stand up to metaphysical scrutiny. There are important a priori 
objections that must (and, as it turns out, cannot) be resolved. 
5.4 What is the N-relation, anyway ± a pseudo objection? 
The N-relation is a relation (a second order universal) that holds between 
first-order universals ± the natural properties. But how are we to 
understand this entity? The answer is simply that we cannot. It is an 
unanalysible relation that exists in the world and plays the role Armstrong 
DVVLJQV LW 7R H[SODLQ D SKHQRPHQRQ OLNH µDOO UDYHQV DUH EODFN¶ WKHQ
Armstrong appeals to a primitive matter of fact ± that there is an 
unanalysable natural necessitation relation holding between the two 
natural properties. The regularity theorist appeals to higher-order 
regularities, but ultimately he too appeals to a sui generis fact: the relevant 
highest-order regularity. This is not a knock down objection to 
Armstrongianism by any means, but I wish to once again highlight that the 
proponent of the view is as much committed to primitives as the Humean. 
5.5 Quidditism in the Armstrongian View 
I presented the quidditism argument against Lewis in the previous chapter, 
and concluded that if Lewis could justify the claim that the perfectly 
natural properties are perfectly natural due to primitive resemblance 
(where primitive resemblance is relevant to resembling causal roles), then 
SRT is not susceptible to the de re quidditism objections. Furthermore, 
1RRQDQ¶V de dicto argument provided significant support for the Humean. 
%XWWKDW¶VQRWWRVD\WKLVUHVSRQVHWRWKH de re quidditism objections hold 
weight against other metaphysical theories with different conceptions of 
properties.  
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 Much of what was said by the necessitarians in answer to the 
Lewisian view applies equally to the Armstrongian conception. As we 
have seen, Armstrong explains regularities by appealing to governing 
extrinsic ODZV7KHSDUWLFXODUV¶SURSHUWLHVDUHWKHPVHOYHVDUHLQHUWDQGLW
is the natural necessitation relations between the universals that determine 
how the particulars that instantiate those universals behave. But if the 
universals confer no causal powers, they are categorical in a way that 
leads to exactly the same problems posed by dispositionalists against 
Humean ontologies. As the natural necessitation relations hold 
contingently in every world, even if N(F,G) holds in the actual world there 
will be many worlds in which N(F,G) does not hold, so although for 
Armstrong the properties are universals and not classes of individuals, 
there remains nothing to stop the property F playing a completely different 
dispositional (causal/nomological) role in another possible world than the 
role it plays in the actual world. But ,GRQ¶WWKLQN$UPVWURQJFDQ draw a 
distinction between natural and unnatural properties in terms of primitive 
similarity between the objects that instantiate them, as the objects 
instantiating these properties play no constitutive role in universals. It 
seems to me, then, that there would be no such thing as an unnatural 
universal57, and so the causal role-permutation arguments raised against 
quidditism seem to work. However, one must again note that these anti-
quidditism objections are nothing more than counter-intuitive implications 
RI$UPVWURQJ¶VYLHZ. 
Furthermore WKHUH LV QR UHDVRQ ZK\ 1RRQDQ¶V µde dicto¶ DUJXPHQW WKDW
%LUG¶VSURSRVal is fallacious, is equally useful for the Armstrongian as it is 
for the Humean. 
5.6 The Knock Down Objection 
There is, however, a knock down objection to the Armstrongian view that 
does not apply to the Humean. The N-relation, for Armstrong, is a second-
order universal, but it is a universal nonetheless, and we know already that 
                                                          
57
 EŽƚĞ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚ ?ƚŚĂƚEŽŽŶĂŶ ?Ɛde dicto response could be used against Bird by the 
Armstrongian, too. 
126 
 
universals are categorical properties for Armstrong ± that is, their identity 
is not fixed by any causal powers it may have and it has no causal powers 
essentially. All we are told by Armstrong is that where an N-relation holds 
between two universals in a world, any instantiation of the first will be 
coinstantiated or followed with an instance of the second. 
 I showed in chapter 3 that a regularity relation between universals 
provides us with the same entailments as what the natural necessitation 
relation is supposed to entail; namely that all Fs are Gs. However, by the 
YHU\ QDWXUH RI $UPVWURQJ¶V TXLGGLtistic properties, N, as a universal, 
cannot have a modal character without contravening his conception of 
properties. The universal, N, may play the role of a different relation in 
DQRWKHU SRVVLEOH ZRUOG 1 PLJKW IRU H[DPSOH SOD\ WKH µWDOOHU WKDQ¶
relational role, where N(F,G) just means that the Fs are taller than the Gs. 
But Fs being taller than Gs would not be metaphysically necessary.  
 In our world N(F,G) is not determined by the universal 
generalisation ± the universal generalisation, we are told, is determined by 
WKH QHFHVVLWDWLRQ UHODWLRQ 5)*ĺ ׊[)[ĺ*[ is a de dicto necessity, 
but there is something metaphysically stronger in the case of the 
necessitation relation$UPVWURQJGRHVQ¶WZDQW1)*WREHequivalent to ׊[)[ĺ*[, and so we need some reason independent from linguistic 
meaning for thinking N(F,G) metaphysically necessitates ׊[)[ĺ*[. 
 Bird (2005) provides the Armstrongian with two options (neither 
of which, he concludes, helps). The first option is this: 
(I*)  <N(F,G)> (merely) implies <R(F,G)58> (Bird 2005: 150) 
This material implication simply suggests a regularity between N(F,G) 
and R(F,G), which I would symbolise as R(N(F,G), R(F,G)). This is 
µPHUHO\¶DUHJXODULW\DQG%LUGUHMHFWV LW (on behalf of the Armstrongian) 
as a plausible candidate, for according to both Bird and Armstrong, a 
regularity cannot explain its instances.  
                                                          
58
 Bird uses R(F,G) in much the same way as I introduced in chapter 3. 
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 Armstrong looks to be hoisted by his own petard. He claimed he 
could use IBE to infer N(F,G) from observed regularities, as N(F,G) is (he 
claims) the best explanation for these regularities; but how does he explain 
the connection between instances of µN(F,G) and R(F,G)59¶ without 
conferring a modal character on N, a universal which, according to 
$UPVWURQJ¶V YLHZ RI XQLYHUVDOV VKRXOG EH FDWHJRULFDO LI KLV YLHZ LV Wo 
remain consistent). As we have already seen, by his own standards, he 
cannot explain it through a constant conjunction between the two. 
 Now I would of course disagree. Were there to be a constant 
conjunction between instances of N(F,G) and instances of R(F,G) for any 
)DQGDQ\*DQ LQVWDQFHRI µ1)*DQG5)*¶FRXOGEHH[SODLQHG by 
the regularity, R(N(F,G), R(F,G)). Armstrong cannot appeal to this, and so 
he must postulate a further necessitation relation, which Bird characterises 
as the third order relation between second order relations N*(N,R). But 
precisely the same problem will arise when we take into consideration the 
non-modal character of N*. We will have to postulate a fourth order 
universal N**, and so forth ad infinitum. There is no order of N relation 
that (without Armstrong breaking his own rules) can ever provide the 
modal force Armstrong requires, and so the regress is vicious. 
5.6 Concluding Remarks 
The Armstrongian view is compelling to those with anti-Humean 
intuitions, in that it provides the metaphysical glue they desire, but 
ultimately the position is fundamentally flawed. The kind of necessitation 
WKH $UPVWURQJLDQ YLHZ SURSRVHV LV µFRQWLQJHQW¶, but this succumbs to a 
vicious regress. To stop the regress, the N-relation must have a modal 
character that is constant across all possible worlds, but $UPVWURQJ¶V
account of universals does not allow this. 
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 dŚĂƚŝƐ ?ƚŚĞĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ?ƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĂůnecessitation relation holding between two 
ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůƐ ? ?ĂŶĚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞŐƵůĂƌĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚŽƐĞƐĂŵĞƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůƐ ? ? 
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Chapter 6: Scientific Essentialism 
 
It should be becoming increasingly clear that any substantial metaphysical 
analysis of laws and causation will be largely concerned with the kind of 
properties and relations allowed in the different ontologies. To avoid the 
problems of quidditistic ontologies, whilst allowing for metaphysical glue 
in the world, many philosophers now posit dispositional properties - the 
identities of these properties are wholly fixed by their causal relations, and 
they, by their very nature, FRQIHU FDXVDO µSRZHUV¶ RQ WKH WKLQJV WKDW
instantiate them. Ellisian scientific essentialists embrace dispositions as 
the powerful properties in nature, and claim that these properties provide 
the oomph in our physical system ± LWLVWKXVDµGLVSRVLWLRQDOHVVHQWLDOLVW¶
position, as at least some properties have dispositional essences. Unlike 
the neo-dispositionalists I will discuss in the next chapter, though, Ellis 
also believes there are categorical properties in the world, but that these 
properties are not problematic in the same way as the Humean and 
Armstrongian quidditistic properties are. Scientific essentialism, though, is 
best known for its commitment to Natural Kinds. Scientific Essentialists 
believe the world is highly structured by hierarchies of natural kinds with 
real essences, and it is this aspect of Scientific Essentialism that forms the 
EDVLVRI(OOLV¶VDFFRXQWRIODZV. 
 In this chapter I outline scientific essentialism, its conception of 
laws, and the properties it commits itself to. I present arguments for and 
against the inclusion of categorical properties in the ontology, including a 
discussion of the implications of general relativity, and concluding that the 
neo-dispositionalist still has much work to do if he is to successfully refute 
(OOLV¶VSRVLWLRQE\UXOLQJ out quidditistic properties.  
6.1 $Q,QWURGXFWLRQWR3URSHUWLHVLQ(OOLV¶V$FFRXQW 
Quidditism may not have been completely destroyed by the arguments 
presented in previous chapters, but nevertheless, perhaps the supposedly 
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counterintuitive conclusions of quidditism, combined with the failure of 
$UPVWURQJ¶V QHFHVVLWDWLRQ UHODWLRQ DWWHPSW WR SURYLGH PHWDSK\VLFal 
necessity, is enough to justify a search for other options.  
The proposed problems with quidditistic ontologies arise from the 
identity of quidditistic properties being antecedent to modal facts. The 
identity of dispositional properties, on the other hand, is entirely fixed by 
stimulus/manifestation-relations (SM-relations) central to their thesis of 
physical modality. Now, given that the identity of these properties is 
determined by their manifestations and stimulus conditions, their identity 
is supposed to be more than just a brute fact - it is thus metaphysically 
impossible for the dispositional roles they play to change in this, or any 
other possible world. Unlike categorical properties, then, it is claimed that 
dispositional properties (according to dispositional essentialists) do not 
possess quiddities, as their identities are fixed by their causal/nomological 
roles (more on this in chapter 7). 
 Dispositional properties are also supposed to be intrinsically 
µSRZHUIXO¶ SURYLGLQJ WKH µRRPSK¶ in causal interactions. They are 
instantiated in particulars, and wholly determine how these particulars 
behave. Dispositional propertLHV DUH ZKDW PLJKW EH FDOOHG µPRGDOO\
DFWLYH¶, as, if there is such a thing as necessary connection between 
distinct existences (as they believe), the dispositional essentialists would 
hold that these connections exist at least partly in virtue of properties with 
dispositional essences. 
 In chapter 7 I discuss neo-dispositionalism, the view that all 
properties have a dispositional essence, but Ellis believes that the world 
consists of both dispositional properties, and categorical properties ± the 
FDWHJRULFDO SURSHUWLHV EHLQJ µSRZHUOHVV¶ SURSHUWLHV FRQQHFWHG ZLWK
structure and numerical relations. Ellis argues that categorical properties 
need not pose so much of a problem as Bird suggests, though ± indeed, the 
properties he identifies as having quidditistic natures are some of the most 
µNQRZDEOH¶SURSHUWLHVRIWKHPDOO 
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 Before entering into the debate about what I, following Bird, call 
WKH µPL[HG YLHZ¶ (that there are both categorical and dispositional 
SURSHUWLHVLVWHQDEOHLW¶VZRUWKORRNLQJDW (OOLV¶VVFLHQWLILFHVVHQWLDOLVPLQ
more detail. 
6.2 An Ontology of Natural Kinds 
(OOLV¶V RQWRORJ\ LVRQH ULFKZLWKQDWXUDO NLQGV+HKolds initially 
that there are natural kinds of processes, natural kinds of substance, and 
natural kinds of properties. (He later (Ellis 2010: 57-62) reduces this to 
just natural kinds of process and natural kinds of properties, by fitting the 
category of substances into the category of processes, but going into 
further detail here is unnecessary). Process natural kinds have dynamical 
members (for example: the decaying of a carbon-14 isotope), substance 
natural kinds have substances as members (for example: a cabon-14 
isotope), and natural kinds of properties/relations have properties and 
relations as their members. Members of natural kinds usually have both 
accidental and essential properties: accidental properties can be gained and 
lost without that substance/process/property ceasing to be a member of the 
kind it was before the changes, but central to scientific essentialism is that 
if a substance/process/property does not instantiate all the essential 
properties of natural kind, K, then that substance/process/property is not a 
member of the natural kind, K. Hence if it is an essential property of an 
electron that it has charge -1, an electron cannot have charge +1. Scientific 
essentialism is thus what Ellis calls a scientific realist metaphysic. Natural 
kinds are out there in the world whether we have discovered them or not, 
and, according to Ellis, the very aim of science is to discover what the 
natural kinds are, and importantly, which properties are essential to which 
natural kinds. 
 (OOLV¶VLVDQRQWRORJ\ RIUHDOPHWDSK\VLFDOQHFHVVLW\ZKHUHµZKDW
is metaphysically necessary is what is substantively true in all worlds in 
which the things or kinds of things referred to exist, and vacuously true in 
DOO SRVVLEOH ZRUOGV¶ Ellis 2000: 335). Following Kripke (1972), Ellis 
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believes that since in our world we refer to H2O as water, if we used the 
WHUPµZDWHU¶WRUHIHUWRDQ\VXEVWDQFHRWKHUWKDQ+20, even if it looked and 
behaved precisely as H2O does, we would be saying something false. But 
µZDWHULV+22¶LVQRW de re necessary LQYLUWXHRIWKHµnominal HVVHQFH¶RI
water, where WKH QRPLQDO HVVHQFH RI D NLQG LV µWKH VHW RI SRZHUV RU
structures that a thing must have, or perhaps just the set of predicates that 
must be satisfied by something, for it to be called a thLQJ RI WKDW NLQG¶
(Ellis 2009: 58), for that would only yield de dicto necessity. The de re 
necessity the scientific essentialist is interested in is derived from the real 
essences of things. (Henceforth when I refer to X being an essential 
property of y, X refers to a real HVVHQFH7KHVHUHDOHVVHQFHVDUHµWKHVHW
of powers or structures that a thing must have for it to be a member of that 
NLQG¶ ibid). The real essences can only be discovered by empirical 
investigation. 
 Take, for example, the law of conservation of momentum. We can 
imagine plenty of other possible worlds in which this law does not hold. 
But if this law is an essential property of the actual world (as Ellis would 
suppose), it is not contingent in the actual world, as, if the law of 
conservation of momentum did not hold, LWZRXOGQ¶WEHthe actual world. 
The law of conservation of momentum thus holds with de re necessity. 
 Many more questions need to be asked of this natural kind 
ontology, though. Here are a few that I will try to cover in this chapter:  
(a) What are the natural kinds?   
(b) What is the hierarchy of natural kinds?  
(c) What counts as a law in a scientific essentialist ontology?  
(d) What counts as a causal law/causation in a scientific essentialist 
ontology?  
(e) Are the laws necessary for the scientific essentialist? 
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 When we first think of natural kinds, we tend to think of biological 
species like eagles, cats, sea-bass and orchids; of birds, mammals, fish and 
flowers; of animals and plants; of biological and non-biological 
categories. And indeed a hierarchy does seem to emerge: each species 
seems to fit into at least one of the higher-order species - all members of 
the eagle-kind are also members of the bird-kind; all members of the bird-
kind are members of the animal-kind; all members of the animal-kind are 
members of the biological kind, etc. But biological kinds are rarely 
thought to be genuine natural kinds by essentialists. There are many 
reasons to deny biological kinds to be genuine natural kinds. Louis 
Menard writes: 
We are no longer interested in the conformity of an individual to an ideal type; 
we are now interested in the relation of an individual to the other individuals 
with which it interacts. To generalize about groups of interacting individuals, we 
need to drop the language of types and essences, which is prescriptive (telling us 
what finches should be), and adopt the language of statistics and probability, 
which is predictive (telling us what the average finch, under specified 
conditions, is likely to do). (Menard 2001: 123) 
BioloJLFDONLQGVGRQRWWKHUHIRUHUHDOO\µFDUYHQDWXUHDWWKHMRLQWV¶± they 
are merely the product of convenient linguistic conventions put in place 
for us to specify similarities in genetic structure, or abilities for individual 
members of the so-called species to mate with one-another, or whatever 
RWKHUPHDQLQJZHGHFLGH WRDWWULEXWH WR WKH WHUPµVSHFLHV¶ ± we fix their 
boundaries by defining them into existence. So if biological kinds are not 
natural kinds, what are, and what are the criteria for being a natural kind? 
 For scientific essentialists like Ellis, natural kinds are just those 
FDWHJRULHVWKDWWUXO\FDUYHQDWXUHDWWKHMRLQWV1DWXUDONLQGVDUHµREMHFWLYH
mind-independent kinds of things in nature, [and] to believe in natural 
kinds one must believe that things are divided naturally into categorically 
GLVWLQFWFODVVHV¶(OOLV One can categorise an individual because 
for every natural kind, K, there is at least one property P, such that P is an 
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essential property of K ± an individual which is a member of K can be 
identified as such, because it instantiates all the essential properties of K.60 
 All three natural kind hierarchies have a species-structure 
analogous to the biological structure considered above. There are higher-
order species with subspecies. There is a highest-order species which is 
WKHVXEVSHFLHVRIQRVSHFLHVDQG WKHUHDUH µLQILPLF¶VSHFLHV ibid) at the 
bottom of the hierarchies - species that have no subspecies. For Ellis, the 
highest-order kinds are known as global kinds: in the case of substances 
this is the class of all physical systems, in the case of dynamic kinds this is 
the class of all events/processes, and in the case of properties and relations 
this would presumably be the class of all properties and relations. There 
are therefore very few global kinds, but a huge number of infimic species. 
Nonetheless, every one of these species will have essential properties that 
uniquely pick them out from the other species. 
6.3 An Introduction to Essentialist Laws 
The aim of science, says the scientific essentialist, is to discover what the 
natural kinds are, and what the essential properties of those kinds are. 
$FFRUGLQJ WR (OOLV¶V YLHZ RI ZKDW LW LV to be a law of nature, this can 
simply be rephrased as ³WKH DLP RI VFLHQFH LV WR discover the laws of 
QDWXUH´ DV IRU WKH VFLHQWLfic essentialist, laws describe the essential 
properties of natural kinds - µall electrons have charge -¶LVDODZEHFDXVH
having charge -1 is an essential property of being an electron. 
Essentialists believe that the laws of nature describe the essences of the natural 
kinds. This is the thesis of dispositionalism. The global laws describe the 
essences of the global kinds, and hence refer to all things in their respective 
categories; the more specific laws refer only to the more specific kinds and their 
various subspecies. (Ellis 2009: 64) 
                                                          
60
 The same could be said of an individual; that is, for any individual, x, there is at least 
one property P, such that P is an essential property of x. But x is not a natural kind, it is 
an individual.  
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0XPIRUG FRPSODLQV WKDW µWKLV ZRXOG UDLVH WKH TXHVWLRQ RI ZKHWKHU VXFK
ODZVDUHDYDLODEOHIDUWRRIUHHO\¶0XPIRUGDQGLWLVFHUWDLQO\
WUXHWKDW(OOLV¶VPHWDSK\Vics of laws leads to a vast number of laws, only 
limited by the number of natural kinds and the number of properties 
essential to them. However, I do not think this should concern the 
scientific essentialist at all. It is perfectly acceptable, I think, for there to 
be many laws, so long as some of them can be deemed more fundamental 
than others, and that there are relatively few of the most fundamental laws. 
The law of conservation of momentum, then, is a global law ± it is an 
essential property of the actual world, or at least of the natural kind the 
actual world is a member of. It is also a law of nature that diamonds are 
composed of carbon atoms, but this is a lower-order natural law. This is 
again in line with our intuitions.  
 I will talk more about EllLV¶Vcausal laws, but before I move on to 
causal laws we must first understaQG WKH UHVW RI (OOLV¶V RQWRORJ\ - in 
particular, the kinds of property that he allows.   
6.4 Properties in Scientific Essentialism 
With respect to his mixed view of properties, Ellis writes that: 
For substDQWLYHNLQGV« [the] intrinsic properties or structures must include at 
least some causal powers, or other dispositional properties. Complex objects 
might have distinctive structures. Isomers, for example, may be thus 
distinguished. But as we descend into more elementary things, structures 
involving relationships between parts necessarily drop out, and, at the most 
elementary level, there is no structure at all. Therefore, the most elementary 
things existing in the world must be essentially distinguished from each other 
not by their structures, but by their dispositional properties alone. (Ellis 2009: 
63) 
But in order to describe dispositional properties we need to know the 
stimulus and manifestation of each disposition, and these SR-relations 
require reference to structure - even to µGHVFULEH WKH FLUFXPVWDQFHV RI D
thing¶VH[LVWHQFH¶ibid) we need to demonstrate the relations it stands in 
relative to other existents with which it might causally interact. According 
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to Ellis, at the fundamental level we need both dispositional and 
categorical properties. This is hotly disputed by neo-dispositionalists, as 
we will see in the next section. 
6.5.1 Categorical Properties in Scientific Essentialism  
Dispositional properties have their identities fixed by their causal role, but 
this is not the case for all properties in the Ellisian ontology. In particular 
he believes that both locational and structural properties must be 
categorical. This of course directly contradicts the neo-dispositionalist 
claim that all properties are essentially dispositional.  
 Ellis provides a number of arguments in favour of structural 
properties being categorical, but he also claims that they are quiddities 
(treating them as distinct). Before moving on I should make what Ellis 
sees to be the categorical/quiddistic distinction a little clearer. Ellis defines 
a categorical property as: 
a property whose identity depends on what [it is] ± but not, apparently on what 
[it does. These are] the spatiotemporal and numerical relationships that are 
required to describe the structure of things (See 
http://philpapers.org/browse/dispositional-and-categorical-properties - Ellis 
Caual Powers and Categorical Properties: p. 4) 
7KHFDWHJRULFDO SURSHUWLHV DUH HVVHQWLDOO\SDVVLYH µVLQFH WKHUH LV QRWKLQJ
that their bearers are necessarily disposed to do just in virtue of their 
KDYLQJWKHVHSURSHUWLHV¶ibid). Note that Ellis does not deny that structural 
properties play a role in laws or causation, he only denies that the 
properties are themselves powerful. 
 Quidditism is the view that properties can have their identity 
primitively ± we have already seen this in both Lewis and Armstrong. 
Barker writes that generally µa property possesses a quiddity just in case 
its identity is fixed by something independent of the causal/nomological 
roles it may enter into... [a categorical property] is paradigmatically... 
thought of as a property whose identity is fixed by a quiddity (Barker 
2009: 1).  
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 Ellis, though, states that all categorical properties are quiddities. 
There seems to be some conflict between Barker and Ellis here. For 
Barker, categorical properties have identities in virtue of their possession 
of quiddities. For Ellis and Bird, categorical properties are quiddities. For 
the purposes of this thesis, I use WKHWHUPµTXLGGLW\¶WR denote a primitive 
identity-fixer. But to avoid confusion as far as possible, when a property 
has its identity fixed by a quiddity, ,VKDOOFDOOLWDµTXLGGLWLVWLFSURSHUW\¶
If all categorical properties are quidditistic, they are all properties whose 
identities are fixed primitively, and thus independently of their 
causal/nomological roles ± this is what ultimately leads to the supposed 
problems of permuting causal roles across (and perhaps even within) 
possible worlds.  
 Dispositional monists dispute the claim that there can be properties 
with identities independent of their causal role, often citing examples such 
as how the atomic structure of a diamond gives it certain causal powers - a 
diamond is entirely constituted by carbon atoms, but so is graphite, and 
graphite clearly has very different dispositional properties from diamonds. 
This is because the carbon atoms in graphite are structured in lattices, 
whereas the atoms in diamonds have a diamond structure at the atomic 
level. So how might Ellis respond? 
 Well, he could say that even at this macroscopic level, structure 
GRHV QRW GHWHUPLQH WKH REMHFW¶V GLVSRVLWLRQDO SURSHUWLHV $ Nnife-shaped 
object made of butter would not have the power to cut. But dispositional 
monists can again take issue with this claim. They can argue that despite 
the knife-shaped lump of butter not being able to cut steak, it still has the 
SRZHU WR GR VR ,W¶s just that this power is µintrinsically finked¶61. The 
PRPHQW WKLV µNQLIH¶ FRPHV LQWR FRQWDFW ZLWK WKH VWHDN LW LV ILQNHG and 
melts. I think this UHVSRQVHGHDOVZLWK(OOLV¶VLQLWLDOREMHFWLRQ 
 A second objection might be that shapes are mathematical objects 
existing entirely independently of particulars with dispositional properties. 
                                                          
61
 This argument was presented by Matthew Tugby at the 2010 Metaphysics of Science 
conference at The University of Nottingham 
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The equation of a circle, for example, is (x - h)2 + (y - k)2 = r2, where h 
and k are the x-coordinates and y-coordinates of the centre of the circle 
and r is the radius. But on behalf of the dispositional monist I would 
simply respond that we are not interested in abstract mathematical objects, 
but the properties of objects in the world. Dispositional monists do not 
claim that abstract objects like numbers have dispositional properties, just 
that all the monadic natural properties instantiated in the world are 
dispositional.   
 But even if we grant the dispositional monist that their responses to 
the above objections are satisfactory, Ellis believes he can argue that 
locational properties are quidditistic, and thus structural properties must be 
categorical. I will summarise these arguments as (A1) and (A2) 
respectively. 
6.5.2 Arguments for Quidditistic Locations and Structures 
A1: 
1. Instances of causal powers must have locations (from where they act), 
and these locations must be contingent. 
2. Instances of location do not have contingent locations ± where 
something is located, it is necessarily located. (No instance of a 
locational property could be instantiated elsewhere) 
3. Location is not a dispositional property (1,2) 
4. If location is not a dispositional/powerful property, it is a categorical 
property. 
C.  Location is a categorical property (3,4).62 
 On the face of it A1 is fairly convincing. Notice though, that in the 
argument presented above there is no mention of the shape of particulars 
being categorical, only the instances of locational properties. But Ellis 
                                                          
62
 For Ellis ?ƐĨƵůůƚĞǆƚ, see Causal Powers and Dispositional Properties, http://philsci-
archive.pitt.edu/archive/00004749/ 
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believes A1 should lead us to the conclusion that the shape/structure of a 
particular must be a categorical property. This requires a second argument: 
 A2 
(a) µ7KH DFWXDO ORFDWLRQs of things depend essentially on their locations 
UHODWLYH WR WKLQJV ZKRVH DFWXDO ORFDWLRQV DUH WDNHQ DV JLYHQ¶ (Ellis 
2010: Causal Powers and Dispositional Properties, http://philsci-
archive.pitt.edu/archive/00004749/) 
(b) If relative locations have causal powers, then actual locations of things 
have causal powers (a) 
(c) Actual locations do not have causal powers 
(d) Relative locations do not have causal powers (b,c)  
(e) The shape (or structure) of a particular is essentially the relative 
locations of its parts (for example, a sphere can be thought of as the 
three dimensional shape, all of whose locational properties lie 
equidistant from its centre) 
(f) Shape does not have causal powers (d,e) 
(g) If shape does not have causal powers then it is a categorical property  
C.  Shape is a categorical property (f,g)  
 Now let us take a look at these arguments in more detail, and see 
what the dispositional monist might have to say about them. The first 
premise of A1 looks indubitable. If I asked a dispositional monist whether 
WKLV LQVWDQFHRI WKHSURSHUW\ µEHLQJDQHOHFWURQ¶FRXOGKDYHEHHQ ORFated 
somewhere else, he would surely have to VD\ ³\HV´. This would be 
WDQWDPRXQW WR DVNLQJ ³could this electron have been located somewhere 
HOVH"´DQG the location of an electron is contingent: DV%ODFNVD\V µLW LV
clear that the same quality can be instantiated at spatially separated 
ORFDWLRQV¶%ODFN  
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 Similarly, prima facie the location of a locational property is 
necessary to its being the location it is. If it was not in that location it 
would not be that property. 
Premise 3 is logically entailed by premises 1 and 2.  
Premise 4 looks analytically true, as to be a categorical property is to have 
identity fixed independently of causal-nomological roles. 
The argument is valid, and on the face of it sound, so where should the 
dispositionalist begin the attack? It seems to me that premises 2 and 4 are 
both non-trivial.  
 Firstly, is it really true that where a locational property is located it 
is located necessarily? It seems to me that it is at least de dicto necessary 
that this instance of a locational property is located here, as surely our 
FRQFHSWLRQRIµORFDWLRQ¶UHTXLUHVWKDWWKHORFDWion of a locational property 
instance be fixed, but is it de re necessary? Paradigmatically a categorical 
property is a property whose identity is fixed by a quiddity. If locational 
properties are quidditiVWLF ZK\ FRXOGQ¶W D ORFDWLRQDO SUoperty, F, be 
permutable; that is, F could have been another locational property, or even 
WKHSURSHUW\µUDYHQKRRG¶? In accepting quidditism, on the face of it, Ellis 
is committed to the location of locational property instances being 
contingent de re. 
 However, I will argue that (OOLV¶V RQWRORJ\ RI QDWXUDO NLQGV PD\
well provide a more substantive response for him here, as he can plausibly 
claim the relations a location bears to other locations are essential to it; the 
nature of a location is fixed by its position in a network of locations, not 
by a network of dispositions. The proposal here is that properties can have 
their identities fixed non-primitively, but not by their causal/nomoligical 
role (and so they remain categorical properties). I will return to this 
possibility shortly, though, concluding that at least some primitives are 
still required to fix the identity of a locational property. 
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 Secondly, dispositional monists are committed only to monadic 
properties having dispositional essences. µ; LV D monadic categorical 
property (M&3¶ is semantically entailed by µ; LV QRt a dispositional 
SURSHUW\'3¶, only if the former is defined as the negation of the latter. 
But this is not the case. It is true that M&3ĺ¤'3 EXW WKLV LV QRW D
biconditional. A monadic categorical property is (usually thought of as) a 
monadic property whose identity is fixed by a quiddity, but our world is 
not entirely composed of monadic properties ± there are also relations, 
dyadic properties, etc. So is location a monadic property the dispostional 
monist is committed to see as being powerful?  
 Black states, when discussing the Lewisian quidditistic ontology, 
that the geometrical relations are the only fundamental relations: 
µ6SDWLRWHPSRUDOSRLQWVEHDUFHUWDLQIXQGDPHQWDOUHODWLRQVWRRQHDQRWKHU± 
JHRPHWULFDO UHODWLRQV 2Q /HZLV¶V YLHZ WKHVH JHRPHWUical relations are 
probably the only fundamental relations, all other fundamental qualities 
EHLQJ PRQDGLF¶ %ODFN   Any location thus bears specific 
geometrical relations to other locations - if the relations change then the 
location changes, so the relations a location property bears to other 
locations are essential to it being the property it is. But does a location 
KDYH DQ\ RWKHU HVVHQWLDO SURSHUWLHV" , GRQ¶W WKLQN LW GRHV 8OWLPDWHO\ LW
seems to me that a locational property can be seen as an n-adic set of 
relations, or in other words, an ordering.  
But an ordering does not automatically pick out this set as a 
location. A location is an ordering of spatial relations, so quiddities are 
still required to fix the identity of a set of relations as being a location 
rather than, say, a load of numbers written down on a piece of paper. 
Locational properties, then, are partly identified by an ordering (thus 
restricting the kinds of property it could be), but these relations still need 
to have their identities as spatial relations fixed by quiddities. 
 But should the dispositional essentialist be concerned? Most 
dispositional monists are committed only to all intrinsic monadic 
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properties having dispositional essence. As they µPDLQWDLQ« WKDW WKH
nature and identity of a relation are exhausted by the relations it bears to 
all other relations¶ 0XPIRUG   $FFRUGLQJ WR 0XPIRUG a 
relation need not have a dispositional essence. If locations are sets of 
relations/orderings (which, for the categoricalist, must be primitively 
spatial relations), perhaps locations are not examples of the monadic 
properties the neo-dispositional must show to be dispositional63. The 
dispositionalist cannot use this response, however, not least because, as we 
shall see in the next chapter, his own account requires properties to be 
relationally constituted ±the properties need to be metaphysically 
constituted by their (non-powerful) relations, in a similar way to how 
objects can be seen to be constituted by natural properties. I take it that 
Ellis has successfully demonstrated here that location is not a dispositional 
property. 
So suppose Ellis has shown that locations are quiddities. What 
Ellis wants to show, is that shapes (and all other categorical properties) are 
quiddities ± ORFDWLRQV GRQ¶W VHHP WR EH LQWULQVLF PRQDGLF SURSHUWLHV RI
things, and so the dispositional monist might not even be overly concerned 
about this conclusion. However, shapes look to be intrinsic, so were 
shape/structural properties to turn out to be categorical, the dispositional 
monist might be more troubled. 
 A2 is an attempt to move demonstrably from the conclusion of A1 
(that spatial locations are categorical properties) to the substantive claim 
that shapes are categorical properties. This is non-trivial, even if we accept 
that locations are categorical. Assuming premise (a), it does seem to 
follow that relative locations are also quiddities. (,Q IDFW JLYHQ WKDW ,¶YH
defined location in terms of its spatial relations to other property instances, 
WKHQ µUHODWLYH ORFDWLRQ¶ DQG µORFDWLRQ¶ GR QRW GLIIHU LQ DQ\ VLJQLILFDQW
                                                          
63
  In fact, at first glance it would be rather strange if they did. The location of a particular does 
not add or subtract to its powers  W it may well play a causal role, in so far as the spatial location 
of a property instance relative to other property instances will affect what stimulus conditions 
are met, what properties manifest, and which properties are finked; but the location itself does 
not change the potencies. We will see shortly, however, that Bird thinks locations, or at least 
spacetime points, do have dispositional essences. 
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respect. The only difference lies in the relata: with spatiotemporal 
locations we are talking about spatiotemporal locations to all property 
instances, but with shapes we are just talking about location of one part of 
an object relative to another). The move from (a) to (b), then, I deem to be 
an acceptable one. 
 Premise (c), however, is not derivable from premises (a) and (b). It 
stands alone, and Bird appeals to General Relativity to mount an attack. I 
will return to this shortly. Of course, given (c), (d) follows if (a) is 
acceptable, but again the neo-dispositionalist is not committed to 
accepting premise (e), either. The dispositional monist may well want to 
claim that shape, or structural properties in general, are not simply the 
relative ORFDWLRQV RI DQ REMHFW¶V SDUWV - they are monadic properties that 
play a distinct causal/nomological role. And, given the numerous 
examples they can provide, it is easy to see why ± even as children, we 
learn to use the spade over the bucket to dig holes, for it seems to have the 
power to shift sand! The dispositionalist might then reject premise 3 on 
two counts: firstly that location does play a dispositional role, and 
secondly that at least some dispositional property instances have their 
locations necessarily; namely, instances of location! 
6.5.3 General Theory of Relativity (GR) and Structural Properties 
Just using medium-sized objects like spades to assert that structural 
properties have dispositional essences is not likely to persuade Ellis. After 
all, Ellis does not deny that structural properties and spatial relations play 
a role in laws and causal interactions (if he did, his position would be 
flagrantly flawed). The dispositional monists need something more than 
what is essentially an appeal to intuition, and Alexander Bird argues that, 
when we consider the implications of GR (combined with his assumption 
that we should adopt the contemporary view that interpretations of GR 
should be background independent), the spatiotemporal locations Ellis 
sees as quiddities are either not part of our ontology at all (and hence the 
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dispositional monist need not worry about them), or they are 
spatiotemporal points with dispositional essences. 
 In chapter 8 I will evaluate the various metaphysical conceptions 
by looking at them in the context of the Principle of Least Action. I argue 
that any serious contender must be compatible with it, and preferably 
explain its holding. I think compatibility with least action principles is 
particularly important, as it has fallen out of all our serious attempts at 
mapping the evolution of the system (Newtoniam Mechanics, Special 
Relativity, General Relativity, String Theory etc). It seems to me that if 
there are any a posteriori necessary conditions of being a law, adherence 
to this principle is likely to be one of them. GR is not on this scale of 
generality ± just as Newtonian Mechanics was inconsistent with GR, so it 
is possible that GR will be incompatible with what is arguably the ultimate 
aim of physics: a unified theory of quantum gravity. However, given its 
wide scope and applicability, and its consistency with empirical evidence, 
it seems to me we have good reason to take the precepts of GR seriously. 
 The two main features of GR important to this discussion are (a) 
that although simultaneity was frame-of-reference dependent under 
Newtonian Mechanics and Special Relativity, in GR the locations in 
spacetime can be agreed upon from all frames of reference. This gives rise 
to EinVWHLQ¶VSULQFLSOHRIJHQHUDOFRYDULDQFH, and allows the laws of nature 
to be invariant under arbitrary co-ordinate transformations. We should, 
from a metaphysical perspective, cease to take seriously the independence 
of space and time when considering the physical system in its entirety 
ZKHQ FRQVLGHULQJ WKH µZRUOG-OLQH¶ RI D SDUWLFXODU ZH FDQ LQ D VHQVH
allow time to be measured by the watch of that particular and observe its 
changes, but the laws of nature are not localised in this way); and (b) it 
accounts for empirical observations incompatible with previous physical 
theories by employing the curvature of spacetime64. In developing a 
                                                          
64
 The equivalence of acceleration and gravity central to relativity, and the curvature of 
spacetime that came out of it, was demonstrated in 1919 when the trajectory of light from a 
distant star must have bent in order for it to be observed. Given that photons have no mass, this 
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metaphysics of location in spacetime, we must also bear in mind the 
implications of spacetime being curved, what effects the curvature of 
spacetime might have on the things in spacetime, and what makes it curve. 
 Bird tries to take advantage of these considerations, and argues that 
GR gives us good reason to think that spacetime points have dispositional 
essences. Unlike the Newtonian view, in which the physical system 
evolves against a background of space and time unaffected by the laws of 
nature, contemporary physicists increasingly endorse background-free 
ontologies (this is probably not the orthodoxy, yet, but Bird pushes this 
LVVXH VR ,¶P KDSS\ WR IROORZ KLP KHUH - where background-free 
ontologies either:  
1. remove space and time altogether, in which case spatiotemporal 
relations fall out the picture entirely ± this is known as relationalism 
about spacetime65 - in denying the ontological priority of 
spatiotemporal points, we are denying that background relations are 
the base; or 
2.  they include space and time in their ontology, but not as a 
background. There are spacetime points as real existent entities in our 
world, but one can have the same fundamental spacetime with 
different spatiotemporal points - this is a background-free version of 
substantivalism about spacetime. 
If we endorse (1) then, according to Bird, the dispositionalist has nothing 
to worry about, as the dispositional monist does not claim that non-
fundamental properties are dispositional. If we endorse (2), Bird argues, 
the dispositional essentialist is committed to a dispositional account of 
locations, but this is not problematic because under a substantivalist 
account of spacetime, spacetime does indeed seem to have a dispositional 
essence. 
                                                                                                                                                              
was possible only if spacetime is curved  W so we certainly have good empirical evidence in favour 
of spacetime-curvature 
65
 As a matter of fact, Vassilios Livanios ĐůĂŝŵƐ ? ? ?ŝƐĂ ?radical interpretation of background-
ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ ? ?>ŝǀĂŶŝŽƐ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? 
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 According to standard interpretations, spacetime in GR is not, as in 
the Newtonian picture, inert and unaffected by the things that occupy it, 
but a manifold with a structure subject to change in virtue of the 
movements of massive objects within it. This is often illustrated with the 
analogy of bowling ball (which represents a massive object) on a 
trampoline (which represents the spacetime manifold), where weight of 
the ball curves WKHWUDPSROLQH¶VVXUIDFH  
 
 
 
 
 
If the principle that matter tells spacetime how to curve is right; that is, 
there is a causal relation between the distribution of matter and the 
curvature of spacetime, then the idea that spatiotemporal points have 
dispositional properties is not implausible. As Bird puts it: 
One reason why it is difficult to see space and time as causes on a classic 
substantivalist conception, is that it is difficult to see them as any way being 
effects. The background is unchanging. But if it is unchanging how can it 
generate any effects  [that is, have the essential quality of a dispositional 
property]? On the other hand, if it is subject to change, then it is easier to see 
how it miJKWLWVHOIEHDFDXVHRIFKDQJH« In dispositional essentialist terms, we 
can see that by being potential manifestations of dispositional essences, spatial 
and temporal properties may also have dispositional essences themselves (Bird 
in Handfield 2009: 240). 
Here, Bird is appealing to the action-reaction principle to suggest that if 
the location of massive objects curves spacetime, then the curvature of 
spacetime has a causal effect on the massive objects. Indeed, the thought 
that the structure of the spacetime manifold determines how matter moves 
(as well as matter telling spacetime how to curve) is well entrenched in 
Spacetime manifold 
Massive object 
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interpretations of GR: it is undeniable that in GR, test particles in inertial 
states follow non-linear geodesics due to the curvature of spacetime µGXH¶
should not be interpreted here as necessarily having has causal 
implications, but it is easiest to use this term in here). In other words, 
world-lines of test particles in inertial states are not straight lines as we 
imagine them in classical spacetime, as the test particle follows the 
contours of the curved spacetime manifold ± just as if we dropped a 
marble on the trampoline, it would roll down to the bowling ball following 
the shape of the elastic surface. 
 It looks, under this hugely simplified version of GR, as if the 
locations and masses of the objects LQDV\VWHPGHWHUPLQHWKHµFXUYDWXUHRI
the spacetime, that is to change the dynamical properties of spacetime 
SRLQWV¶ ibid), and the shape of the spacetime manifold determines the 
locations of the objects. To put it in the causal terms of dispositional 
essentialists:  
(1) the structure or geometry of spacetime (at least partially) causally 
determines which paths objects follow, so the structure of spacetime is 
powerful; and 
(2)  the mass and spatiotemporal location of the objects causally 
determines the structure of spacetime, so the masses have the power to 
curve spacetime.  
Structure can thus be seen as having a dispositional essence. 
 So what are the implications here for Ellis? Well, Ellis argues that 
you can take away all the powers from a location (and we must be talking 
about spatiotemporal points, now), and the location remains. According to 
the account above, the spacetime manifold is (a) affected/changed by other 
property instances, and (b) can act as stimulus conditions for other 
property instances. %XW DUH (OOLV¶V Fonclusions and the account above 
incompatible? Before making any conclusions here, I would first like to 
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turn my attention briefly to the relationalist/substantivalist interpretations 
of spacetime, as this will affect our conclusions. 
 There is still a debate between the substantivalists and 
relationalists about spacetime (as we have already seen, the 
dispositionalist claims he has no issues if relationalism is true). Although I 
will not make a contribution to the debate here, I would like to note that 
the outcome is of some interest when discussing the possibility of 
quiddistism about location. Curvature can be accepted by both parties, as 
is it as intrinsic property of spacetime geometry, independent of how we 
describe the geometry (whether there are spacetime points, the nature of 
these spacetime points etc). The substantivalist, though, contrary to the 
relationalist, endorses the view that spacetime geometry is composed of 
spacetime points whose identities are not uniquely determined by the 
theory, where most substantivalists accept that different spacetime 
manifolds (at different possible worlds) could differ only in virtue of the 
identity of the spacetime points that constitute it.  
 Belot and Earman (1999, 2001) take relationalism about spacetime 
to be a denial of a fundamental ontological role for spacetime points ± 
WKH\ µGHQ\ WKDW WKHUH FRXOG EH WZR SRVVLEOH ZRUOGV ZLWK WKH VDPH
geometry which differ only in virtue of the way that geometry is shared 
out over existent spacetime pointV¶ %HORW DQG (DUPDQ   If we 
accept substantivalism, however, whereby spacetime points have their 
identity fixed independently of their position in the geometrical structure, 
there is no reason why they could not swap their locations whilst retaining 
the geometrical µVKDSH¶ of spacetime. When physicists have been asked 
whether there can be two worlds which differ solely over a permutation of 
the spacetime points, they answer that µthere is nothing anti-substantival 
about denying that there can be such distinct possible worlds¶ (see 
Butterfield,1989; Brighouse, 1994; Rynasiewicz, 1994; Hoefer, 1996). 
(Pooley in Rickles, French, Saatsi 2005: 107). 
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 Again, for these substantivalists, the spacetime points are not 
identified by the geometry ± they have their identity independently of the 
geometry. Spacetime points, for the substantivalist, are haecceistic.  
 So far I have been talking about the identity and properties of 
spacetime points, not of locations. Locations, it seems to me, are 
properties of spacetime points ± properties that could be entirely distinct 
from the dynamical properties of the haecceistic spacetime points, and not 
properties essential to their being the individual spacetime points they are. 
Ultimately, when Bird says that (paraphrasing) ³mass changes the 
curvature of spacetime, or in other words, changes the dynamical 
SURSHUWLHV RI VSDFHWLPH SRLQWV´, it might be less misleading to say that 
³mass changes what locational properties the spacetime points 
instantiate´ But even that is strictly inaccurate, as in a four-dimensional 
spacetime manifold, there is no change RIWKLVQDWXUHLVQ¶WUHDOO\DSDUWRI
the picture. Rather, mass affects the shape of the manifold. Although every 
geometrical location is occupied by a spacetime point, the geometry is in 
some sense independent of these points ± as permutation of the spacetime 
points is a possibility. (OOLV¶V FODLP, then, that you can remove all the 
powers from a location (the thing with the powers is located there 
contingently) and the location remain, could still be true; that is, if, as 
looks to be implied by the haecceistic nature of spacetime points, we can 
take the current location of a spacetime point p1, to have the powers 
located there contingently (the powers instantiated by spacetime points p1 
and p2 in world, w, might be different66, but the nature of spacetime 
allows for the permutation of p1 and p2), but the current location of p1 is 
necessarily located where it is (that is, that locational property can only be 
instantiated by a spacetime point at that geometrical point of the 
manifold), then (OOLV¶VDUJXPHQWIRUORFDWLRQEHLQJ a categorical property 
LVQRWWKZDUWHGE\%LUG¶VUHVSRQVH.  
                                                          
66
 Perhaps not in our world, but there is nothing metaphysically impossible about distinct 
spacetime points instantiating different causal powers even under a dispositional essentialist 
metaphysic, and spacetime points are particulars, not properties. 
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 ,I ZH DFFHSW (OOLV¶V LQWHUSretation of shape, it also follows that 
shape-properties are also categorical properties. The shape of an object is 
the relative locations of its parts; that is not to say that it is the relations 
between the spatiotemporal points the object happens to occupy, as you 
could swap all those spatiotemporal points for other ones and keep the 
object in the same location - it is the relative locations RIWKHREMHFW¶VSDUWV
in the geometry of spacetime that constitute its shape. Shape, then, can be 
a categorical property with a partly quidditistic nature.   
 Other objeFWLRQV WR %LUG¶V DUJXPHQW KDYH DOVR EHHQ UDLVHG The 
PRWLRQRIPDVVLYHREMHFWV LVSUHFLVHO\GHVFULEHGE\(LQVWHLQ¶VHTXDWLRQV
but there is more than one way of interpreting these equations. Vassilios 
LivanioV ORRNV DW WKH ZD\ (LQVWHLQ¶V HTXDWLRQV FDQ EH Lnterpreted, and 
points out two notable possibilities. The first possibility, and presumably 
WKHRQH%LUGDFFHSWVLVWKDWµWKHFXUYDWXUHRIVSDFHWLPHGHSHQGVcausally 
RQ WKH GLVWULEXWLRQ RI PDWWHU ILHOGV DFURVV LW¶ /LYDQLRV  . But, 
says Livanios, talk of the distribution of matter presupposes a pre-existing 
metrical structure, which cannot be. So we need an alternative 
interpretation whereby µWKH G\QDPLFDO VWUXFWXUH RI VSDFHWLPH DOORZV WKH
trans-world variation of spacetime structure to vary in such a way that the 
(LQVWHLQ HTXDWLRQV KROG¶ /LYDQLRV   :e should look upon the 
Einstein equations as showing us what can only be described as a law-like 
constraint (which, as we have seen many times, does not require causal 
connections) between spacetime structure and the distribution of the 
massive objects in any metaphysically possible world. But, as Livanios 
says: 
If matter does not cause any changes in spacetime structure, then spacetime 
(better, the metric field) is not a recipient of change and, consequently, does not 
have any passive causal essence. Moreover, given that in this case we do not 
have any causal influence, the appeal to the action-reaction principle is 
unjustified. So, pace Bird, there is no reason (related to the application of this 
principle) to suppose that spacetime (metric) has an active dispositional essence. 
(ibid) 
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%LUG¶VDUJXPHQWis beginning to look very unappealing. I have shown that 
the property dualist may well be able to hold on to his view that locations 
and shapes are categorical properties, even if we accept that spacetime 
points have powerful properties. And Livanios has given us good reason 
to think that matter does not cause any changes in spacetime structure, 
anyway. 
 This does not, if Bird is even half right, completely undermine 
neo-dispositionalism. Bird says that if we accept relationalism about 
VSDFHWLPH WKHQ WKHUH¶V QR QHHG WR DFFHSW FDWHJRULFDO SURSHUWLHV DV WKH\
eliminate space and time from their ontology. He goes on to argue that the 
substantivalist can give a dispositional account of spacetime, but even if 
this fails, he can at least fall back on relationalism. 
 The obvious question, then, is what entitles Bird to thinking shapes 
are dispositional? Ellis has given us an account of shape in terms of 
relative locations, but Bird has not given us any such account. In fact, Bird 
says the dispositional monist can get out of trouble by denying that 
structure is a fundamental property: 
If [structural properties] are not fundamental properties, then having 
dispositional essences or not does not distinctly bear on the truth of dispositional 
monism. (Bird in Handfield 2009: 232) 
By giving the dipositional monist this option, he denies he even has to 
provide a dispositional account of structure, as he is committed only to 
fundamental properties having dispositional essences, and structural 
properties might not be fundamental. 
 So what should we make of all this? Ellis has given us a 
categorical account of locations and shapes. Bird has responded by 
appealing to the nature of spacetime, but his attempt fails unless we adopt 
a relationalist account of spacetime. Bird can fall back on shape/structural 
properties not being fundamental, but if this discussion of General 
Relativity has shown us anything, it is the fundamental role that structural 
properties play in our world. In light of our understanding of spacetime 
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curvature, it seems to me that the claim that structural properties are not 
fundamental requires much work, as structural properties certainly seem to 
be fundamental, intrinsic, monadic properties of the spacetime manifold. 
6.6 Dispositional Properties in Scientific Essentialism 
,KDYHRXWOLQHG(OOLV¶VRQWRORJ\RIQDWXUDONLQGVEULHIO\GHVFULEHGKRZLW
involves both categorical and dispositional properties, and provided 
arguments for and against the requirement of categorical properties. I 
have, however, said little about WKH GLVSRVLWLRQDO SURSHUWLHV LQ (OOLV¶V
ontology which are so central to his view of causal processes and causal 
laws.  
 According to Ellis every natural kind of property has a real 
essence, and in the case of dispositional properties these essences are (of 
FRXUVH GLVSRVLWLRQDO 7KH GLVSRVLWLRQDO HVVHQFH RI µIUDJLOLW\¶ LI LW LV D
natural kind of property) would be, according to Ellis, linked with the 
manifestation and stimulus conditions described above. If a property does 
QRWKDYHWKLVHVVHQFHWKHQZKHQZHUHIHUWRLWDVµIUDJLOLW\¶ZHZRXOGEH
saying something false. To illustrate this perhaps a little more clearly, 
imagine in our world one of the (essential) potential stimulus conditions 
IRUWKHSURSHUW\µIUDJLOLW\¶ LVµEHLQJKLWZLWKDKDPPHU¶1RZVXSSRVHLQ
another possible world, w*, there is a property that can be instantiated by 
particulars that has precisely the same stimulus conditions and 
PDQLIHVWDWLRQV DV µIUDJLOLW\¶ LQ RXU ZRUOG H[FHSW µEHLQJ KLW ZLWK D
KDPPHU¶LVQRWRQHRIWKHVWLPXOXVFRQGLWLRQV1RZWKHLQKDELWDQWVRIw* 
may never have tried to hit a vase with a hammer, but the truth about 
whether it would smash or not when hit with a hammer is out there in the 
ZRUOGIRU WKHPWRGLVFRYHULI WKH\ WULHG LWZRXOGQ¶W smash). Any object 
with this other-worldly property, despite their having behaved in exactly 
the same way as all fragile objects in our world would have done (given 
WKH VWLPXOXV FRQGLWLRQ µEHLQJKLWZLWK DKDPPHU¶KDYHQHYHUEHHQPHW
the vase would not instantiate one of the essential properties of the 
SURSHUW\µIUDJLOLW\¶ZHUHIHUWR,IZHZHQWWRWKLVZRUOGDQGVDLG³WKLVYDVH
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LVIUDJLOH´, we would be saying something false ± we would be referring to 
WKH SURSHUW\ µIUDJLOLW\¶ ZKHUHDV WKH YDVH LQ WKLV RWKHU ZRUOG LQVWDQWLDWHV
WKH SURSHUW\ µIUDJLOLW\¶ 6LPLODUO\ LI LQKDELWDQWV RI WKLV RWKHU SRVVLEOH
ZRUOGUHIHUUHGWRZKDWZHPLJKWWHUPIUDJLOLW\DVµIUDJLOLW\¶When if they 
DWWULEXWHG WKH SURSHUW\ µIUDJLOLW\¶ WR DQ REMHFW LQ RXU ZRUOG WKDW ZRXOG
smash when hit with a hammer) they would be saying something false, as 
WKHLU WHUP µIUDJLOLW\¶ UHIHUV WR WKH SURSHUWLHV ZLWK DOO WKH HVVHQFHV RI
fragility*, a property whose stimulus conditions does not include being hit 
with a hammer. 
 ,WPD\ORRNDVWKRXJK(OOLVLVUHDOO\MXVWGHILQLQJµIUDJLOLW\¶WRXVH
our example) as that property which displays smashing when hit, but again 
LW PXVW EH HPSKDVLVHG WKDW (OOLV¶V LQWHQWLRQ is not to define these 
SURSHUWLHVLQWRH[LVWHQFHµ)UDJLOLW\¶LILWLVDUHDOQDWXUDONLQGRISURSHUW\
is a metaphysically real property that must be discovered a posteriori. In 
science we are not discussing the meaning of dispositional term, but 
discovHULQJWKHUHDOHVVHQFHVRISURSHUWLHVLQWKHZRUOGµLQGHSHQGHQWO\RI
RXUV\VWHPVRIFODVVLILFDWLRQ¶ibid).  
 (OOLV WKXV DYRLGV ERWK WKH µVZDSSLQJ GLVSRVLWLRQDO UROHV¶ DQG
µPXOWLSOH UHDOLVDELOLW\¶ REMHFWLRQV UDLVHG DJDLQVW WKH +XPHDQV DQG
Armstrongians, as any property that does not have all the essential 
stimulus conditions and manifestations of property P (which has had its 
referent fixed) cannot be property P.  
 It is worth discussing exactly how Ellis sees dispositional 
properties, and to do this one has to start by looking at natural kinds of 
processes. These are displays of dispositional properties, the essences of 
ZKLFK DUH WKH GLVSRVLWLRQDO SURSHUWLHV µ,Q WKH FDVH RI DQ\ VLPSOH FDXVDO
process, the real essence will be a dispositional property, and the scientific 
SUREOHP ZLOO EH WR VSHFLI\ SUHFLVHO\ ZKDW WKLV SURSHUW\ LV¶ (OOLV 
333). In the simple non-multitrack cases (where a disposition only has one 
manifestation), the essence of a dispositional property can, according to 
(OOLV µEHXQLTXHO\ characterized by an ordered pair <C,E>. Ellis defines 
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µ&¶DVDNLQGRIFLUFXPVWDQFHDQGµ(¶DVDµNLQGRIHYHQW¶WRVWD\LQOLQH
with the general dispositionalist talk, we can think of these as the stimulus 
conditions and manifestation of the property, but it is important to bear in 
mind that both the stimulus conditions and the manifestation of the 
property must be thought of as natural kinds in their own right. It seems to 
me that Ellis has this stimulus-manifestation relation in mind when he 
writes thaWµLI[LVDQREMHFWZLWKWKLVGLVSRVLWLRQDOSURSHUW\WKHQ[PD\EH
VDLGWRKDYHWKHSRZHURUSURSHQVLW\WR(LQFLUFXPVWDQFHV&¶ (ibid)).  
 The natural kinds of process that ultimately constitute the 
evolution of physical systems thus occur in virtue of the natural kinds of 
(dispositional) properties of things, and the identity of the properties 
determining the evolution of the physical system are fixed by the natural 
kinds of process to which they refer. For any two worlds with the same 
kinds of properties and relations, the same kinds of natural process will 
occur given the same circumstances: given that causal processes are (at the 
very least) a species of natural processes, and that the essential properties 
of the natural kinds of process are dispositional properties, if two worlds 
have the same dispositional properties, the same kinds of causal process 
will occur in both worlds. 
 7R LOOXVWUDWH FRQVLGHU WKH VXEVWDQFH QDWXUDO NLQG µHOHFWURQ¶ WKH
SURFHVV QDWXUDO NLQG µVXEMHFWHG WR UHSXOVLRQ IRUFH¶ DQG the property 
natural kind <within negatively charged electromagnetic field (C), 
subjected to repulsion force (E)>. We know the following:  
1. It is of the essence of an electron that it is negatively charged, so 
anything that is not negatively charged is not an electron;  
2. The dispositional property <C,E> is an essential property of negatively 
charged objects.  
3. If the stimulus conditions, C, are met, the natural kind of process 
µVXEMHFWHGWRUHSXOVLRQIRUFH¶RFFXUVDVWKLVLVRIWKHHVVHQFHRI&(! 
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In all metaphysically possible worlds, then, when an electron is in a 
negatively charged field it is subjected to the repulsion force. 
Metaphysical necessities like that discussed above hold in virtue of the 
natural kinds of things that exist, and the properties which determine their 
memberships of these kinds. Consequently, the desideratum outlined 
previously that the causal necessities be de re, is satisfied. 
 I have shown how Ellis believes his essentialism allows him to 
escape the problems posed by quidditism, and how this essentialism forms 
the foundation of Scientific Essentialism. I must now consider the account 
of causal laws that falls out of this framework in more detail.  
6.7 Causal Laws in Scientific Essentialism 
&DXVDO ODZV DUH LQ (OOLV¶V RQWRlogy, unsurprisingly tied up with 
dispositional properties as well as natural kinds, as although laws of nature 
are the essential properties of natural kinds, the causal processes involve 
the manifestation of dispositional properties. Crudely, Ellis makes the 
following moves to get to a formalised account of causal laws: 
µ/HW'EHWKHFDXVDOGLVSRVLWLRQ&(!DQG'[t) the proposition that x 
has this disposition at t¶(OOLV 
According to this state of affairs, when C occurs, E occurs (and E is 
caused by C). 
µ/HW&[t) be the proposition that an event or state of affairs of the kind C 
exists or occurs to x at t, and E(x,Wį) the proposition that an event of 
kind E occurs to x in the time interval from t to t + įW¶ibid) 
If an event of type E must occur during the period between t and t + į, 
µWKHQ WKHGLVSRVLWLRQ&(!RI[DW t is said to be causally determinate.¶
(ibid) 
Where this is true of all instantiations of <C,E>, Ellis calls this a 
µGHWHUPLQLVWLFODZRIDFWLRQRI WKHGLVSRVLWLRQ¶7Kis, he says, is a causal 
law, and can be formalised as: 
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(CL) ׊x,t [C(x,t*j!([t)]  
 Causal laws are thus defined both in terms both of dispositions and 
of natural kinds; firstly a disposition is, for Ellis, characterised by an 
ordered pair of natural kinds of events, and secondly the law statements 
(as expressed above) are universally quantified statements concerning the 
relations between events of kind C and events of kind E. Note that this 
formalism bears strong resemblance to the form of the Humean law-
statement, but according to Ellis, this statement is true in virtue of the 
dispositional property <C,E> instantiated by x at t, and so law-statements 
refer to necessary connections between distinct existences, not just 
regularities. 
 This universally quantified statement is the form of a causal law-
statement, but it must follow from the Scientific Essentialist metaphysic 
that For Ellis, all laws are essential properties of natural kinds. 
Fundamental causal laws, just like other fundamental laws, are essential 
properties of the world kind. 
6.8 Conclusions to Chapter 6 
In this chapter I have discussed the main aspects of, and problems with, 
(OOLV¶VVFLHQWLILFHVVHQWLDOLVPSummarising: Ellis presents a view of laws 
whereby laws describe the essential properties of natural kinds. Laws are 
therefore propositions, not, as with Armstrong, aspects of nature. 
However, these propositions do describe de re necessities. It is no accident 
that electrons have charge -1, because charge -1 is an essential property of 
being an electron. Thus the µaccidental regularities¶ Rbjection holds no 
weight, and the problems of Armstrongianism seem to be overcome. 
(OOLV¶VODZVDUHDOVR propositions describing the nature of the world, rather 
than the laws being in nature, in the Armstrongian sense - I find this view 
compelling, as it seems to me that most people, philosophers and non-
philosophers alike, can meaningfully talk about laws of nature, without 
having any metaphysical understanding of what laws might be at their 
core. 
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 Ellis believes that a complete ontology has both dispositional and 
categorical properties, where the former are powerful 
properties/propenstities with directedness towards their manifestations, 
and the latter are structural and numerical relations that, although they 
play a role in cause and law, are not themselves powerful properties. Ellis 
provides arguments for locations and structures being quiddities, and Bird 
responds by appealing to GR. I have shown that the arguments from GR 
DUHIRXQGZDQWLQJDQG%LUG¶Vµback-XSSODQ¶RIFRQFOXGLQJWKDWVWUXFWXUHV
are not really fundamental properties anyway, and hence should not 
concern the dispositional monist, is dubious. If consideration of GR 
teaches us anything, it is that geometrical structure is fundamental to the 
evolution of our system. It seems to me, then, that Bird has a lot more 
work tRGRLIKHLVWRUXOHRXWWKHµPL[HGYLHZ¶WKDWLVWKHYLHZWKDWWKHUH
are both fundamental dispositional and fundamental categorical properties. 
 ElliV¶V 6FLHQWLILF (VVHQWLDOLsm looks compelling on the evidence 
we have seen so far. However, its plausibility in part relies on the success 
of an account of dispositional properties. Further discussion of 
dispositional properties will be provided in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 7: Neo-Dispositionalism 
 
7.1 Neo-Dispositionalism 
In this chapter I examine the dispositionalist account of causation as 
advocated by Alexander Bird and Stephen Mumford, compare and 
contrast it with the scientific essentialism of Brian Ellis, and show how 
their position can be defended against a number of regress objections. 
 I call the view looked at in this chapter neo-dispositionalism, to 
distinguish it from the view of properties Bird calls µGLVSRVLWLRQDO
PRQLVP¶ (Bird 2007: 3), (elsewhere the dispositional monist view is given 
WKH WLWOH µSDQ-GLVSRVLWLRQDOLVP¶ (Bostock 2008)). Dispositional monists 
believe that all properties have a dispositional essence, but not all 
dispositional monists believe all properties are wholly dispositional. John 
Heil (2003), for example, holds a view in which all properties have 
dispositional essences, but all properties also have a categorical aspect to 
tKHP%LUG¶VGLVSRVLWLRQDOPRQLVP, however, rids itself of categoricalism 
altogether ± not only does he endorse µGLVSRVLWLRQDO PRQLVP¶ (that all 
properties have a dispositional essence) (Bird 2007: 3), but he believes all 
natural properties to be wholly powerful/dispositional67. 
7.2 The Modal Character of Neo-Dispositionalism 
It is important first to grasp the modal character of this account of 
causation:  
Bird writes that µLQ DOO SRVVLEOH ZRUOGV DQ\ REMHFW WKDW SRVVHVVHV 3 LV
GLVSRVHGWR\LHOG0LQUHVSRQVHWR6¶Bird 2007: 45), formalised as  
(DEp): (S,M)x) 
From (DEp), and the conditional analysis of dispositions as a necessary 
equivalence (( D(S,M)x ฀ Sx APDǆ ? ? ?we can derive  
                                                          
67
  Note that in this discussion we are only talking about natural properties.  
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(I)  
According to neo-dispositionalists, then, in all possible worlds, if x 
instantiates dispositional property, P (which has stimulus conditions S and 
Manifestation M), if the stimulus conditions were met, then P would 
manifest.  
 Furthermore, ZKHQZHµFRQVLGHUDQ\ZRUOGw and any case where 
some x in w possesses the potency P, where x acquires the stimulus S (that 
is: (Px & Sx)), we can derive a universal generalisation of the form:  ׊x3[	6[ĺ0[68.  
This is a universal generalisation of the form we often associate law of 
nature, and indeed Bird (but not Mumford) believes a theory of laws as 
supervening on dispositions can be developed. I will provide a more 
detailed discussion of this possibility in the second half of this chapter. 
7.3 Dispositional Monism v. Ellisian Dispositionalism 
Looking at the preceding sections, one can identify the main differences 
between the neo-dispositionalist and the Ellisian metaphysics:  
Firstly, the former deny that there are any categorical properties, avoiding 
the supposed problems posed by their quidditistic nature. Its qualitatively 
more parsimonious ontology might be seen as an advantage over the 
mixed view; 
Secondly, the neo-dispositionalists do not require an ontology of natural 
kinds (note, though, that there being natural kinds with real essences is not 
incompatible with dispositionalism); 
Thirdly, the PRGDO FKDUDFWHU RI %LUG¶V GLVSRVLWLRQDO properties provides 
the neo-dispositionalist with the opportunity to develop an account of laws 
µin nature¶ VXSHUYHQLng on this one kind of property, whereas For Ellis, 
laws are propositions describing the essential properties of natural kinds. 
                                                          
68
  From (I) and (II) we have (III) Mx, discharging (II) we have (IV) (Px&Sǆ ?APDǆ ?ĂŶĚƐŝŶĐĞx 
is arbitrary we may generalize ׊x  ? ?Wǆ ?^ǆ ?APDǆ ? ?ŝƌĚ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?
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The purpose of this chapter is to determine whether or not neo-
dispositionalism is a plausible account of properties, and to see out how 
one should view dispositions. In this next section I look at two questions 
that arise: that of whether properties are clusters of powers, and that of 
whether or not there can be multi-track dispositions.  
 Once I have outlined the details of the most plausible dispositional 
essentialist ontology, I move on to some pressing arguments against the 
position, namely the regress objections. 
7.4 Properties, Powers, and Multi-Track Dispositions 
Stephen Mumford (2004) puts forward the idea that (at least some) 
SURSHUWLHVPLJKWEHµFOXVWHUVRISRZHUV¶± that is to say, a single property 
might consist of a multitude of powers with distinct stimuli and 
manifestations. Elasticity, for example, might be considered a single 
property, yet it has the power to bend, to stretch, to bounce, and so on. But 
elasticity is not one of tKHIXQGDPHQWDOSURSHUWLHV,¶P interested in, in this 
thesis. It is no doubt true that we tend to group powers together such that 
when we attribute a property to a particular, we are attributing to that 
object a number of powers that regularly come as a package. The power to 
bend, to stretch and to bounce, often come together, and so for the sake of 
convenience we give a name to this group of powers. But it seems to me 
that these powers can often exist independently of one another. 
 To justify his claim, though, it might be argued that Mumford only 
needs to show that one property has a number of powers that cannot come 
apart; that is, there is a fundamental property such that one of its powers 
cannot be instantiated unless the power or powers associated with it is also 
instantiated. The clusters of powers view can has been repackaged in the 
IRUPRIµPXOWL-WUDFNGLVSRVLWLRQV¶VR,Zill focus on this discussion. 
Multi-track dispositions take a number of different forms: they are 
either:  
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(a) dispositions with one stimulus condition but multiple possible 
manifestations (disposition D has stimulus condition S1 and manifestation 
M1 v M2 Y0«  
(b) dispositions with one manifestation but many possible stimulus 
conditions (disposition D has stimulus conditions S1 v S2 Y 6« DQG
manifestation M1);   
(c) dispositions with more than one possible stimulus condition and more 
than one possible manifestation (disposition D has stimulus conditions S1 
Y 6 Y 6« DQG PRUH WKDQ RQH SRVVLEOH PDQLIHVWDWLRQ 0 Y 0 Y
0«69 ; or 
(d) dispositions with either a conjunction of stimulus conditions, and/or a 
conjunction of manifestations (disposition D has stimulus conditions 
S1^S2^S3... and manifestation M1^M2^M3...) (see Bird 2007: 21-24).  
 If bending and bouncing are different manifestations of elasticity 
(an elastic object having the power both to bend and to bounce under 
different stimulus conditions), for example, then elasticity would count as 
a multi-track disposition. But, it seems to me, the stimulus conditions and 
manifestations associated with elasticity can be broken up into a 
conjunction of multiple distinct single-track dispositions. If these single-
track dispositions constitute the multi-track disposition, then the latter 
cannot be fundamental. Consider the case of the stimulus condition 
µPDVVLYHREMHFWEHLQJWKURZn DWZLQGRZ¶DQGLWVPDQLIHVWDWLRQVµZLQGRZ
VPDVKLQJ¶ DQG µPDNLQJ D QRLVH¶ 2QH might be tempted to see mass as 
giving things that instantiate it a multi-track disposition, as in virtue of the 
REMHFW¶VLQVWDQWLDWLQJWKLVSURSHUW\ throwing it at a window causes it both 
to smash a window and make a noise. But these can be broken down into 
two separate, more fundamental dispositions: the disposition to smash a 
window when thrown at it, and the disposition to make a noise when 
thrown at a window. There is no need to posit multi-track dispositions.  
                                                          
69
 Note that there these disjunctions do not entail that any one of S1, S2, S3 could produce any 
one of M1, M2, M3. It may be the case that S1 can only produce M1, S2 can only produce M2 
and S3 can only produce M3. 
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In cases of multi-track dispositions of type (a) WKH SURSHUW\¶V
fundamental constituents all share the same stimulus condition, but they 
have distinct identities fixed by their different manifestations. With those 
of type (b) the multi-track disposition is constituted by more fundamental 
properties, whose identities differ in virtue of the different stimulus 
conditions (but having the same manifestation). With those of type (c) the 
constituent dispositions may be even more obviously distinct: the multi-
track disposition could be constituted by distinct properties with both 
different stimulus conditions and different manifestations. Now consider 
dispositions of type (d): suppose that for water to shatter, the temperature 
of the water has to be sub-zero degrees centigrade, and it must be hit with 
a hammer ± these are distinct events, whereby water can be frozen without 
being hit with a hammer, and vice versa. This seems to be a case of 
genuine multi-track disposition, but it is not a fundamental one. Let us 
look at few examples of the more fundamental dispositions: 
(1) The disposition to attract massive objects 
(2) The disposition to attract protons 
The first notable aspect of the more fundamental dispositions is that they 
tend to be functional. They tend involve fields of one kind or another, and 
the strength of those fields depends on certain circumstances. An object 
LQVWDQWLDWHVGLVSRVLWLRQLILWLWVHOILQVWDQWLDWHVWKHSURSHUW\µPDVV¶%XW
the attractive force it exerts on other massive objects is dependent on how 
µPDVVLYH¶WKHREMHFt is. One might be tempted to interpret this disposition 
as being multi-track, as the disposition to attract massive objects seems to 
have multiple stimulus conditions (the different quantity of mass), and 
multiple manifestations (the different strengths of the gravitational fields 
emitted). But it seems to me that there is no need to allow for multi-track 
dispositions, here. The gravitational force between two objects is directly 
proportional to the two masses, and inversely proportional to the square of 
the distance between them. Each value of mass contributes towards the 
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attractive force in a different way; that is, specific quantities of mass give 
objects different dispositions. 
  Ultimately, if we want the properties instantiated by particulars to 
tell us exactly what powers that particular has, knowing that the particular 
has mass, or that it has charge is insufficient. We need to know the 
quantities of mass and charge, as each quantity confers different 
dispositions.  
7.5 The Regress Objection and Relational Constitution   . 
 Although neo-dispositionalism does seem initially to have significant 
virtues over its mixed-view and categorical monism opposition, there are a 
number of criticisms that need to be dealt with. The first objections to be 
tackled that are specific to the dispositional monist positions70 (as opposed 
to ontologies allowing for dispositional properties as well as categorical 
properties, or categorical monsm) DUH WKH µ5HJUHVV 2EMHFWLRQV¶ ZKLFK
come in three different forms ± I shall call these tKH µQRWHQRXJK UHDOLW\
UHJUHVV¶ ((Armstrong 1983, 2005; Blackburn 1990)) WKH µHSLVWHPLF
UHJUHVV¶6ZLQEXUQHDQGWKHµUHJUHVVRILGHQWLW\¶5RELQVRQ 
7.5.1 The 2QWRORJLFDORUµNot Enough Reality¶ Regress 
The first criticism is that if a dispositional property is just a power to 
produce some other power, (µWKH SRZHU WR SURGXFH $ LV QRWKLQJ EXW WKH
SRZHUWRSURGXFHWKHSRZHUWRSURGXFH%«DQGVRRQ¶$UPVWURQJ: 
123)), and all properties are dispositional, then there is no µEHLQJ¶ LQ WKH
world. Or to put it another way: if both the stimulus and manifestations of 
a disposition are also just potencies, then there can EHQRµDFWLRQ¶.  
7KH µQRW HQRXJK UHDOLW\¶ UHJUHVV VXJJHVWV WKDW WKHUH QHHGV WR EH
more than just powers in our ontology, or particulars are just constantly 
changing their potencies. Potencies are never manifested, they are just 
replaced by other potencies, and replacement by other potencies is not a 
                                                          
70
 These objections are raised against dispositional monist positions (including neo ?
dispositionalism) 
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genuine manifestation. It is thus argued that an ontology of pure powers is 
untenable. This objection does not, you will note, itself rule out the 
possibility of dispositional properties. Its upshot is that there must be at 
least some categorical properties in a workable ontology.  
 Unsurprisingly the neo-dispositionalists argue that this regress 
fails. The argument is that powers do not have enough actuality; that is, 
that a change in potency does not count as an actual manifestation, and so 
the regress works only if powers are nothing in themselves ± that is to say, 
the changing of a paUWLFXODU¶V SRWHQFLHV GRHV QRW FRQVWLWXWH a genuine 
manifestation as we normally see it. A genuine manifestation, I take it, 
must be the gaining or losing of natural, first-order properties: properties 
like colour, shape, charge etc. These properties are not, or so the objector 
would hold, potencies. However for the neo-dispositionalist, the properties 
listed above are dispositions. The objector is just unjustifiably assuming 
that gaining charge is not (merely) a change in dispositions.   
Of course the claim that dispositions are genuine entities in their own 
right (not reducible to counterfactual conditionals) requires argument, but 
if the categoricalist raises this issue, the dispositionalist can respond that 
the claim that categorical properties have sufficient reality, and 
dispositional properties do not, cannot be right, as the essential features of 
/HZLV¶V +XPHDQ FDWHJRULFDO SURSHUWLHV DUH DOO DOVR IHDWXUHV RI
dispositional properties. Bird outlines the features of a categorical 
property thus: 
(a) It is distinct from (not identical with) other properties; 
(b) It is a universal and thus can have instances; 
(c) For some n it is an n-adic universal. (Bird 2007a: 11) 
All of criteria (a), (b) and (c) are, Bird claims, also true of dispositions. 
Dispositions just have, as an extra criterion, a dispositional essence. 
  However, it seems to me that Lewis could, and indeed would add 
the following to his list of essential features of categorical properties: 
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(d) Properties are sets of particulars (if (d), then (b) must be false, and vice 
versa) 
This nominalist position grounds properties in particulars, so it cannot be 
DUJXHG WKDW /HZLV¶V SURSHUWLHV GR QRW KDYH HQRXJK µEHLQJ¶ 7KH
QRPLQDOLVW¶V SURSHUWLHV are abstract entities in the form of sets, but the 
members of those sets are particulars occupying spacetime points ± the 
SDUWLFXODUV SOD\ D FRQVWLWXWLYH UROH JLYLQJ WKH SURSHUW\ LWV µUHDOLW\¶. 
$OH[DQGHU %LUG¶V properties do not share this feature (the property is 
supposedly wholly located wherever it is instantiated, but these 
instantiations play no constitutive role with respect to the universal). If it 
is this feature that gives properties their reality, then %LUG¶VDUJXPHQWWhat 
the categoricalist fares no better, fails against the nominalist versions. 
However, the categoricalists who hold a view of properties as universals 
(Armstrong, Dretske, Tooley amongst others) cannot use this argument 
against Bird. 
 Armstrong (2005) re-packages the not enough reality objection 
when considering the view that causation is the transference of potencies. 
µ&DXVDOLW\EHFRPHVWKHPHUHSDVVLQJDURXQGRISRZHUVIURPSDUWLFXODUVWR
IXUWKHU SDUWLFXODUV¶ $UPVWURQJ   0XPIRUG TXLFNO\ GLVPLVVHV
this objection, though, simply pointing out that causality¶V being the 
passing around of powers is actually a very attractive account (see 
0XPIRUG µ3DVVLQJ 3RZHUV $URXQG¶ IRUWKFRPLQJ. In certain 
FLUFXPVWDQFHV , FDQ VHH KRZ 0XPIRUG¶V FODLP KHUH LV plausible. I think 
the closest the natural sciences get to (explicitly) using potencies in 
physics, is in the XVHRIµSRWHQWLDOHQHUJ\¶$FRLOHGXSVSULQJKDVHODVWLF
potential energy. When the spring is released, the ball that was sat on top 
of it shoots into the air gaining gravitational potential energy, and so on. It 
is not, therefore, on the face of it at all obvious that the gaining and losing 
of potencies should not be considered genuine manifestations. I conclude, 
then, that this particular regress objection is unsuccessful. 
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7.5.2 The Epistemic Regress 
 The epistemic regress (Swinburne 1980), as the name suggests, concerns 
our knowledge of dispositional properties. If all there are are potentialities 
then we can never know what properties anything has, and yet it is 
obvious that we do! We can only attribute a property to an object if we 
have seen its effecWDQRWKHUSURSHUW\EXWZHFDQRQO\NQRZWKHµHIIHFW¶
SURSHUW\KDVEHHQLQVWDQWLDWHGLILWLQWXUQPDQLIHVWVDQGVRRQ« 
  Bostock (2008) provides a similar response to the epistemic 
regress as he does to the ontological regress; namely that it only works if 
we presuppose that properties are not entities in their own right. 
According to Bostock we can know dispositional properties directly, so 
knowing the properties that caused them is not necessary. He writes that 
µ3DQ-Dispositionalism claims that properties, of their nature, are caused to 
be instantiated by certain other properties and, in turn, cause, in certain 
circumstances, other properties to be instantiated. But this metaphysical 
claim in itself says nothing about how we become acquainted with 
properties¶(Bostock 2008: 147). $JDLQ,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKHHSLVWHPLFUHJUHVV
is overly problematic for the neo-dispositionalist. 
7.5.3 The Identity Regress 
The identity of a categorical property is fixed intrinsically; its identity is 
primitive71.  
In contrast, the identities of dispositional properties (for the neo-
dispositionalist) are fixed relationally; that is, the first order natural 
properties have their identities fixed by the relations they stand in to their 
stimuli and manifestations. These stimuli and manifestations are natural 
properties in their own right, and so these, too, have their identities fixed 
by the stimulus-manifestation relations (SM-relations) they stand in to 
other natural properties. This seems to require no appeal to any primitives 
of the nature required by the categoricalist. On the face of it there is a 
                                                          
71
 As we saw in chapter 6, in the special case of spatial categorical properties, their identity is 
ŽŶůǇ ?ƉĂƌƚůǇ ?ƉƌŝŵŝƚŝǀĞ ?ƵƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂquidditistic aspect to them nonetheless. 
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UHJUHVVRUµLQILQLWHFRPSOH[LW\¶DULVLQJ here, as every natural property has 
its identity fixed by another natural property, which has its identity fixed 
by a third property, and so on. But it need not be a regress -- the pattern of 
relations may turn back on itself, creating a network. Whereas with 
$UPVWURQJ¶V DUJXPHQW FRQFHUQLQJ Whe ontology of dispositions formed 
into a circle - a circle that looked to be vicious (which can be countered 
simply by asserting that dispositions are things in themselves), Bird 
claims, using Dµgraph theory¶, that the kind of circularity involved in the 
IL[LQJRISURSHUWLHV¶LGHQWLWLHVLVYLUWXRXV7KHWKHVLVWKDWQHHGVGHIHQGLQJ
is this: 
(S) The identity and distinctness of the elements of a set E of entities supervene 
on the instantiations of some relation R (or set of relations <Ri>) on the elements 
of E.(Bird 2007: 139) 
:KHQ ZH WUDQVODWH WKLV LVVXH LQWR JUDSK WKHRU\ 6 EHFRPHV µ6 7KH
identity and distinctness of the vertices of a graph can supervene on the 
VWUXFWXUH RI WKDW JUDSK¶(ibid). What are required are graph structures 
whereby no rotation of the graph will swap the vertices and yet leave the 
structure of the graph the same. Any graph where this were possible would 
fail to fix the identity of the vertices. However, there are many graph-
structures than do satisfy the criteria for fixing identity. Bird provides the 
following example (the circles denoting the vertices (properties), the lines 
denoting relations (second-order relations between properties) : 
 Figure 7.1 
 
 Aside from the graph with just a single vertex, the graph in figure 
7.1 is the simplest non-trivial asymmetric structure that can fix the identity 
of its vertices. It follows that there must either be one, or more than five 
fundamental properties; so it would be impossible for there to be two, 
three or four fundamental properties. Bird does not see this as hugely 
problematic. He claims it is more than plausible that there is only one kind 
of fundamental property (where different non-fundamental properties 
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correspond to different structures of instantiation of the one fundamental 
property), and it may well be the case that, if there is more than one kind 
of property, they relate to one another in such a way that there must be 
more than five. 
 Within the context of graph theory it is possible to include loops 
and digraphs (directed graphs) to add further asymmetries. The directness 
of a relation represents the relationship between a property and its 
manifestation. Clearly there needs to be some directedness when using 
graph theory as a representation of the relations between properties and 
their manifestations are, in most cases, irreversible. Once we allow 
directedness into the graph theory the graphs look to provide an acceptable 
representation of the property networks, and the identity regress problem 
seems to be have been dealt with (as the identity of the vertices is uniquely 
fixed by the structure of the graph).  
I have looked, then, at the three classic versions of the regress 
objection, and shown the responses to these objections as put forward by 
Bird and Bostock. $VIDUDV,¶PFRQFHUQHGWKHVHUHVSRQVHVDUHDWOHDVWRQ
the face of it, sufficient to deal with the problems as raised by Armstrong 
et al. However, in the following section I return to the plausibility of the 
GLVSRVLWLRQDOLVW¶V UHODWLRQDO FRQVWLWXWLRQ RI LGHQWLW\ FRQFOXGLQJ WKDW WKHLU
ontology requires primitive identities after all.  
7.6.1 Implicit Categoricalism in Neo-Dispositionalism 
The identity regress is resolved by the relational constitution of 
dispositional properties ± we can fix the identity of a property in the same 
way as the identity of a node in a graph can be fixed by its relations to 
other nodes in graph theory. But the essence of neo-dispositionalism is 
that the fundamental natures of all properties are wholly powerful; that is, 
(a) there are no categorical properties, and (b) the dispositional properties 
themselves are entirely devoid of quiddities. The SM-relations are second-
order properties; that is, they are properties of properties. They play not 
only a role in fixing the identity of properties, but they also play an 
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LPSRUWDQW UROH LQ FRQVWLWXWLQJ WKH µQDWXUH¶RI DSURSHUW\ It seems to me, 
then, that for the neo-dispositionalist, these second-order properties must 
also be powerful ± they must therefore lack quiddities (primitive identity-
fixers), having their identities fixed by some other means. Barker (2009) 
shows us that it is not clear, however, that the identity of these relations 
can be fixed in any other way than by invoking quiddities. If Barker is 
right, the very foundations of neo-dispositionalism are undermined ± the 
dispositionalist requires all properties to have entirely dispositional 
natures, but as we will see, if they do, then the position is susceptible to an 
identity regress.  
Barker provides two main arguments, the first of which I outline 
below. The second concerns the regress one encounters when we try to fix 
the identity of SM-relations. I present this in 7.6.2. 
 Dispositional properties LQ WKH µSRZHUV¶ VHQVH are usually 
conceived of as properties of objects. An object, x, can instantiate the 
dispositional property charge -1, which, if possessed, amongst other things 
disposes it to accelerate away from positively charged object, y, when 
placed in the electrostatic field emitted by y. The dispositional property 
charge -1 is powerful because when instantiated by x, x has certain powers 
that it did not have previously; that is, it responds to certain stimuli it 
ZRXOGQ¶W KDYH GRQH LI LW GLG QRW KDYH WKLV SRZHU DQG LW FDQ µDFW¶ RQ
objects instantiating properties of which charge -1 is itself a stimulus 
property. A dispositional property is powerful because it gives powers to 
the objects that instantiate it. 
 As we saw, according to the view outlined in the previous section, 
the identity of dispositions is fixed relationally; that is, fixed by the 
network of SM-relations. The SM-relations a dispositional property stands 
in to other dispositional properties are second-order properties, or 
properties of properties - dispositional properties (powers), on the other 
hand, are supposed to give powers to the particulars that instantiate them ± 
they are properties of particulars: the first-order, natural properties. Thus 
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the relations constituting the identity of dispositional properties cannot be 
powers ± at least not in the way powers have previously been conceived.   
7.6.2 The SM-Relation Identity Regress 
The second attack mounted by Barker begins by suggesting what would, if 
SM-relations were powers without quiddities (for Barker, a quiddity being 
a primitive identity-fixer), fix their identities. Unless powers are 
relationally constituted then we get an identity regress even at the first-
order property level. However, not only natural properties, but also 
second-order properties must have their identities fixed by their place in 
an asymmetric graph. SM-relations, if they are to have their identity as 
powerful relations between natural properties fixed, must have their 
identities fixed by their relations to other properties. µ,I>6072] is a power, 
it is relationally constituted by SM-relations to other properties, which in 
turn must be relationally constituted by SM-relations, and so on¶%DUNHU
2009: 3). We thus get a regress, and this regress is vicious. Furthermore, 
LW¶VQRWFOHDUWRPHZKDWSURSHUWLHVWKHVHVHcond, third, fourth... order SM-
relations could be, other than second, third and fourth order properties 
respectively73.  
7.6.3 Responses to the SM-Relation Identity Regress 
Stephen Mumford suggested to me two responses to this problem: the first 
being that it is wrong for dispositions to be characterised in terms of SM-
relations74; the second being the denial that relations are powerful - the 
neo-dispositionalist can, he claimed, avoid the problem by committing 
himself only to the claim that all properties are powerful, and deny that 
relations need to be powerful as well. 
I agree with Mumford that the simple SM-relation characterisation 
seems inadequate, but this will not solve his problem. Mumford writes: 
                                                          
72
 Barker calls the relations SR-relations (stimulus-response relations) rather than SM-relations. 
But to be consistent I will continue to use SM-relation, as they are, as far as I can see, identical. 
73
 See chapter 9 for more detailed discussion. 
74
 This suggestion ŝƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚŝŶĂĨŽƌƚŚĐŽŵŝŶŐƉĂƉĞƌ ?DƵƚƵĂůDĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚDĂƌƚŝŶ ?ƐdǁŽ
dƌŝĂŶŐůĞƐ ? ?DƵŵĨŽƌĚ ? ?ƚŽďĞƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚŝŶĂ:ŽŶĂƚŚĂŶ:ĂĐŽďƐĞĚŝƚĞĚǀŽůƵŵĞ ? 
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But the process of production is depicted as an equal partnership, hence the view 
jettisons the Aristotelian idea that one partner is passive and the other active (a 
view that the stimulus-response model retains)... This may seem to be only a 
modest amendment to the stimulus-response model but we will see that it has 
quite radical consequences. But the first is simply that if the response (the effect, 
the manifestation) is produced by the partners working together, and neither 
could have acted alone, then we have a more equal and symmetrical 
relationship. It would be misleading, therefore, to label one partner the 
disposition and another partner the stimulus. In a way, each power is WKHRWKHU¶V
stimulus, so which is the disposition and which is the stimulus is entirely 
relative to their perspectives. We therefore should dispense with stimulus talk as 
misleading. (Mumford: forthcoming) 
I have no issue with these claims. In fact, I think to distinguish, 
ontologicalO\ WKH µVWLPXOXV¶ SURSHUW\ IURP WKH µGLVSRVLWLRQ WR EH
VWLPXODWHG¶SURSHUW\ZRXOGEHDQREYLRXVHUURU- perhaps one that people 
have been making, but in my opinion not obviously so. My willingness to 
DFFHSW0XPIRUG¶VSRLQWKHre is perhaps indicative of my unwillingness to 
accept it as a successful response to the problems posed in the preceding 
section. The mere fact that the disposition and the stimulus are reciprocal 
disposition partners does not dispose of the need for the higher-order SM-
relations. 
Mumford uses the example of ice coming into contact with water, 
and how this cools the water. ,¶PKDSS\WRDFFHSW that, ontologically, we 
should not distinguish the water from the ice in terms of which plays the 
active and which plays the passive role, but nonetheless, Mumford needs a 
second order property; that is, a relation between properties involved in 
the event ± a relation linking the dispositions of the water and the 
dispositions of the ice. The manifestations may occur simultaneously (be 
mutual), but ultimately, under the dispositional essentialist analysis of 
causation, we still have a causal sequence that occurs in virtue of the 
nature of natural properties. There still needs to be a second-order relation 
between these properties ± a relation that is part of the nature of each 
property linking them together; and it is the nature of this relation, 
171 
 
whatever it may be, that should be troubling the neo-dispositionalists. 
Now let us look at his second response: 
 Mumford suggests that the neo-dispositionalist can deny that 
relations are powerful. Barker takes care to prove that SM-relations are 
not powers, but apparently Mumford is happy to accept this, anyway (or at 
the very least, he deems it consistent with neo-dispositionalism). I think 
this raises the question, however, of how natural properties are to be free 
of quiddities, when the neo-dispositionalist is committed to their relational 
constitution?  
The fact that first-order properties are constituted by relations to 
other properties (second-order properties) does not commit properties to 
being relations themselves (the nodes in the graphs are nodes, not 
relations), but nonetheless, these relations are still properties of the natural 
properties ± they determine its nature.  
What this means is that although the neo-GLVSRVLWLRQDOLVW¶VQDWXUDO
properties still have their identities tied to their causal/nomoligical role 
(and are hence distinctly non-categorical), the nature of each 
µGLVSRVLWLRQDO¶SURSHUW\ LV LQKHUHQWO\ OLQNHGZith quiddities. If this is the 
case, then neo-dispositionalism, and in fact dispositionalism in general is 
on the ropes. In the final chapter I will conclude that this forms the 
foundation of a knock-out blow for the neo-dispositionalist, forcing the 
powers theorists into admitting that theirs is a categoricalist metaphysic 
after all. Just as Lewis points out that being called Armstrong does not 
give you massive biceps VR LW LV WUXH WKDW FDOOLQJ D SURSHUW\ µSRZHUIXO¶
does not make it so.  
7.7 Dispositionalism and Laws 
I now put these significant worries on the back-burner for the time being, 
with a view to returning to them in the concluding chapter. 
 Alexander Bird and Stephen Mumford qua neo-dispositionalists 
take laws to be aspects of reality; that is, lDZVDUHµLQWKHZRUOG¶ in their 
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metaphysical analysis. Mumford ZULWHVWKDWµ/DZVPXVWDGGVRPHWKLQJWR
nature such that the world would be significantly different were they not 
WKHUH¶0XPIRUG± he claims that although the Humeans claim 
to have an account of laws, their ontology is in fact devoid of laws (as 
there is nothing in the world over and above the Humean mosaic). This, I 
take it, must stem purely from intuitions shared by Armstrong, but not of 
course by Humeans or Scientific Realists like Ellis. Similarly, Bird claims 
that µSHRSOH« DUHZLOOLQJWRUHJDUGDSURSRVLWLRQDVDVVHUWLQJDODZLI¶
(Bird 2007: 203) ± Bird thinks that people believe certain propositions 
assert laws, and not that certain propositions are laws. 
 Even though both Mumford and Bird agree that laws must be a 
part of the physical world, they disagree on whether there are any laws at 
DOO 0XPIRUG KROGV D SRVLWLRQ WKDW KH WHUPV µ5HDOiVW /DZOHVVQHVV¶
(Mumford 2004), which is supposed to be an anti-Humean (in so far as it 
allows for metaphysical glue) position, but is also lawless in the sense that 
there are no real laws in nature. 
 Bird, on the other hand, sees laws as both existing, and also 
governing (although not extrinsically governing, in the Armstrongian 
sense). GiveQ WKH GLVFXVVLRQ DERYH 0XPIRUG¶V YLHZ VHHPV WR IDOO PRVW
QDWXUDOO\ RXW RI GLVSRVLWLRQDO HVVHQWLDOLVW RQWRORJLHV EXW %LUG¶V view, I 
think, is plausible if dispositional essentialism is. In this section I will 
discuss both realist lDZOHVVQHVV DQG %LUG¶V YLew of laws in the neo-
dispositionalist framework, and present arguments for and against each 
position. ,ZLOOFRQVLGHU0XPIRUG¶Vµ&HQWUDO'LOHPPD¶ZKLFKSXUSRUWVWR
show that there are no laws in nature, and then GHPRQVWUDWH %LUG¶V
response, which allows laws to be in nature, whereby laws supervene upon 
powers. 8OWLPDWHO\ , DUJXH WKDW VRPH RI 0XPIRUG¶V DVVXPSWLRQV DUH
XQMXVWLILHGDQGWKDW%LUG¶VDFFRXQWRIODZVDVVXSHUYHQLQJRQIXQGDPHQWDO
properties is far more appealing.  
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7.7.1 Mumford on Laws in Nature   
0XPIRUG¶V  ERRN LV HQWLWOHG µ/DZV in 1DWXUH¶75. One might think 
WKDW0XPIRUGZLVKHVWRGLVWLQJXLVKµODZVin QDWXUH¶IURPµODZVof QDWXUH¶ 
(the usually terminology), in which case he might argue that there are laws 
of nature but not laws in nature. In fact, some Humeans might wish to 
endorse this ± for some Humeans, laws are propositions76, and although 
which propositions are laws supervenes on the pattern of instantiation of 
local particular matters of fact, they are not seen to be in nature per se77. 
However, Mumford seems to hold the view that any metaphysical position 
without laws in nature is a metaphysical view without laws, claiming that 
despite his dispositionalist metaphysic being a realist metaphysic (in so far 
as there is more to the evolution of the physical system than just one event 
after another), it is one completely devoid of laws - powers do all the 
work. 
 Mumford provides a number of arguments against there being laws 
in nature. I summarise the most interesting ones, below: 
1. There is not, nor can there be, a nominal essence of laws (in nature) 
2. There are disagreements as to what laws are supposed to be 
3. µ6FLHQFH GRHV QRW JLYH WR LWV ODZV WKH VDPH IXQGDPHQWDO LPSRUWDQFH
that is given to them by the metaphysical conception employed by 
nomoORJLFDOUHDOLVP¶0XPIRUG 
4. The Central Dilemma 
                                                          
75
 My emphasis. 
76
 For Lewis, propositions are sets of possible worlds (See Lewis On the Plurality of Worlds 
Blackwell Publishing 1986 pp 27-50), but further discussion of this is unnecessary in the context 
of this thesis  
77
 David Lewis might not endorse this view, as for him propositŝŽŶƐĂƌĞŵƵĐŚůŝŬĞƉƌŽƉĞƌƚŝĞƐ P ?ƚŚĞ
proposition is the same thing as the property of being a world where that proposition holds; and 
that is the same thing as the set of worlds where the proposition holds. A proposition holds at 
just those worlds that are ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨŝƚ ? ?>ĞǁŝƐ ? ? ? ? P ? ?-54). Laws are, in a sense, in nature, as 
to have a proposition, p, as a law, is just to be a world that is a member of the set of worlds 
where (a) p is true, and (b) p is a law. 
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With respect to (1), it is true that a complete set of the nominal essences 
(that is, the properties we look for in a conceptual analysis) of laws is 
difficult to identify. In chapter 2, I considered various possibilities, 
including universality, mind-independence, and our ability to appeal to 
them in explanations and predictions. But there are certain fundamental, 
crucial aspects of the concept of law that people disagree on. Perhaps the 
most important of these is concerned with what laws actually do:  
Do laws describe, or do they prescribe?  
Do they govern and restrict the behaviour of otherwise inactive objects, or 
is it the other way around ± do the laws supervene on movements of 
objects?  
Are laws necessarily (de dicto) extrinsic to objects, or can they be intrinsic 
to them? 
 Could the laws have been otherwise? 
With respect to (2), Mumford highlights the differences between 
the various metaphysical positions (Mumford 2004: 132), and in particular 
tKH GLIIHUHQFHV EHWZHHQ (OOLV¶V DQG $UPVWURQJ¶V RQWRORJLHV EXW %LUG¶V
neo-dispositionalist account of laws could be added to this list). 
Armstrong sees laws as relations between universals (in nature), whereas 
Ellis sees laws as (propositions) describing the essential properties of 
natural kinds. Clearly very different conceptions of what a law is supposed 
to be. 
 In response to Mumford here I would simply say that both the 
Armstrongian view and scientific essentialism are attempts at 
metaphysical analyses of our concept of laws of nature. No doubt each is 
motivated by the variations in their own beliefs about what laws should be 
± Armstrong believes that laws must ultimately govern otherwise inert 
particulars, and Ellis believes that laws are closely linked with the highly 
structured world that we live in. Both, though, are trying to satisfy the rest 
of the conditions for being a law of nature, whilst maintaining a tenable 
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metaphysical position. Disagreements in the metaphysical nature of what 
it is to be a law are inevitable given the disagreements regarding what they 
see to be the nominal essences of laws, but nonetheless, I believe that if 
the conditions I identified in chapter 2 can be satisfied, whatever satisfies 
them is worthy of the name: µODZV¶ 
 I dRQ¶WVHHREMHFWLRQDVRYHUO\SUREOHPDWLFas it seems to me 
that arguably one of the main aims of science, and physics in particular, 
has been the discovery of laws and their subsequent applications (to space 
exploration, for predictions, and even in manufacturing). Perhaps 
0XPIRUG¶VREMHFWLRQZRXOGEHEHWWHUSXWDVKLVEHOLHIWKDWDWWULEXWLQJWKH
name or status of µlaw¶ to a proposition/equation seems more or less 
DUELWUDU\ LQ WKH UHDOP RI VFLHQFH ,Q VFLHQFH ZH ILQG µODZV¶ µWKHRUHPV¶
µSULQFLSOHV¶µUXOHV¶DQGµK\SRWKHVHV¶DQGZKHWKHUDGLVFRYHU\LVWHUPHGD
ODZ RU D SULQFLSOH MXVW GRHVQ¶W VHHP WR IROORZ IURP DQ\ RI WKH LQWULQVLF
properties of the propositions/equations in question. Bird, however, 
disagrees, insisting that there are real differences between laws and 
principles etc. In short, Bird believes that whether a physical principle is 
called a law or not depends on whether it fulfils certain criteria at the time 
of its discovery ± the criteria essentially being the conditions arising from 
a conceptual analysis of laws. For Bird: µ5HODWLYHWRDSDUWLFXODUILHOGDQG
the state of knowledge concerning it, S is held to state a law if and only 
LI¶ 
1. It states a reasonably general relationship between quantities and properties; 
2. It seems to state a relationship that is close to fundamental; 
3. It is a new discovery, not easily deducible from known laws; 
4. It has wide application in predicting and explaining phenomena; 
5. The relationship seems necessary rather that accidental. (Bird 2007: 199) 
 When we look at lists of laws, principles and theorems, we see 
that, at the time of discovery, those statements that satisfy these conditions 
tend to have been called laws, and those that did not were not called laws. 
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Importantly though, it seems to me that whether or not scientists use the 
WHUP µODZ¶ FRQVLVWHQWO\ HQRXJK IRU WKH SKLORVRSKHUV¶ OLNLQJ VKRXOG QRW
overly concern us. No doubt all our beliefs about laws have in some sense 
been shaped by what the scientists call laws, but philosophers have the 
right to take what we can from science, and use it in metaphysical theory. 
Perhaps WHOOLQJDVFLHQWLVWWKDWµVXFKDQGVXFKSULQFLSOH¶LVQRWDSULQFLSOH
but a law would not be of concern to him, as the scientist is not 
metaphysically loading his discovery. However, we, as metaphysicians, 
can take the concept of law that has evolved from the scientists¶ work, and 
attempt to unravel the metaphysical underpinning of these laws. If we can 
find something that satisfies all the conditions we postulated in our 
conceptual analysis, then this is, as a matter of de dicto necessity, a law of 
nature - LQ WKHHQG ,GRQRW WKLQN LW UHDOO\PDWWHUVZKHWKHU WKHUH¶VPXFK
consistency in the application of the term amongst scientists. 
 0XPIRUG¶VPDLQREMHFWLRQWRWKHUHEHLQJODZVLQQDWXUHLV the 
Central Dilemma. 
The Central Dilemma is presented as follows: 
I. Either laws have [1] some (governing or determining) role or [2] not. 
II. If [1] there is a (governing or determining) role for laws, then such laws are 
either [A] external to the things for which they play that role (they govern or 
determine) or [B] they are internal 
III. If [A]: a theory of external laws is in need of an account of how laws relate 
suitably to the things they govern. The most plausible such account, the DTA 
theory [Ar], still has difficulty in explaining this relation and entails an 
incredible thesis (quidditism). Any other theory of external laws would need to 
avoid the problem of  [Ar], but in a way that provides an account of A that is at 
least as plausible as [Ar]. 
IV. If [B]: A theory of internal laws is in need of an account of how laws could be 
suitably internal. The most plausible such account, reduction [Br] (Ellis), is an 
implausible account of governance. Any other internal account would need to 
avoid the problem of [Br] but in a way that provides an account of B that is at 
least as plausible as [Br].   (Mumford 2004: 158) 
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He concludes that neither [A] nor [B] look good, and so we should reject 
(1); that is, we should reject that there can be laws that play a governing or 
determLQLQJ UROH7KLVFRPELQHGZLWK0XPIRUG¶V UHDOLVWPHWDSK\VLFVRI
dispositional properties, leads to the view he calls Realist Lawlessness. 
7.7.2 2EMHFWLRQVWR0XPIRUG¶V$UJXPHQWV 
The first objection I wish to mount against Mumford is once again 
concerned with the conceptual analysis of laws he presupposes. Let us 
grant, for the sake of argument, causal realism in the Mumford/Bird/Ellis 
sense ± from this I think it reasonable to suppose that (although this is not 
necessarily so) laws, if there are any such things, either are, or describe, 
the aspects of reality that provide the metaphysical glue that maintains the 
uniformity of nature. 
 For Mumford, lDZV PXVW SOD\ HLWKHU D µJRYHUQLQJ¶ RU D
µGHWHUPLQLQJ¶ UROH ± in this respect they must be in nature, not merely 
descriptions of it. Compare this with (OOLV¶s laws: Ellis claims that laws 
describe the essential properties of natural kinds ± if kinds have essential 
properties, then (at least according to Ellis) there are laws, as there are 
descriptions of the essential properties of natural kinds. 
 0XPIRUG FDOOV (OOLV¶V YLHZ D µUHGXFWLYH DFFRXQW¶ SUHVXPDEO\
because he sees Ellis as reducing laws to some other kind of thing. Thus, 
if Ellis can show this other kind of thing to exist, then he can show that 
laws exist. However, Mumford thinks this rules laws out from playing the 
roles they have to, to satisfy the criteria of being a law µ+RZ FRXOG
something govern, or play any determining role in, that to which it is 
UHGXFLEOH"¶0XPIRUG 
 Mumford is right, I think, in proposing that nothing can govern 
something to which it is reducible, but does that really serve as an 
adequate critique of scientific essentialism. To begin with, Ellis is not 
reducing laws to essential properties of natural kinds. Laws are descriptive 
propositions for Ellis, not aspects of reality (although they express de re 
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necessities): they cannot be reduced to something physical. Laws, for 
Ellis, describe the essential properties of natural kinds. These descriptions 
clearly do not govern what the essential properties of the natural kinds are, 
as Mumford proposes laws must. %XWWKHQ(OOLVZRXOGQ¶WZDQWWKHPWR  
 What properties are essential to a natural kind is a mind-
independent aspect of reality, not governed by anything. If Ellis is right, 
and the world is structured in the way he supposes, then there are 
properties instantiated by members of natural kinds as a matter of de re 
necessiW\ (OOLV¶V ODZV DUH global in scope, explain the regularities in 
nature, help us make predictions, and so forth/DZVLQ(OOLV¶VRQWRORJ\
describe the aspects of reality that constrain it, and ensure that nature 
remains uniform. The world thus evolves in accordance with the nature of 
the things that constitute it: For Ellis, then, the laws tell us, but do not 
determine, what the natures of these things are. It seems to me that if Ellis 
is right, his laws are (a) very useful, and (b) would satisfy the conditions 
of lawhood in common with PRVWSHRSOH¶V FRQFHSWLRQRI ODZV. I do not 
think, then, that the secoQG KRUQ RI 0XPIRUG¶V GLOHPPD LV WRR
problematic. He claims firstly WKDWµDWKHRU\RILQWHUQDOODZVLVLQQHHGRI
an account of how the laws could be suitably LQWHUQDO¶ 0XPIRUG 
157). Ellis (if one is happy to embrace scientific essentialism), I think, 
succeeds in providing us with such an account; and secondly Mumford 
argues WKDW µWKH PRVW SODXVLEOH VXFK DFFRXQW UHGXFWLRQ (OOLV LV DQ
LPSODXVLEOH DFFRXQW RI JRYHUQDQFH¶ ibid) ± , VD\ ³6R ZKDW" ,W¶V E\ no 
means clear that we need an account of laws that govern, in order to have 
an account of laws´  
 7KH VHFRQG REMHFWLRQ WR 0XPIRUG¶V DUJXPHQW FRPHV IURP %LUG
(2007). Bird claims that laws could, in fact, be seen to play a governing 
role. To reconcile a realist view of laws with neo-dispositionalism, Bird 
suggests a supervenience theory of laws, where laws supervene upon 
potencies. ,QWKHQH[WVHFWLRQ,ZLOOGLVFXVV%LUG¶VVXJJHVWLRQDQGKRZ,
think this leads us to a potentially catastrophic objection to dispositional 
essentialism. 
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7.7.3 %LUG¶V/DZVRf Nature 
Bird, like Mumford, thinks that laws have to be in nature in order to do the 
work they have to do. Laws cannot be propositions (although they can be 
expressed by propositions), but must be aspects of reality capable of 
determining how the system evolves - but they must also be, or be closely 
related to, the potencies of things (which are of course internal properties 
of things). 
 So what are laws DFFRUGLQJWR%LUG¶VQHR-dispositionalist account? 
They cannot be the properties themselves, for to say a property in and of 
itself is a law would completely undermine our conception of law. We 
can, Bird claims, nonetheless claim that laws supervene on dispositions ± 
but they should be seen as relations between properties rather than the 
properties themselves. This is formalised as (regularities): 
V*: ׊xILQNVDQGDQWLGRWHVDUHWR'DUHDEVHQWĺ'[	6[ĺ0[RU 
V**  ׊x(ceteris paribus '[	6[ĺ0[ (Bird 2007: 60) 
Bird includes the condition of there being no finks or antidotes in order to 
overcome objections to the arguments regarding the non-universality of 
laws (see Cartwright 1995). However, given that, as I have shown 
previously, we have good reason to think that fundamental properties have 
neither finks nor antidotes, it seems to me that the ceteris paribus clause is 
surplus to requirements in the case of fundamental laws (which are 
relations between fundamental properties). Fundamental laws, then, do not 
require the ceteris paribus clause (note, though, that the formalisation 
would still work for fundamental laws, LW¶V MXVW WKDW WKH ceteris paribus 
clause is redundant).  
 Although Bird agrees with Mumford as to the most fundamental 
explananda of the uniformity of nature and the truthmakers of 
counterfactuals being potencies, he concludes that there are laws in nature; 
laws that explain, hold universally, are mind-independent and non-
accidental - laws are relations among properties that supervene on 
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potencies (Bird 2007: ch9). So aJDLQ %LUG¶V neo-dispositionalist 
metaphysic of laws is closely tied with his metaphysic of causation - laws 
can be expressed as regularities, but the truthmakers of his law-statements 
are the same properties that provide the metaphysical glue in causal 
LQWHUDFWLRQV,I%LUG¶VPHWDSK\VLFVRIFDXVDWLRQLVWHQDEOHWKHQRQWKHface 
of it so is his account of laws, as it seems to satisfy the conditions to be 
found in all plausible accounts of laws of nature. 
 I have now presented the four main accounts of cause and law: the 
Humean account, the Armstrongian view, Scientific Essentialism and 
Neo-Dispositionalism. In the next chapter I will evaluate all four in the 
context of what I consider, from a metaphysical perspective, to be the 
most important principle in physical theory: The Principle of Least Action 
(PLA). It is so important because it has held true in all widely accepted 
physical theories since Newton. If any scientific hypothesis could be 
confirmed by observation, it would be the PLA.  
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Chapter 8: Consistency with our Best Scientific Theories 
 
8.1 The Principle of Least Action 
I claimed at the beginning of this thesis that the best understanding of our 
physical system will come from the advancement of both science and 
metaphysics. I will not go so far as to say that any metaphysical theory 
inconsistent with current scientific theory should immediately be 
discarded, as there are numerous examples of scientific theories that have 
been falsified - VR ZK\ WKLQN RXU FXUUHQW VFLHQWLILF WKHRULHV ZRQ¶W EH
falsified, too? (Newtonian forces, for example, look like Armstrongian 
governing laws ± but Newtonian mechanics has been superseded by 
relativity theories). However, there is one scientific principle that has held 
true of all recent workable systems, including Newtonian Physics, Special 
and General Relativity, and String Theory. I refer to The Principle of 
Least Action (PLA), which states that for any closed physical system the 
action of that system will be minimised78. The form of the equations that 
determine the action of each system differ from one system to the next 
(these are called the Lagrange equations), but the basic notion of 
minimising action has always held true. Ultimately there is little doubt that 
ours is a world that evolves in accordance with least action principles, 
whatever the (uVLQJ(OOLV¶V WHUPLQRORJ\Iundamental laws of nature turn 
out to be.  
 If this is a justified claim (which I will just assume), it seems to me 
that any feasible metaphysics of laws must be able to accommodate it. In 
the following chapter I will firstly explain the PLA in more detail, and 
then look in turn at each of the metaphysical theories we have discussed 
(except the Armstrongian view which has already been discarded) to 
determine whether (a) they are compatible with the phenomenon, and (b) 
if the PLA is a law, how should it interpreted metaphysically, as opposed 
to purely a mathematical formalism?  
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 KƌŵŽƌĞĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞůǇ ? ?ĞǆƚƌĞŵŝƐĞĚ ? ? 
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 A detailed understanding of the PLA is not required for my 
purposes, so , WKLQN DQ DQDORJ\ LQ WHUPV RI µHIIRUW¶ UDWKHU WKDQ DFWLRQ
would be sufficient, and less technical. 
8.2 The Lazy Philosopher and The Principle of Least Effort 
Let me introduce Matthew: an ex-philosophy student/turned lazy gardener. 
Because of the economic downturn DQG WKH%ULWLVKJRYHUQPHQW¶V ODFNRI
appreciation for the value in the Arts, Matthew FRXOGQ¶WILQGDQacademic 
job straight away, and he was a little short of money - so after a brief 
failed attempt at joining the professional snooker circuit, he took to 
pumping water from a well into a Tibetan village to earn his right to live 
as a Buddhist monk. The well is already built, so all he has to do is lay the 
piping down to the water tank in the village. Of course due to his innate 
laziness, Matthew wants to spend as little time and use as little energy as 
possible to fill the tank, but as he soon finds out, the amount of time and 
energy required depends upon how he lays the piping. Initially he just laid 
the piping randomly from the top of the hills to the bottom, but it took a 
lot of effort to fill the tank, so he re-laid the piping and found the work a 
lot easier. Remembering his philosophy of physics and mathematical 
training, rather than trying every single possible route (of which there are 
an infinite number!), he realised the simplest way to choose would be to 
formalise the topology of the hills, and use a bit of calculus to work out 
the best route  - by assigning a value to each point in the valley indicating 
the amount of effort it takes for the water to pass through the pipe when 
laid across it, he can find the µeffort function¶ which tells us how much 
work it takes to fill the tank for any route79.           
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 This work ŝƐƉĂƌƚŽĨĂũŽŝŶƚƉĂƉĞƌǁŝƚŚ<ĂƌŝŵdŚĞďĂƵůƚ ?dŚĞďĂƵůƚĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐƚŚĂƚ ?the path of least 
effort will be the one for which very small variations in the path produce no change in E (the 
effort required). This is because finding such an extremal path indicates that the quantity E is 
stationary (either maximum, minimum or an inflection) and given the physical structure of the 
problem only the minimum option is possible. So the problem of our lazy plumber is solved by 
insisting that for variations between paths infinitesimally close to his test path there is no change 
in the amount of effort (฀EA? ? ? ? ?^ŵĂƌƚ ?ĂŶĚdŚĞďĂƵůƚ ?< ?A Powerful Account of a Lazy World ?
Presented at the 2010 British Society of Philosophy of Science Conference.)  
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By formalising the topology of the hills and using the effort function, 
Matthew was able to find out how to fill the tank in the village in the 
quickest possible time (allowing him to meditate further on the time it 
takes to get a response from the top philosophy journals)80.  
 Replacing effort with action (a notion closely linked with effort 
given its SI units are joules-seconds), our world, it turns out, is as lazy as 
Matthew, as the action is always minimized. 
8.3 The Principle of Least Action 
For a given physical system there is a special function particular to it 
called the Lagrangian, L, (When Mathew gave numbers to each point in 
the valley, the equation he used ± but did not define ± was the equivalent 
of the Lagrangian) which associates each possible worldly state of affairs 
with a number ± and each possible state of affairs is represented by a point 
RQWKHµYHORFLW\-configuration spacH¶JUDSK7KH/DJUDQJLDQµLVDIXQFWLRQ
RI DOO WKH« LQWULQVLF SURSHUWLHV DVFULEHG WR WKH REMHFWV LQ WKH V\VWHP E\
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 Fortunately for Matthew, the institute of Applied Philosophy in Tibet heard of his endeavours, 
and immediately offered him a permanent position. 
village 
 
The Plumber ?s Problem: figure 8.1 
y(x)  
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classical mechanics81¶ .DW]DY   DQG LV W\SLFDOO\ HTXLYDOHQW WR
the kinetic energy of the system minus the potential energy82.  
 The action, I, like the effort in the case of the lazy philosopher, can 
once again be worked out using calculus once the Lagrangian and the path 
is known83.  
 
Figure 8.284 
 As I have already stated, the PLA is not restricted to Newtonian 
Mechanics ± it is found in Special and General Relativity, and even String 
Theory (the difference just lies in the form of the Lagrangians (in classical 
mechanics it is just kinetic minus potential energy, but in contemporary 
physical theories the Lagrange equations are more complex. Nonetheless, 
the principle still holds). The PLA seems to satisfy all our criteria for true 
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 i.e. space-time co-ordinates, velocities, charges and masses  
82
 The Lagrangian relevant to general relativity represents an important deviation from this  
83
 ƐdŚĞďĂƵůƚǁƌŝƚĞƐ P ?The action, I, of a physical system is then defined between two points in 
velocity-configuration space for any given path, ฀, between those two points. A direct physical 
interpretation of action is not generally given in physical theory, but its SI units of joules-seconds 
indicate a close connection with both energy and time (and justifies our analogy with the 
plumbers concept of effort). The action can be explicitly calculated by the integral of the 
Lagrangian with respect to time along a path.  
I=฀฀Ldt ? ?^ŵĂƌƚĂŶĚdŚĞďĂƵůƚ PA Powerful Account of a Lazy World) 
 
84
 Figure 2 shows the velocity-configuration space of a four-dimensional world, where each point 
represents the state of the world (including velocities, mass, charge etc) at a particular moment. 
The dotted lines represent possible paths that could have been taken to get from the first point 
to the second (sets of possible states the world could have taken en route to the second point). 
The path of least action  W which will always be the actual path  W is shown in black.  
Velocity-Configuration Space 
Each point in the space represents 
the instantaneous state of the 
physical system and is associated 
with a value of the Lagrangian. 
 The principle of least action picks 
out a distinguished path between 
any two points corresponding to 
the real physical trajectory of the 
system 
t1 
t2 
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law-statements, and given its universality across all physical theories it is 
extremely important, I think, that we consider its compatibility with our 
metaphysical views85. Joel Katzav argues that the PLA is incompatible 
with dispositional essentialism ± if he is right, I agree with him that 
dispositional essentialism is in serious trouble86. 
 There are two objections Katzav raises, based on his assumptions 
about what the PLA presupposes. I will outline the two presuppositions 
(8.4.1 and 8.4.2), and then see how each of the metaphysical theories can 
tackle the supposed problems87.  
8.4.1 Many Possible Paths 
Katzav believes the PLA allows that the history of a physical system could 
have corresponded to a velocity-configuration space path without a 
minimised action (there were many routes Matthew could have chosen for 
his pipeline), and from this he makes the non-trivial assumption that PLA 
presupposes its own contingency. He reasons, then, that any theory 
entailing the possibility of only one set of laws must be incompatible with 
it. 
 
8.4.2 The Explanatory Power of the Principle of Least Action 
Katzav argues that the Principle of Least Action is the ultimate 
explanation for why closed physical systems evolve in the way that they 
do.  
 7KH3/$WHOOVXVWKDWWKHSK\VLFDOV\VWHP¶VTXDQWLW\RIDFWLRQ must 
be the smallest relative to the quantities of action it might have possessed; 
                                                          
85
 Arguably the PLA should not be thought of as a law itself, but as a principle that describes the 
way our physical system evolves. In these terms an adequate account of laws should explain the 
PLA but need not include it as one of its laws. 
86
 My thanks to Karim Thebault, with whom I have written a paper entitled A Powerful Account of 
a Lazy World (recently presented at the 2010 British Society of Philosophy of Science 
conference). The contents of this section form a part of that paper. 
 
87
 EŽƚĞƚŚĂƚ<ĂƚǌĂǀƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐƚŚĞƐĞĂƐƉƌŽďůĞŵƐĨŽƌůůŝƐ ?ƐĚŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂůĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůŝƐŵ ?ƚŚŝƐŝƐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚ
from neo-dispositionalism and of course from Humeanism). 
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as stated earlier, if we know WKH V\VWHP¶V DFWLRQ LQWHJUDO WKH DFWXDO
equations of motion can be calculated from this information alone. So the 
property of being a physical system that has a quantity of action that is a 
minimum can be appealed to in explaining why certain equations of 
motion describe the objects that comprise it. 
 Katzav then argues that, as the equations of motion describe the 
dispositions of the objects within it, and that physical systems having an 
action that is minimized (that is, that the physical system complies with 
the PLA) explains why those systems have the equations of motion they 
do, we should realise that the PLA also explains why the objects in the 
system have the dispositions they do. One might ask why these deductions 
are explanatory? It is, he argues, because µWKDW VRPH TXDQWLW\ is [a 
minimum] VHHPVWRLPSO\WKDWLILWLVDFWXDOLWLVQRWDQDFFLGHQW¶ (Katzav 
2004: 215), and that something is not an accident allows us to appeal to it 
in explanations.  
 
8.5 Can the Three Metaphysical Theories Accommodate Many Possible 
Paths? 
I will now start the process of assessing each of the three main 
metaphysical theses against the problems posed by these problems, 
starting with the sophisticated regularity theory. 
8.5.1 The Sophisticated Regularity Theory and the MPP 
When we ask whether the system could have followed a different path, we 
are simply asking whether it would have been possible for our physical 
system to have evolved in a different way; that is, might certain events 
have occurred such that the principle of least action was violated? For the 
Humean this is certainly possible. The laws of our world supervene upon 
the spatiotemporal location of local particular matters of fact, and not vice 
versa. The regularities are not governed or determined by the laws, rather 
the laws fall out of the regularities and the best-systems account. In the 
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actual world the principle of least action is (we are assuming) a law in 
virtue of its being true, but it need not have been a law at all. The 
Sophisticated Regularity Theorist, therefore, has absolutely no problem in 
accommodating the apparent presupposition that the PLA holds 
contingently ± it is a consequence of their metaphysical position that it 
must hold contingently. 
8.5.2 Scientific Essentialism and the MPP 
If Katzav is right in thinking the PLA presupposes its own contingency, 
then Ellis is in trouble. According to scientific essentialism and the 
dispositional properties fundamental to the position (assuming 
determinism) there is only one way in which our physical system could 
evolve given the initial conditions. The properties instantiated by objects 
have their dispositional natures essentially, and given the absence of finks 
and antidotes they cannot fail to manifest once stimulus conditions are 
met. Katzav argues that as this theory entails the possibility of only one set 
of laws (and thus only one possible path between the states of affairs t1 
and t2 in figure 2), dispositional essentialism must be incompatible with 
the PLA. 
 For the scientific essentialist, it is true that the PLA is a law 
applying to all physical systems. It is not logically necessary that the PLA 
holds in all worlds, but it is de re necessary in our world in the same sense 
that electrons are necessarily negatively charged. According to Ellis, 
physical systems are Lagrangian (adhere to the PLA) as a matter of a 
posteriori metaphysical necessity: µOLNH DFFLGHQWDO JHQHUDOL]DWLRQV >WKH
PLA is] a posteriori, and can be established only by empirical enquiry, but 
unlike such generalizatLRQVWKH\DUHQRWFRQWLQJHQW¶(OOLV 
 For Ellis, as with Katzav, it is no accident that the PLA holds in 
our world. However, unlike Katzav, Ellis takes it to be an essential 
property of the actual world, so its holding is not a contingent matter. 
From the quotation above we can see that this is true of all physical 
systems, for that matter, and although it is logically possible for other 
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worlds not to adhere to the PLA, according to Ellis none of those worlds 
would be physical systems.  
 Ellis sees the dispositional essentialism Katzav is really addressing 
to be what he terms a naïve form of the essentialist position (essentially 
WKHSRVLWLRQ,QDPHUDWKHUOHVVSDWURQL]LQJO\µQHR-GLVSRVLWLRQDOLVP¶, and 
in response to Katzav suggests that his more sophisticated version (SDE), 
which employs essential properties of natural kinds, can accommodate the 
PLA without difficulty.  
 He responds to the MPP by asserting the principle of least action to 
EH µRI WKH HVVHQFH RI WKH JOREDO NLQG LQ WKH FDWHJRU\ Rf objects or 
VXEVWDQFHV¶ (OOLV   PDNLQJ LW D ODZ RI QDWXUH WKDW DOO QDWXUDO
kinds in that hierarchy adhere to the principle88. Any world in which the 
PLA does not obtain cannot be a member of the global kind our world 
must be a member of. It is thus a posteriori metaphysically necessary that 
there is only one metaphysically possible path, so it simply cannot 
presuppose its own metaphysical contingency89. Ellis thus gets around the 
objection by denying .DW]DY¶V SUHVXSSRVLWLRQ that the PLA holds 
contingently. 
8.5.3 Neo-Dispositionalism and the MPP 
Bird and Mumford do not appeal to essential properties of natural kinds in 
their ontology, and so they are unable to give exactly the same response 
Ellis provides. Of course these neo-dispositionalists will face the same 
objection; that is, the need for the path of least action to be just one of a 
myriad of possible paths.  
 On the face of it Bird does seem to have a reasonable response. He 
FODLPV WKH IXQGDPHQWDO IODZ LQ .DW]DY¶V UHDVRQLQJ LV KLV LPSOLFLW
assumption that because something is logically possible it must also be 
metaphysically possible (see Bird 2007: 200-214). Although neo-
                                                          
88
 Note that this does not commit him to the PLA being a powerful property of the objects 
89
 It turns out there are a number of possible paths, but this possibility is only a logical possibility, 
not a metaphysical one; but more on this later. 
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dispositionalism rules out the metaphysical possibility of equations other 
than actual ones describing our system, it does not claim this to be a 
logical impossibility. But this is not an inconsistency; metaphysical 
impossibility does not entail logical impossibility, since according to 
dispositional essentialism, the domain of what is logically possible 
includes propositions which cannot be instantiated in any metaphysically 
possible world.  
8.5.4 Conclusions Regarding the MPP 
Each of the three metaphysical theories seems to have a response to the 
MPP problem consistent with its ontology: Any regularity theorist can 
claim that a law/regularity like the PLA holds contingently, and so they 
cannot be WURXEOHGE\.DW]DY¶VFODLP ,Q(OOLV¶VRQWRORJ\LIDFFHSWDEOH
the PLA is a law, and hence it must be an essential property of the actual 
world - .DW]DY¶VEHOLHIWKDWWKHSULQFLSOHSUHsupposes its own contingency 
must, according to the scientific essentialist, just be false; and finally the 
neo-dispositionalist agrees that the path followed is logically contingent, 
but that this is not inconsistent with it being metaphysically necessary 
(which is all the dispositionalist is committed to). 
 8OWLPDWHO\ , GRQ¶W WKLQN WKH PDQ\ SRVVLEOH SDWKV SUREOHP
particularly undermines any of the theories. However, there are reasons 
for doubting the legitimacy of all three responses: 
1. Anti-Humeans would argue that it is absurd to conclude that the PLA 
is a cosmic coincidence;  
2. Those who, like myself, think we have no reason to believe that the 
laws of our world could not have been different, ZLOOTXHVWLRQ(OOLV¶V
response; and 
3. for the neo-dispositionalist, although he explains why only one 
possible path is available, he does not explain why this path is the path 
of least action. 
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 The objections to the Humean and Ellisian responses are really just 
reformulations of the objections to the positions themselves, but the 
objection to the neo-dispositionalist here is more interesting. Although 
Bird et al provide us with metaphysical necessity in the form of powerful 
properties, constituted by SM-relations, the principle of least action does 
not look to take this form. If neo-dispositionalism is correct, then all the 
IXQGDPHQWDO GLVSRVLWLRQV PXVW VRPHKRZ µDGG-XS¶ WR HQVXUH WKH SDWK RI
least action is followed ± the path supervenes on the dispositions. But we 
have not been provided with any reason to think that this should be the 
FDVH 6XUHO\ LW FDQ¶W EH D FRVPLF FRLQFLGHQFH DV HOLPLQDWLQJ FRVPLF
coincidences is arguably the main aim of dispositional essentialism.  
 This leads us neatly into looking at the kind of explanations the 
PLA and our metaphysical theories afford. 
8.6.1 Sophisticated Regularity Theory and the Explanatory Power of the 
PLA 
The principle of least action is a global law of the highest order. For the 
sophisticated regularity theorist, this would translate as it being one of the 
fundamental axioms in the best systems analysis; from this principle and 
the other fundamental axioms (all expressed in terms of regularities) all 
the laws of nature can be derived, and, as I have shown (section 3.3.5), 
these regularities can act as explanations. Of course for the regularity 
theorist the PLA is not itself explained, but this is not problematic - 
explanatory chains always have to end somewhere, and this fundamental 
regularity is a plausible option for the ultimate unexplained explainer. 
 The regularity theorist would see the PLA as the ultimate 
explanans, as it is arguably the highest-order regularity when it comes to 
the evolution of our physical system. But this is not why Katzav thinks we 
can appeal to it in explanations. From the quotation above, we see that he 
thinks that as the path followed by the physical system is precisely that 
which minimises action, we should infer that it is no accident that it does 
so. In tKH FRQWH[W RI .DW]DY¶V SDSHU µno DFFLGHQW¶ cannot be a Humean 
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LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI µQR DFFLGHQW¶ he is implying that there is some 
metaphysical glue ensuring that this path is followed, as mere physical 
necessity would make the claim trivial (if we assume the PLA to be a 
law). This of course means that Katzav would never be won over by the 
Humean, even though Humeans can easily provide a response in terms of 
the best system analysis. 
 In short, the PLA would certainly explain the lower order 
regularities for the sophisticated regularity theorist. If the claim is that to 
be consistent with the PLA, the laws of motion, which are ultimately 
lower order regularities derivable from the PLA, must be explained by the 
PLA (and not vice versa), then, on his terms, the Humean has a perfectly 
adequate response, whether or not Katzav will acknowledge this.  
8.6.2 Scientific Essentialism and the Explanatory Power of the PLA 
As Katzav seems to present LW WKH DUJXPHQW DJDLQVW (OOLV¶V YHUVLRQ RI
dispositional essentialism runs as follows: 
P1. The quantity of action in the physical system being an 
extremum explains why certain equations of motion describe the 
way the objects that comprise it behave. 
P2. The equations of motion of a physical system describe the 
dispositions of the objects within it. 
C. The quantity of action in the physical system being an 
extremum explains why the objects within the system have the 
dispositions they do. 
Assuming that arguments of the form: a explains b, b describes c, 
therefore a explains c is valid, why is the PLA incompatible with 
dispositionalism in virtue of C? It is incompatible (according to Katzav) 
because for the dispositionalist, dispositional properties alone are the 
explanans for all the dispositions of objects (the way they behave in 
certain circumstances). If we accept that the PLA plays an explanatory 
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role, then there are explanations for physical phenomena independent of 
the dispositional properties of particulars. To put it another way; if we 
accept, (as we should, according to Katzav, on account of the fact that the 
PLA can be no accident) the vast explanatory value of the PLA, the 
dispositions of objects (the way they behave in certain circumstances) 
KDYHDQH[SODQDWLRQWKDWGRHVQRWGHULYHIURPWKHµSRZHUIXO¶GLVSRVLWLRQDO
properties those objects instantiate, and this supposedly directly 
contradicts the essence of dispositionalism. 
 One might argue that not only can the equations of motion be 
derived from the PLA, but the PLA can be derived from the Lagrange 
formula and equations of motion of any physical system. Why not suppose 
these deductions are the explanations; that is, that the PLA is explained by 
the laws of motion?  
 .DW]DYDQWLFLSDWHVWKLVUHVSRQVHDQGUHVSRQGVWKDWµDs the fact that 
physicists typically use the [PLA] to deduce corresponding equations of 
motion and not vice versa illustrates, the explanation only proceeds from 
the [PLA] WRWKHHTXDWLRQVRIPRWLRQ¶ (Katzav 2004: 217). But, he claims, 
even if a deduction of the PLA is explanatory, we would still have reason 
to think that other principles (from which the relevant formulation of the 
PLA is deduced), are not compatible with dispositionalism. 
 I think Ellis can respond to the explanatory problem using the 
same principles as his response to the Many Possible Paths problem, in 
that he can focus on his formulation of scientific essentialism. For Ellis it 
is de re necessary that our world has the PLA as a property, as the PLA is 
an essential property of the global kind our world is a member of. 
$FFRUGLQJWR(OOLVLQVFLHQFHZHVKRXOGRIWHQFRQVLGHUµ;LVDQHVVHQWLDO
SURSHUW\RI<¶WRKDYHJHQXLQHH[SODQDWory value. Just as we can explain 
DOO HOHFWURQV KDYLQJ QHJDWLYH FKDUJH E\ DSSHDOLQJ WR µQHJDWLYH FKDUJH¶
being an essential property of electrons, so we can explain our world 
evolving in accordance with the PLA in virtue of our world being a natural 
kind with the PLA (a natural kind of process) as an essential property. So 
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the PLA certainly does have explanatory value (the fact that it is de re 
necessary that our world evolve in accordance with the PLA seems like a 
reasonable explanation for the phenomenon!).  
 But that does not mean that other essential properties cannot have 
explanatory value, too (including dispositional properties). It is an 
essential property of electrons that they repel other things with negative 
charge, and we can appeal to this when explaining why electrons repel 
things with negative charge. In our world it might be entailed by the PLA 
that electrons repel things with negative charge, but the PLA is not an 
essential property of all worlds (there are many worlds where the PLA 
does not hold). Explanations in terms of essential properties of natural 
kinds of processes and substances, however, can hold across all worlds. If 
it is an essential property of electrons that they repel things with negative 
charge, all electrons in all possible worlds repel things with negative 
charge: µLW LVDQHVVHQWLDOSURSHUW\RIHOHFWURQV WKDW WKH\UHSHOQHJDWLYHO\
FKDUJHG WKLQJV¶ can, it seems to me, have explanatory value in certain 
contexts. 
 I claim, therefore, that the Scientific Essentialist can both explain 
the holding of the PLA in light of it being of the essence of the actual 
world, and (in agreement with Katzav) appeal to it when explaining the 
evolution of the physical system. Again, in agreement with Katzav, 
scientific essentialists can even appeal to the PLA as an explanation of 
why the actual world has the natural kinds of substances, processes and 
properties it does, but I claim he can also appeal to the essential properties 
of these natural kinds as explanantia in their own right. The supposed 
inability of the dispositions of things to explain the PLA is not 
significantly problematic for Ellis, as for Ellis there is more to explaining 
why our physical system evolves as it does than just the dispositional 
properties instantiated in the world. 
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8.6.3 Neo-Dispositionalism and the Explanatory Power of the PLA 
So once again Ellis can fall back on his ontology of natural kinds, but the 
neo-dispositionalist cannot do this. For him, it seems to me, the entire 
evolution of our physical system really is entirely attributable to the 
dispositional properties of things (and nothing else). Although Bird can 
deal with the MPP problem, it is not entirely clear how he is to explain 
why the principle of least action holds in our world (even if he can explain 
why there is only one metaphysically possible path). %LUGZULWHVWKDWµWKH
PLA is an a posteriori tool for providing the answer [to the question of 
which path will be taken]. That is consistent with the PLA itself being 
necessary, with the actual path being necessary, and with those necessities 
flowing from the (in this case unknown) intrinsic properties of the initial 
VWDWH RI WKH V\VWHP¶ %LUG   ,W LV FOHDU WKDW WKURXJK %LUG¶V
ontology the PLA falls out of the dispositional properties of our world and 
its initial state, but from what I have said about neo-dispositional so far we 
have no reason to think this is anything other than a cosmic coincidence 
XQGHU%LUG¶VRQWRORJ\; the necessities flow from the intrinsic properties of 
the initial state of the system, but presumably there are many ways the 
initial state of the system might have differed. 
 Bird deals directly with least action principles twice in 1DWXUH¶V
Metaphysics; initially to dispel the many possible paths problem, but later 
when he refutes 0XPIRUG¶VFODLPWKDWLQVFLHQFHµUHODWLYHO\DUELWUDU\DQG
almost certainly non-PHWDSK\VLFDO FRQVLGHUDWLRQV«OHDG WR VRPHWKLQJ
EHLQJ FDOOHG D ODZ¶ 0XPIRUG   %LUG DOVR H[SODLQV ZK\
scientists label the PLA a principle and not a law. As we saw in section 
7.6.1, Bird thinks scientists really do differentiate between laws, 
principles, and theorems, providing a list of conditions for laws. Bird 
argues that least action principles do not satisfy all these criteria: in 
particular they fail to satisfy conditions (2) and (3) ± they do not µVWDWHD
UHODWLRQVKLS WKDW LV FORVH WR IXQGDPHQWDO¶ DQG WKH\ DUH QRW µQHZ
GLVFRYHULHV WKDW DUH QRW HDVLO\ GHGXFLEOH IURP NQRZQ ODZV¶ Bird 2007: 
199). This, he claims, is because although the least action principles do 
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provide an alternative mathematically elegant formulation of the laws, we 
are not able to derive anything more than we were able to using what 
.DW]DYUHIHUVWRDVWKHµODZVRIPRWLRQ¶. (Using Newtonian mechanics as 
an example, we have Newtonian laws of motion and the least action 
principle reformulation where the quantity of action is kinetic minus 
potential energy. The least action principle approach does not provide us 
with any more information, in the Lewisian sense, than do the Newtonian 
laws of motion). 
 Secondly, he claims that the kind of explanations the least action 
SULQFLSOHVDIIRUGDUHµH[SODQDWRULO\RGG,QWKHFDVHRI)HUPDW¶VSULQFLSOH
KRZGRHVWKHOLJKWUD\NQRZZKLFKSDWKLVWKHTXLFNHVW"¶ibid).     
 ,Q UHVSRQVH WR %LUG¶V ILUVW REMHFWLRQ LW seems to me that (2) is 
satisfied by the PLA. What could be more fundamental than a principle (or 
law) that has been true of all reasonable formulations of the evolution of 
our physical system? 
 Criterion (3) can be split into two parts: (i) that it is a new 
discovery, and (ii) that it is not easily derivable from known laws. With 
respect to (i) I do not see why being a new discovery is required for or 
relevant to a true statement being given law-status. Can what was once 
considered a true law-statement cease to be a true law-statement over time 
despite it never being falsified (even through numerous scientific 
revolutions)? And with respect to (ii), this presupposes what the known 
laws are. Following Katzav, why not suppose that the PLA is the known 
law anGGHULYHWKHµODZVRIPRWLRQ¶IURPWKDWDQGWKHUHOHYDQW/DJUDQJLDQ 
Doing the work this way URXQGZRXOGJLYHWKHODZVRIPRWLRQµQRQ-ODZ¶
status ZKLFK,KDVWHQWRDGGLVQRWDFRQFOXVLRQ,¶GZLVKWRPDNHHLWKHU. 
 %LUG¶VVHFRQGDUJXPHQW that the least action principle explanations 
are explanatorily odd, is not exactly a knock down argument in the context 
of scientific theory. I agree that this kind of explanation is strange, but so 
are many explanations in science. Explaining light bending around stars 
by appealing to the curvature of spacetime is odd; the fact that time travels 
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slower for things travelling at higher velocities is odd; the M-Theory, 
(which asserts that the strings in string theory are really 1-dimensional 
slices of a 2-dimensional membrane vibrating in 11-dimensional space90) 
is odd; and the idea that a quantumly entangled particle can have a spin 
state that is neither up, nor down, nor neither, nor both is very odd... but 
these hypotheses serve as explanans for our empirical evidence, so the fact 
that the kind of explanation the PLA affords is explanatorily odd should 
QRWEHWRRSUREOHPDWLF,I,DVNWKHTXHVWLRQ³ZK\GLGRXUSK\VLFDOV\VWHP
follow this particular path through velocity-FRQILJXUDWLRQVSDFH´LWVHHPV
WRPHWKDW³EHFDXVHWKDWZDVWKHSDWKRIOHDVWDFWLRQ´ZRXOGbe a perfectly 
good explanation ± and in particular, it would EHEHWWHUWKDQ³EHFDXVHRI 
law of motion-1, law of motion-2, law of motion-3 and the initial state of 
WKH V\VWHP´ 3HUKDSV WKLV LV GXH WR DQ LQWXLWLRQ WKDW the Ramsey-Lewis 
µVLPSOLFLW\DQGVWUHQJWK¶FULWHULRQLVDJRRGZD\RIMXGJLQJEHWZHHQULYDO
theories, but nonetheless this looks right.  
8.6.4 Should the PLA be a law for Neo-Dispositionalists? 
I try to show above that the criteria set by Bird for a statement to be a law-
statement are either satisfied by the PLA, or should not be one of the 
criteria at all. But this does not mean the PLA will be a law for Bird, given 
his metaphysical conception of laws. Next I show why the PLA cannot be 
a law for the neo-dispositionalist.  
 As we saw in the preceding chapter, Stephen Mumford argued for 
a metaphysical position with metaphysical necessity grounded by 
dispositional properties, but devoid of any laws, as he assumes the 
governing role to be HVVHQWLDO WR µUHDO¶ laws (as we saw earlier (Beebee 
2000), it is not at all clear that laws need any governing aspect to them at 
all). Bird claims, though, that the dispositionalist ontology is not 
incompatible with governing laws tout court, only extrinsic governing 
laws (in the Armstrongian sense)+HZULWHVWKDWµOaws can govern even if 
they are potencies¶ %LUG  , concluding that µODZV DUH JHQHUDO
                                                          
90
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/String_theory - I do not pretend to understand what this means, 
but more than 4-dimensions in spacetime seems odd to me! 
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relations among properties that supervene on potencies, and which have 
H[SODQDWRU\SRZHU¶%LUG 
 The PLA does not fall into this category, though, as although 
according to Bird its holding supervenes on the general relations among 
properties that supervene on potencies (in our world), it is not itself a 
general relation among properties with dispositional essences (potencies). 
6RXQGHU%LUG¶VRQWRORJ\ the PLA is not a law. I try to provide accounts 
what the PLA might really be, in the next section. 
 In conclusion to this section - Katzav challenges the dispositional 
essentialist to show how dispositional properties can play an explanatory 
UROHZKHQ LW LVFOHDUDV IDUDV.DW]DY¶VFRQFHUQHG WKDW WKLV UROH LV IXOO\
occupied by the PLA. As the PLA plays the role the dispositional 
properties are supposed to play, and the PLA is more fundamental, Katzav 
believes dispositional properties are made redundant. Bird refutes 
.DW]DY¶V FODLPE\ VD\LQJ WKDW WKH3/$ LV QRW D real law, but a principle 
that plays no metaphysical role in the evolution of the system. The PLA, 
for Bird, is just a neat mathematical formalism that captures and describes 
the motions and changes determined by the intrinsic properties of 
particulars. As it is just a principle and not a law, the PLA carries with it 
no genuine explanatory power (in the same way as, for Bird, Humean laws 
cannot explain because they are not metaphysically meaty), and so the 
challenge Katzav raises, that dispositional properties cannot play an 
explanatory role, is overcome. For Bird, all the laws of motion supervene 
on potencies.  
 This does not, however, solve the problem of why the PLA holds 
in the first place. We can see that for Bird the PLA holding in our world 
ultimately supervenes on potencies. But as Katzav says, its holding (at 
least for the necessitarian) makes it look like no accident that it does. Bird 
has still not explained why it is no accident that the path of least action 
rather than any other path is followedDQG,¶PVXUHthat as a necessitarian 
KHZRXOGQ¶WZDQWLWWREH accidental either. I will try to show in 8.7.4 that a 
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dispositional account of the PLA is not entirely out of the question, but 
whether it solves the neo-GLVSRVLWLRQDOLVW¶VSUREOHPLVDQRWKHUPDWWHU. 
8.7 So what is the PLA? 
Katzav is trying to persuade us that the PLA explains the laws of motion 
and the dispositions of things (and not the other way around). If Katzav is 
to support his claim within a metaphysical debate he needs to give a 
metaphysical account of what the PLA actually is, which he fails to do in 
his 2004 paper. The PLA is, for the physicist, an alternative way of 
formalising, mathematically, the evolution of the system. This is not 
metaphysically informative. Katzav needs a metaphysical interpretation of 
this alternative formalism that differs from the metaphysics of the 
dispositional essentialist. There are, as far as I can see, several options as 
to what the PLA could be, each of which falls naturally into one of the 
three metaphysical theories this thesis is concerned with: 
1. The PLA is just a true law-statement ± expressible as a regularity. 
2. The PLA is an extrinsic governing law that determines how otherwise 
inert objects behave. 
3. The PLA is a dispositional property of the entire physical system. 
4. The PLA is a dispositional property of all the constituent parts of the 
system. 
I will deal with these options in turn: 
8.7.1 The Regularity View 
If we embrace Humeanism we could almost certainly interpret the PLA as 
one of the axioms in the Lewisian Best System. It would simply be a true 
law-statement expressing a universal regularity, and a very informative 
one at that - all the laws of motion would be derivable from it and the 
other fundamental axioms), and it would have explanatory value (at least 
as far as the regularity theorist is concerned). Taking the PLA to be just a 
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regularity, however, would take away the metaphysical necessity I think 
Katzav wants it to have.  
 We do not have to assume there is no metaphysical necessity even 
if we accept the PLA to be just a regularity. Bird, for example, might 
claim that the PLA is just a regularity, but it would be a regularity in 
virtue of the myriad of dispositional properties that constitute the world. 
This would, however, also strip the PLA of all its explanatory power as far 
as Katzav is concerned. Nevertheless, even if Bird is not happy to, the 
Humean in particular would be happy to embrace the PLA as a law. 
8.7.2 The Governing PLA? 
Option 2 has strong parallels with the Armstrongian view of laws of 
nature. According to this interpretation of the PLA, in every closed system 
there would be an extrinsic governing law determining what all the 
dispositions of that system must be (note that for Katzav, dispositions 
must just mean stimulus-response regularities, rather than some 
metaphysically stronger notion. I use disposition here purely because 
Katzav himself does). With Armstrong we saw that where N(F,G) holds, 
all Fs must, with metaphysical necessity (metaphysical glue) be Gs - Fs 
and Gs are both causally inert, and the N-relation is a universal that holds 
between these properties only contingently at any world. Where the PLA 
holds non-accidentally under (2), there must be some extrinsic property 
(that holds contingently at any world), P, ensuring that all the right 
UHJXODULWLHV RU GLVSRVLWLRQV LQ .DW]DY¶V VHQVH KROG RPQLWHPSRUDOO\
omnispatially, and with metaphysical necessity (involving connecting as a 
matter of µcontingent necessity¶ whatever sets of universals need to be 
connected).  Property P (when it holds) determines what properties the N-
relations stand between. The natural way to see this is as a third order 
relation between second order universals, rather like the third order N-
relations used by Armstrong when explaining functional laws.  
 $VWKHµGLVSRVLWLRQV¶RISURSHUWLHV ultimately hold in virtue of the 
P-relation and the corresponding N-relations holding between the right 
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universals, the properties (as governed by the N-relation) are themselves 
inert, so just as with Armstrong, this externally governing conception is 
susceptible to the quidditism objections%XW,¶PQRWVXUHWKLV alone would 
overly concern Katzav. After all, he thinks the PLA presupposes its own 
contingency, and so the idea that it will not hold in many possible worlds 
is beneficial (just as Armstrong with the N-relation, Katzav would think 
that when a world seems to be evolving in accordance with the PLA, 
inference to the best explanation will direct us towards the P-relation 
holding at our world ± he says that if it holds, it holds non-accidentally). 
Katzav must, however, give some account of what the P-relation is. Under 
the governing law metaphysical conception, the P-relation would be a 
third order relation between universals ± itself a universal; but as Bird 
(2005) showed us, this generates a vicious regress in the light of the 
quiddistic nature of universals in a metaphysics of extrinsic governing-
laws. 
8.7.3 A 3/$'LVSRVLWLRQ,QWULQVLFWRWKH6\VWHP¶V&RQVWLWXHQWV 
Only in the trivially simple case of a one particle system do objects 
individually follow space-time trajectories which are strictly speaking 
paths of least action91; the PLA applies to the action of the entire system, 
so generically all the trajectories of all the particles in four dimensional 
space-time must be coordinated such that the system as a whole follows a 
path of least action in velocity-configuration space. Why each individual 
particle follows a space-time trajectory corresponding to the minimum 
action for the system it is part of cannot, therefore, be explained purely in 
terms of a PLA disposition of any particular (unless in a single-particular 
system) considered in isolation.  
 The manifestation of the PLA disposition is not the object 
instantiating it following a trajectory that would, if all the other objects in 
the system followed suit, minimise WKH V\VWHP¶V DFWLRQ EXW WKH actual 
minimising RI WKHV\VWHP¶VDFWLRQ7KLVFDQEH HQVXUHGEy including the 
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 In fact, the trajectory for an individual particle in a composite system can be radically different 
to the trajectory corresponding to its least action if considered on its own. 
201 
 
RWKHU REMHFWV IROORZLQJ µminimising WUDMHFWRULHV¶ DPRQJVW WKH 3/$
GLVSRVLWLRQ¶V VWLPXOXV FRQGLWLRQV )XUWKHUPRUH DV WKH minimising of 
action is not restricted to any finite time period the manifestation of the 
PLA disposition must be the minimising of action over the entire 
duration92 RI WKH V\VWHP¶V H[LVWHQFH &RQVHTXHQWO\ WKH 3/$ GLVSRVLWLRQ
must (in a PLA world) be constantly manifesting for the PLA to be true in 
virtue of the PLA disposition. Furthermore, the manifestation of the PLA 
disposition instantiated by X requires all other objects to be following 
paths of least action, but if the other objects are following paths of least 
DFWLRQLQGHSHQGHQWO\RIWKH3/$GLVSRVLWLRQWKHQWKHV\VWHP¶VIROORZLQJ
the path of least action would (mostly) not be due to the PLA disposition 
(and we want the PLA disposition to be doing the work). We can solve 
this problem however, but ensuring that all objects are following paths of 
least action because of the PLA disposition they all instantiate. 
 For the stimulus conditions to be met, then, all objects in the 
system must take space-WLPHWUDMHFWRULHVWKDWDOORZWKHV\VWHP¶VDFWLRQWR
be minimised. So given: i) the non-accidental nature of the PLA; ii) the 
fact that according to dispositional essentialism, the trajectories of objects 
are determined by their dispositional properties alone; and iii) the fact that 
the PLA disposition can exist only where the manifestation relata exists 
(since if all the objects in the system are to have the requisite trajectories 
then all of them must instantiate the PLA disposition), in every 
metaphysically possible world in which the path of least action is followed 
due to the PLA disposition, if the property is instantiated by one object,  it 
is instantiated by all objects.  
 One might be tempted to object that if we accept the account 
provided above, overdetermination looks to creep into our causal picture - 
both the disposition of an electron to move towards a positively charged 
metal sheet and the PLA disposition are responsible for its motion. I GRQ¶W
see this as particularly problematic, as often more than one disposition 
determines the motion of an object. However, it does seem as if a cosmic 
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 Or over the relevant region of space-time in the case of a field theory 
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coincidence is required for this situation to arise ± if this is to be a PLA 
world in virtue of the PLA disposition, every particular, omnispatially and 
omnitemporally, would need to instantiate the PLA property, and cosmic 
coincidences of this kind are not welcomed by the neo-dispositionalist. 
 Nonetheless, if these accounts are plauVLEOH WKHQ .DW]DY¶V
argument fails. The PLA does not wholly determine the laws of nature ± 
they are partly determined by the other properties instantiated by 
particulars. But this should not be surprising. The PLA alone can never be 
sufficient to determine the evolution of the system, as we also need some 
means by which to determine what the quantities of action will be, and it 
seems to me that the other properties instantiated by particulars in the 
world are suited to playing this role ± it is these properties that determine 
the Lagrange equations. 
 We can see the PLA in two perfectly legitimate but very different 
ways. The first, and this, I think, is how the scientists will generally see it, 
is as a way of mapping the evolution of the physical system ± it is an 
alternative means (alternative to the more conventional laws of motion) by 
which to mathematically formalise the way closed systems behave. This is 
not metaphysically loaded. 
 The second way is to see the PLA as a law as (some) 
metaphysicians try to see laws, rather than just some mathematical 
equations. I provided several options: a truth that supervenes on local 
particular matters of fact, an extrinsic governing law, an essential property 
of the actual world, and a neo-dispositional account. To ask whether the 
metaphysical accounts central to this thesis are compatible with the PLA, 
then, is to ask whether the holding of least action principles (in the first 
sense) can be explained by each of the metaphysical theories. 
 For the Humean, the PLA would probably be the highest order 
regularity ± the regularity which tops the explanatory chain as I described 
it in chapter 3. It cannot itself be explained in terms of its holding with 
metaphysical necessity, but of course the Humean ZRXOGQ¶W ZDQW WKLV
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anyway. In a PLA world the PLA will be law ± it would be a non-
accidental regularity derivable from the axioms that comprise the best 
combination of simplicity and strength, purely in virtue of its being one of 
these axioms, and as such it has explanatory value, holds universally, 
holds contingently (thus saving it from the MPP problem) and can be used 
for future projections. Admittedly those unwilling to accept that the laws 
supervene on their instances rather than the other way around will be very 
unhappy with this view, but this is hardly the Humeans¶SUREOHP- they do 
not share such intuitions. Least action principles, then, pose no problem 
for Humeanism. 
 The Armstrongian could accommodate the PLA in his ontology by 
taking the PLA to be a third-order property. Although compatible with the 
Armstrongian view, this interpretation of the PLA should be rejected on 
account of the vicious regress identified by Bird (2005). 
 For Ellis, the fact that our world evolves in accordance with least 
action principles can be attributed to the fact that if the least action 
principles did not hold, then not only would it not be our world, but the 
non-PLA world would not even be a physical system. It can, he argues, be 
established as an a posteriori necessity that the path of least action is 
followed by all physical systems (and so Katzav is just wrong in thinking 
the PLA presupposes its own contingency)(OOLV¶VYLHZLVFRPSHOOLQJLQ
as much as the PLA does come out as a law of nature as it is an essential 
property of the world, but at the same time it does not undermine his claim 
that the motion of physical objects is entirely determined by the myriad of 
dispositional properties in his ontology. 
 The neo-dispositionalist has a little more work to do if the holding 
of the PLA is not to come out as coincidental. If the dispositional 
properties do not include any commitments to physical systems following 
paths of least action, then there seems to be no real reason why the 
dispositions could not have been such that this path was not followed, 
which of course begs the question of why it is followed in our world (for 
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surely they would not want to concede that we just happen to be in the 
PLA world). I have provided an account whereby we can accommodate 
the PLA by including a µPLA disposition¶ with the stimulus condition 
being that all particulars in the system instantiate the property - this, I 
claim, solves the problem for the dispositionalist, but at the expense of a 
cosmic coincidence. We end up with a position that is not susceptible to 
.DW]DY¶V 033 SUREOHP on the grounds that the PLA presupposes only 
logical contingency, and not susceptible to the Explanatory problem as the 
PLA is itself a power amongst the many required to explain the evolution 
of our physical system. Nonethless, it is still not particularly appealing 
IURP D QHFHVVLWDULDQ¶V SHUVSHFWLYH DV DYRLGLQJ FRVPLF FRLQFLGHQFHV LV D
major motivation for their view. 
8.8 A New Approach 
In the preceding sections I have been looking for a single metaphysical 
view that captures the least action principles, but it seems to me that this is 
the wrong way of going about it. The PLA and the traditional laws of 
motion are two formalisms of the same phenomenon ± namely, the 
evolution of the physical system. These are mathematically equivalent, but 
the best metaphysical interpretations of the two might not be compatible. 
That is not to say that we must choose one over the other. If we want de re 
necessity, it seems to me that the following are the best options: 
8.8.1 The Best Necessitarian Metaphysical Account of the Laws of Motion 
We can rule out the Armstrongian view for the numerous reasons I have 
already outlined, and as the two remaining possibilities are the regularity 
theory and theories involving dispositional properties (and regularity 
theory is devoid of de re necessity), we are forced into a dispositionalist 
account (as a best necessitarian theory). 
 Introducing the PLA disposition seems a little ad hoc and 
unnecessary when considering the individual laws of motion ± that is, the 
laws independent of one another. Introducing the PLA disposition was 
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something we had to do to try and explain the evolution of the entire 
physical system in accordance with the PLA. If we are just looking for a 
reason for the traditional laws of motion to hold, neo-dispositionalism 
without the PLA disposition seems to do the trick. It is in virtue of the 
dispositional properties in the world that the system evolves as it does - 
the dispositions have stimulus conditions and manifestations, and each 
causal interaction can be cashed out in terms of the manifestation of one or 
more dispositions. Similarly, individual causal processes can be seen in a 
scientific essentialist light, whereby the less general laws of motion are 
essential properties of the process natural kinds significantly lower down 
the hierarchy than the PLA. Neither of these explanations explains the 
PLA, but this is not problematic here, as we are trying to give an account 
that captures the more traditional laws of motion. 
8.8.2 The Best Necessitarian Account of the PLA 
Just as the best necessitarian account of the µlaws of motion formalism¶ 
requires no direct reference to the PLA, so I believe the best metaphysical 
account of the PLA formalism requires no reference to the dispositional 
properties inherent in the dispositionalist account of the laws of motion. It 
can be cashed out entirely in terms of the essential properties of the global 
kind. 
 If we are to know how the actual world is to evolve, it is not 
sufficient to say that the PLA is one of its essential properties. The 
mathematical formalism requires not just the PLA, but also the Lagrangian 
for the system itself. Just as Newtonian Mechanics and General Relativity 
have their own Lagrangians, so will the ultimate physical theory - the 
grand unified theory of quantum gravity. Although this is unknown to us, 
LWLVDSURSHUW\WKDWLQ(OOLV¶VZRUGVLVDUHDOHVVHQWLDOSURSHUW\RXWWKHUH
for us to discover. If we now take the Lagrangian of the unified theory of 
quantum gravity and the PLA to be the two essential properties of our 
physical system, then the entire evolution of the physical system between 
any two points in its velocity-configuration space can be derived. 
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 The neo-dispositionalist and scientific essentialist interpretations 
of the individual laws of motion cannot, on the face of it, explain the PLA. 
Neither can the metaphysical interpretations of the PLA be used to explain 
lower-order laws of motion (or at least they are not the best explanations) 
± so how could we choose one metaphysical explanation over the other? It 
is not as obvious to me as it is to Katzav that we should immediately 
assign preference to the PLA as the best explanation of the evolution of 
our physical system, as the dispositionalist account seems to have the 
advantage of explaining events at a much smaller scale, and in the way we 
tend to interpret change in the world. Similarly, it is not obvious that we 
should prefer the neo-dispositionalist or lower-order natural kinds account, 
as the PLA version is, on the face of it, significantly more parsimonious. 
We seem to be left either with causal overdetermination, where two 
distinct kinds of metaphysical glue determine the evolution of the system, 
or with metaphysical underdetermination, where only one theory is the 
right one, but there is no possible way to choose between them93.  
8.9 Conclusions 
The aim of this chapter was to see if applying the three standing 
metaphysical theories to (possibly) our most fundamental physical 
principle could help us eliminate one or more of the candidates. However 
it seems firstly that (in their own ways) all three remaining candidates (the 
Armstrongian view having been ruled out) can cope with the challenges 
provided.  
 However, Ellis has both dispositional properties and essential 
properties of natural kinds in his ontology, and therefore Scientific 
Essentialism does seem to be the most compatible with my claims in 8.8. 
%XWLIDVNHG³ZKDWH[SODLQVWKHHYROXWLRQRIRXUSK\VLFDOV\VWHP´RQHKDV
to wonder which metaphysical explanation Ellis would give. Neo-
dispositionalism, too, is faced with a problem: he has to suddenly allow 
for a major cosmic coincidence ± that all particulars omnispatially and 
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 At least not without engaging in some serious metametaphysics, which is way beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
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omnitemporally instantiate the PLA disposition. Humeanism, then, looks 
to come out on top. 
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Chapter 9: The Case Against Dispositional Essentialism 
 
In this chapter I will show why I think we should reject dispositional 
essentialism, and hence both neo-dispositionalism and scientific 
essentialism , ZLOO ILUVW UHODWH %DUNHU¶V DUgument concerning the 
categorical nature of the SM-relation, WR %LUG¶V µ8OWLPDWH¶ DUJXPHQW
against the contingent necessitation view of laws, demonstrating how Bird 
inadvertently throws his own metaphysic into the flames; secondly I 
demonstrate that neo-dispositionalism is simply a variant94 of 
$UPVWURQJ¶V PHWDSK\VLF; thirdly I show that dispositional essentialism 
cannot deal with counterfactuals; and finally that the dispositional 
essentialist has no workable account of metaphysical necessity.  
9.1.1 The Ultimate Argument Against the Neo-Dispositionalist 
In this section I argue that if Bird wants to uphold hLVµXOWLPDWHDUJXPHQW
DJDLQVW $UPVWURQJ¶V FRQWLQJHQW QHFHVVLWDWLRQ YLHZ RI ODZV¶ (Bird 2005), 
then he is hoisted by his own petard. Following on from section 7.6.3 I 
show that, when it comes down to it, neo-dispositionalism is just another 
view whereby a necessitation relation (albeit one that plays a constitutive 
role) is supposed to determine the patterns of property instantiations, and 
that Bird, too, needs to show why his necessitation relation (a property of 
his natural properties) necessitates these regularities. Unless he takes the 
view that the N-relation-equivalent implicit in his ontology (the SM-
relation) has its identity primitively, such that in all possible worlds it 
plays the role of determining patterns of property instantiation, he is 
subject to the very same regress that Armstrong is. But if Bird can claim 
his N-relation-equivalent has its identity as an SM-relation primitively 
without falling into a regress, then Armstrong can claim the same thing. 
But neither Bird, nor Armstrong, are in a position to make these claims. 
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 It is not the same view, but is similar in respects which the dispositional essentialists do not 
intend. 
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9.1.2 The Stimulus-Manifestation Relation (SM-relation) as an N-Relation 
The SM-relation plays a different role from that of the N-relation of 
$UPVWURQJ¶V ontology, but only in the role it plays with respect to the 
FRQVWLWXWLRQ RI QDWXUDO SURSHUWLHV $UPVWURQJ¶V 1-relation plays no 
constitutive role, and is thus entirely independent of the identity of his 
universals - this leaves his position obviously open to the supposedly 
counter-intuitive consequences of categoricalism. %LUG¶V 60-relation is 
supposed to solve these problems by playing a constitutive role, fixing the 
identity of the properties in terms of their causal/nomological roles. The 
N-relation and the SM-relation do (or at least they are mean to) play the 
same role in certain other respects, however - both play the role of fixing 
the pattern of property-instantiations. 
 In the case of the neo-dispositionalist: where a dispositional 
property, D, is constituted by second-order relational properties, SM-
relations, such that it has stimulus condition S and manifestation M, 
[D(S,M)], then whenever S and D are instantiated by particulars, and these 
come together in the circumstances (absence of finks and antidotes etc), M 
manifests (where M is partly constituted by its SM-relation to D). M 
manifests because of the SM-relation it bears to D ± or to put it another 
way (in the context of neo-dispositionalism), M manifests in virtue of the 
SM-relation it (necessarily, due to its constitutive role) bears to D.  
 ,QWKHFDVHRI$UPVWURQJ¶VFRQWLQJHQWQHFHVVLWDWLRQYLHZZKHQWKH
first order universal, F, bears the second-order relation, N, to the universal, 
G, in world, w ± that is, N(F,G) is true in w - whenever F is instantiated in 
w, then so is G. G is instantiated in virtue of the N-relation it bears to F, 
just as M is instantiated in virtue of the SM-relation it bears to the coming 
together of instantiations of D and S. In both cases, the relations central to 
their respective versions of metaphysical necessity are second-order 
properties, whose relata are first-order (natural) properties that can be 
instantiated by particulars. The SM-relation, and the N-relation are for all 
intents and purposes the same second-order property - they merely play a 
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GLIIHUHQW UROH LQ WKH FRQVWLWXWLRQ RI QDWXUDO SURSHUWLHV LQ %LUG¶V DQG
$UPVWURQJ¶VRQWRORJLHV. 
9.1.3 7KH8OWLPDWH$UJXPHQW$JDLQVW%LUG¶V'LVSRVLWLRQDO0RQLVW$FFRXQW
of Laws 
The conclusion reached above, on the face of it, might not overly concern 
the dispositionalist. Dispositionalists are on the whole more sympathetic 
WR $UPVWURQJ¶V YLHZ WKDQ WKH\ DUH WR +XPHDQLVP DV WKLV 1-relation is 
supposed to provide the same kind of constraints on property 
instantiations as they want (where Humean worlds seemingly have no 
such constraints). $UPVWURQJ¶s metaphysic is usually thrown out due to its 
categoricalism (and the problems arising through quidditism), and the neo-
dispositionalist just solves these problems by claiming that natural 
properties are actually constituted by the second-order relations between 
natural properties 6R ZK\ VKRXOGQ¶W WKH\ MXVW HPEUDFH WKH WKRXJKW WKDW: 
yes, SM-relations are the same thing as the N-UHODWLRQ LW¶V MXVW What 
Armstrong went wrong by not appreciating the constitutive role they must 
play? 
 Bird gave us some insight into why this cannot be the case ± or at 
least why he cannot accept this to be the case. For Armstrong, claims Bird, 
the N-relation is just another universal (albeit a second-order universal) 
with a quidditistic nature. There needs to be some reason why, when the 
N-relation holds between F and G (for any F and any G), there is a 
regularity between Fs and Gs. To explain why N(F,G) explains the 
constant conjunction of instantiations of F and instantiations of G, 
Armstrong needs a further explanation for the regularity µwhenever N 
stands between two properties, there is a constant conjunction between 
those properties¶. As the explanation cannot be just the regularity 
R((N(F,G),R(F,G))95, he requires a further, higher order necessitation 
relation1¶. As we saw in section 5.6 this generates a regress, as we also 
need an explanation for why 1¶ necessitates the regularity between N-
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 Where R(F,G) says, there is a constant conjunstion between Fs and Gs 
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relations and regularities ± VRZHSRVWXODWH1¶¶ DQGVRRQ. So, for Bird, 
the SM-relation in neo-dispositionalism cannot be like the N-relation in 
$UPVWURQJ¶V YLHZ - firstly because if it were, we would be introducing 
quidditism back into our ontology (and the very thesis of neo-
dispositionalism is that it is devoid of quiddities), and secondly because, if 
the SM-relation were the same second-order property as the N-relation (in 
all respects except its constitutive role), there would be an equally vicious 
regress in neo-dispositionalism. 
 But this, I contend, is exactly what we end up with. In 7.6.2 I 
SURYLGHGDQH[SRVLWLRQRI%DUNHU¶VDUJXPHQWV WKDWGHPRQVWUDWHs why the 
SM-relation cannot be a powerful disposition: he argued firstly that the 
SM-relation is a second-order property ± a property of properties, whereas 
dispositional properties are first order natural properties of things; and 
secondly because if SM-relations are powerful, then they must have their 
identities fixed by third-order relations to other second-order properties, 
and these third-order relations in turn must have their identities fixed by 
fourth-order relations to other third-order properties, and so on. This 
regress is, as Barker points out, a vicious one.  
To recap: the identity of the natural properties can be dispositional 
properties fixed relationally, but if (a) the properties of natural properties 
are to be powerful, and (b) the identities of natural properties are to be 
relationally constituted by SM-relations, then the SM-relations must be 
powers. But the identity of all powers needs to be relationally constituted, 
including, it seems, the SM-relation, the relations that constitute the SM-
relation, the relations that constitute the relations that constitute the SM-
relation, and so on. We simply cannot fix the identity of all the requisite 
relations without generating this vicious regress. 
 If the identity of the SM-relation cannot be fixed relationally, then 
it is not a power ± it is a quidditistic, categorical, second-order property. 
The identity of dispositional, natural properties, and therefore µZKDWLWLVWR
SRVVHVVDFDXVDORUQRPRORJLFDOQDWXUH¶%DUNHULVthus fixed by a 
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pattern of categorical second-order properties. If Bird wants to argue that 
$UPVWURQJ¶V SRVLWLRQ IDLOV LQ YLUWXH RI WKH IDct that the N-relation is a 
quidditistic property, and attempting to fix its identity by using higher-
order N-relations generates a vicious regress, then he is hoisted by his own 
petard, for the SM-relations that fix the identity of natural properties (and 
hence their causal/nomological roles) are equally quidditistic - fixing the 
role of the SM-relation using higher-order SM-relations generates the 
exact same regress. %LUG¶V DFFRXQW RI ODZV DV LQWHUQDOO\ JRYHUQLQJ
relations between first order natural properties, seems to fare no better that 
$UPVWURQJ¶VH[WHUQDOO\JRYHUQLQJFRQFHSWLRQ 
9.1.4 A Solution? 
Perhaps the neo-dispositionalist could simply say that it is a primitive 
matter of fact that in all metaphysically possible worlds, the SM-relation 
plays the role that it plays in our world; that is, it is a brute fact that it 
determines (with metaphysical glue) the patterns of property instantiations 
in all metaphysically possible worlds. But it seems to me that if Bird 
responds in such a way, then Bird cannot use his regress objection against 
Armstrong %LUG¶V DUJXPHQW against Armstrong relies on the N-relation 
being just a standard quidditistic (second-order) property that could 
change its role across possible worlds ± but if Bird is allowed to make the 
claim that his SM-relation plays the same role in all possible worlds as a 
EUXWHPDWWHURIIDFWWKHQZK\FDQ¶W Armstrong? Armstrong could, by the 
same logic, simply respond that the N-relation is the primitively powerful 
relation that provides the proponent of the contingent necessitation view 
of laws both a means of judging between accidental and non-accidental 
regularities, and a metaphysically meaty explanation of many of the 
regularities in our world.  
But this looks messy for both accounts: for the Armstrongian 
because it introduces a second kind of property ± a universal that is not 
categorical; and for the neo-dispositionalist because he wants an ontology 
completely devoid of primitives of this kind (after all, it is precisely 
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because of similar primitives in the Humean ontology that Humeanism is 
so unpalatable for the dispositionalist)  - but how is Bird to justify his 
claim that these second-order properties play the SM-relation role (as 
opposed to some other kind of ordering) in all metaphysically possible 
worlds? Perhaps the dispositionalist will just have to accept that the chain 
of explanation must end somewhere, and this is where it ends ± the 
primitive powerfulness of natural properties. I find this somewhat 
unsatisfying, however, as we have still not really been given an account of 
the nature of dispositional properties WKDW LV WKH QDWXUDO SURSHUWLHV¶
properties) ± which, when it comes down to it, I think the main project of 
the dispositional essentialists should be. 
9.2.1 Dispositionalism is Just Armstrongianism in Disguise 
In this section I will show, following Barker (forthcoming), why it is 
XQVXUSULVLQJWKDW%LUG¶VDUJXPHQWDJDLQVW$Umstrong can be turned on his 
own position, by demonstrating that in fact, the whole dispositional 
essentialist project is just another form of the Armstrongian position. The 
laws of the neo-dispositionalist are no different from the laws of the 
contingent necessitation view ± at least not in a way that shows it to be a 
new kind of necessitarian position. 
 To recapitulate $UPVWURQJ¶V YLHZ ODZV FRQVWUDLQ WKH SDWWHUQV RI
property instantiation, and these laws are natural necessitation relations 
holding between universals. N(F,G), which denotes the N-relation 
standing between two natural properties, constrains all metaphysically 
possible worlds in which it holds, so that it is not possible, within those 
worlds, for the state of affairs Fa and ¬Ga to be instantiated. The modality 
(what is possible and what is not within a metaphysically possible world) 
LQ $UPVWURQJ¶V YLew is thus provided by the N-relation, but the actual 
holding of the N-relation is contingent in so far as there are N(F,G) 
worlds, and there are non-N(F,G) worlds. The N-relation is a universal, 
and so to be consistent with $UPVWURQJ¶VYLHZRISURSHUWLHV it should be 
categorical, and thus quidditistic. 
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 To summarise neo-dispositionalism: The neo-dispositionalist 
believes that all properties have a dispositional essence, and that [the 
identities of] these properties are relationally constituted. They can claim 
that there are no quidditistic natural properties, because all the identities of 
QDWXUDO SURSHUWLHV DUH IL[HG E\ WKHLU SODFH LQ DQ DV\PPHWULF µJUDSK¶ RU
pattern of SM-relations (stimulus-manifestation relations). It is not, 
therefore, metaphysically possible for any property to play any 
causal/nomological role other than the role it actually plays, in this, or any 
other possible world. The modality in neo-dispositionalism thus flows 
from the dispositions of natural properties. As we saw in section 7.2: in all 
possible worlds, if x instantiates dispositional property, D, if the stimulus 
conditions were met, then P would manifest. 
Neo-dispositionalism, therefore, supposedly differs from 
Armstrongianism in two important respects: firstly, the properties in 
$UPVWURQJ¶V PHWDSK\VLF DUH DOO TXLGGLWLVWLF ± they can change their 
causal/nomological roles across possible worlds; and secondly, the 
necessary connections in neo-dispositionalism are meant to be found in 
the intrinsic (always dispositional) natural properties of the things that 
instantiate them, whereas in Armstrongianism the necessity is provided by 
a further (second-RUGHU XQLYHUVDO WKDW¶V extrinsic to the natural property 
instantiations ± the N-relation between first-order universals. 
9.2.2 A New Armstrongian View ± What Constitutes A Dispositional 
Property 
According to Armstrong, the laws are contingent as N(F,G) holding in any 
world is a contingent matter of fact. But Barker demonstrates an 
alternative Armstrongian view, Armstrongianism*, wherein the main 
principles of the Armstrongian view of laws are upheld - that is, the 
properties are quidditistic, and the N-relation provides the metaphysical 
glue ± but the laws of nature are nonetheless metaphysically necessary. 
Armstrongianism* can be summarised as follows: 
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1. All properties are quidditistic ± they have their identity primitively, not 
being fixed in any way by their modal character. 
2. The N-relation ensures that whenever N(F,G) and Fa, then Ga 
3. 3URSHUWLHV KDYH WKHLU UROH µinsofar DV¶ WKH\ LQVWDQWLDWH certain N-
relations to other quidditistic properties. 
4. Each natural, quidditistic property has a unique position in a network 
of N-relations.  
To clarify: 
The insofar as-locution is a way of augmenting the identity conditions for some 
object. For example, a person is, roughly, a passenger insofar as they are 
conveyed by some vehicle for some journey, which means the identity 
conditions of the passenger x is that they are identical to person O and that O is 
associated in the right way with some journey-vehicle pair. Applying that idea to 
the term p insofar as it has network-position-Y, the latter denotes the entity x 
that is (i) identical to quiddity p, and (ii) in the network position Y. (Barker: 
forthcoming)   
The upshot of this is that the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. 
The natural property, charge -1, could not play a different role ± that is, it 
could not abide by different laws ± as x is a natural property insofar as it 
fits into its particular position in the network of N-relations. This is not 
merely a de dicto necessity96. 7DNH D µSKDVH¶ Wo be a section of the x¶V 
existence across modal space - just as a person can be a traveller at one 
time and not at another, so a property can fit into the network of N-
relations in the right way at one world, and not at another. As the natural 
property is the quiddity when it iVLQFHUWDLQµSKDVHV¶DQGWKHVHSKDVHVDUH
real and not linguistic constructions, these phases corresponding to the 
natural property (the ones where the property has the right position in the 
network of N-relations) can provide the foundation of the de re necessity 
of Armstrongian* laws. $V %DUNHU SXWV LW µWKH QDWXUH RI WKH >QDWXUDO@
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 One might assume that there nothing to a natural property but the quiddity, but this would be 
false  W the phases are real. 
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property is made up of a quidditistic core, but overlaid by modal relations 
± LW¶VDTXLGGLW\XQGHUFHUWDLQFRQGLWLRQV¶ibid)97. 
 Armstrongianism* about laws, although it is different from 
Armstrongianism about laws insofar as if N(F,G) holds in one world, 
(whereby F and G are natural properties), then N(F,G) is true in all 
possible worlds (or at least in those worlds in which F is instantiated), yet 
it remains Armstrongian in the sense that the universals are quidditistic, 
and the N-relation provides the modal force. Clearly this differs 
significantly both from the Humean position, and, on the face of it, from 
dispositional essentialism. +RZHYHU WKHVH DSSDUHQW µVLJQLILFDQW¶
differences to dispositional essentialism are really just superficial. 
The first reason we have for thinking this has already been shown - 
the second-order property linking the natural properties in 
Armstrongianism* is the categorical N-relation, and the second-order 
property linking the natural properties in neo-dispositionalism is the, what 
turned out to be categorical, SM-relation. The only difference was the role 
the SM-relation plays in the constitution of the identity of the neo-
dispositionalist¶VQDWXUDOSURSHUWLHV. So far, though, we have been talking 
about WKHFRQVWLWXWLRQRIDSURSHUW\¶V identity, rather than what constitutes 
the property itself ± indeed, the dispositional essentialist never provides us 
with such an account. The next section will address this issue. 
9.2.3 What Constitutes a Dispositional Property? 
There are theories about the constitution of particulars in terms of first-
order properties. Some think an object is just a bundle of natural 
properties; others think of µthin-SDUWLFXODUV¶ upon which first-order natural 
properties attach themselves - but what about the constitution of natural 
properties in terms of second-order properties? Barker suggests there are 
two comparable possibilities for the neo-dispositionalist: natural properties 
are bundles of SM-relations (whose relata are other bundles of SM-
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 My thanks to Stephen Barker for our discussions of this issue. 
217 
 
relations), or natural properties as µthin-properties¶ XSRQ ZKLFK 60-
relations (whose relata are other thin properties) attach themselves.  
Take the second option ± that natural properties are thin-properties, 
µWKLFNHQHG¶ E\ 60-relations to other thin-properties. This immediately 
looks troublesome for the neo-dispositionalist, who, remember, wants an 
ontology devoid of properties with inherent categorical natures. The thin-
property itself is, it seems, the property-equivalent of a substratum. The 
thin property has no modal role, DV WKH QDWXUDO SURSHUW\¶V PRGDO UROH is 
played entirely by the SM-relations that thicken it. Properties end up 
having a categorical core, just as with Armstrongianism*. 
In fact, what we are left with looks an awful lot like 
Armstrongianism*. Even if we assume, as the neo-dispositionalist must, 
that the thin-properties have their particular SM-relations necessarily (they 
have their identity fixed by their place in the network of SM-relations), 
this does not make the properties powerful. We have a categorical base in 
the form of (modally inert) thin-properties, thickened only by the 
(categorical) SM-relations that constitute the network of relations that fix 
WKHLGHQWLW\RI WKHQDWXUDOSURSHUWLHV1RµSRZHUV¶ in sight, and plenty of 
quiddities!  
The bundle approach does no better. Relations have an order - 
N(F,G) entails, by Armstrongian logic, that all Fs are Gs, but not that all 
Gs are Fs. When a property instantiates an SM-relation, we have to know 
ZKLFK µGRFNLQJ-SRLQW¶98 WKH SURSHUW\ LV µDWWDFKHG¶ WR ± for the neo-
dispositionalist, if natural property/disposition F is partially constituted by 
the SM-UHODWLRQFRQQHFWLQJLWWR*ZKHUH*PDQLIHVWVZKHQ)¶VVWLPXOXV
conditions are met, then the ordering requires F to be prior to G. A 
µEXQGOH¶ILUVW-order property cannot, therefore, simply be the bundle of the 
second-order properties that constitute it, for this would not take into 
consideration the orderings. We can conclude that only the relevant 
GRFNLQJSRLQWVKRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGDVLQQDWXUDOSURSHUWLHV¶EXQGOHV But, 
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 ĂƌŬĞƌ ?ƐƚĞƌŵŝŶŽůŽŐǇ 
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WKLV OHDGV WR DOO SURSHUWLHV EHLQJ QXPHULFDOO\ LGHQWLFDO DV µDOO QDWXUDO
properties are indiscernible in that each natural property has both docking 
points of [the SM-relation] in its bundles, since each natural property 
enters into both positions in SM-relational facts, that is facts like N(F,G)¶
(ibid).  
The bundle theory for natural-property-constitution is hopeless, 
DQG WKH µWKLFNHQHG¶, thin-properties just give us a position resembling 
µArmstrongianLVP¶ DV WKH SURSHUWLHV WXUQ RXW WR EH TXLGGLWLVWLF ± a 
position the neo-dispositionalis deplores. %LUGVD\V WKDW ODZVµVXSHUYHQH¶
on dispositional properties, and that these dispositional properties can 
JRYHUQ µLQWHUQDOO\¶ :HOO LW VHHPV WR PH WKDW %LUG¶V SURSHUWLHV ZKich 
VXSSRVHGO\ KDYH WKHLU µSRZHU¶ WKURXJK the second-order SM-relations, 
govern just as ArmstroQJ¶VODZVJRYHUQWKDWLs, via what turned out to be 
categorical relations between first-order natural properties. Lewis said that 
being called Armstrong does not give you massive biceps ± well, calling a 
property a power does not make it powerful, either. 
9.3.1 Dispositional Essentialism and Counterfactuals 
One of the main necessitarian arguments against the naive regularity 
theorist was that this earlier form of Humeanism could not deal with 
counterfactuals. David Lewis and his Humean possible worlds analysis of 
counterfactuals, however, deals with assessing counterfactuals very nicely. 
But can neo-dispositionalism do the same thing? I argue not ± and 
furthermore, and for similar reasons, it turns out to be very difficult for the 
neo-dispositionalist to give any account of modality. 
 Dispositional essentialists no doubt think they have the upper hand 
on the Humean when it comes giving truth values to counterfactuals ± the 
VWDWHPHQWµLI,KDGQRWVWUXFNWKHPDWFKLWZRXOGQRWKDYHOLW¶LVPDGHWUXH
they would argue, by the natural, dispositional properties instantiated by 
the match and by the match-box. There is a reason why the match lit ± 
namely that the stimulus conditions required for the requisite dispositions 
to manifest were obtained. But as we shall see, it turns out that 
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dispositional essentialists have a serious problem when it comes to 
counterfactuals.  
9.3.2 The Problem of Counterfactuals 
Let us assume possible world semantics in a deterministic world, and 
consider the example we have above. As we have seen, with the Humean 
conception, if the match was struck in the actual world at time, t, (and it 
lit), the nearest possible world in which that match was not struck at t will 
require a small, localised miracle (with respect to the laws of the actual 
world); that is, if we take the laws of our world, and the precise match of 
matters of fact between the actual world, w, and the close possible world, 
w*, prior to t, then assuming determinism, the match would have to be 
struck and lit in w* at t, unless we allow for the laws to be breached. The 
Humean thus allows for the small, localised miracle, and then lets w* run 
on in accordance with the laws of our world (as opposed to the laws of 
w*, which would almost inevitably differ from the laws of the actual 
world)99. We then judge the truth value of the counterfactual by looking at 
the states of affairs at w* after t.  
But this cannot be the case with dispositional essentialism. For the 
dispositional essentialist, the laws are necessary ± the laws supervene 
upon properties, and thus the laws are identical in all worlds with the same 
properties. By the very nature of the neo-dispositLRQDO HVVHQWLDOLVW¶V
µPRGDOLW\¶, there are no metaphysically possible worlds with minor 
miracles RIWKHNLQGHQYLVDJHGLQ/HZLV¶VWKHRU\. It turns out that a world 
with a course of events similar to that of our world up to time t, but 
ZLWKRXW WKH PDWFK¶V VWULNLQJ DW t, must be a world with very different 
properties, and thus very different laws. %XWLIWKHODZVLQWKHFORVHVWµQRQ-
VWULNLQJ¶ZRUOGDUHYHU\Gifferent from the laws of the actual world, then 
there is no reason to suppose that, in such a world, a match that is not 
struck fails to light. It follows that the neo-dispositionalist has no 
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 as opposed to the laws of w*, which will differ from those of w (as the best systems analysis 
does not allow for laws (regularities) with exceptions). 
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MXVWLILFDWLRQ IRU DVVHUWLQJ KLV FRXQWHUIDFWXDO ³LI WKH PDWFK Kad not been 
VWUXFNLWZRXOGQRWKDYHOLW´ 
Perhaps one might argue that we can imagine a world, w**, that 
comes into existence in a state that matches our world at t perfectly, 
except in the respect of the match, which is not being struck at w**. We 
can let w** run on in accordance with the laws that supervene on the 
ZRUOG¶VSURSHUWLHVWKHVDPHSURSHUWLHVDQGWKXVVDPHODZVDVWKHDFWXDO
world), and judge the truth value of the counterfactual. But we end up with 
a situation where the whole histories of w and w* would bear very little 
resemblance to one another. The closest non-striking world would be a 
world very different in its history to the actual world, and this would give 
counter-intuitive results when assessing counterfactuals in accordance 
with the possible world semantics. 
9.4.1 Metaphysical Necessity in Neo-Dispositionalism ± A Worry 
In section 7.2 I gave the account of modality that the neo-
dispositionalist would wish to uphold. Given that there are no finks or 
antidotes at the fundamental level, in a deterministic world it is de re 
necessary that if the (dispositional) natural property, D, is instantiated by 
x, and that the stimulus conditions for D are met, then '¶VPDQLIHVWDWLRQ
property will be instantiated (possibly by x, but not necessarily ± it 
depends on the nature of the manifestation property); in other words, in all 
possible worlds in which D is instantiated by one or more particulars, and 
the stimulus conditions for these instantiations of D are met, the 
manifestation property or properties manifest LQDFFRUGDQFHZLWK'¶VSODFH
in the network of SM-relations. But, I claim, the possible worlds account 
of modality fails when applied to neo-dispositionalism, and if the neo-
dispositional essentialist is to have any account of modality at all, he will 
have to devise an entirely new one.  
There are two ways of approaching the possible worlds account of 
PRGDOLW\ WKH PRGDO UHDOLVW DFFRXQW DQG WKH µZRUOGV DV DEVWUDFW HQWLWLHV¶
approach. The modal realist approach regards every possible world as a 
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UHDO H[LVWLQJ µXQLYHUVH¶ SHUKDSV RQH PLJKW FDOO WKHP WKH µUHDO H[LVWLQJ
worlds that constitute the multiverse). A proposition is necessarily true if 
it is true at all of these possible worlds - electrons have charge -1 
necessarily if all electrons at all possible worlds have charge -1, and so on. 
A proposition is contingently true if it is false at any possible world - 
µ7KHUH DUH VWDUV¶ LV FRQWLQJHQWO\ WUXHEHFDXVH although there are stars at 
our world, there are no stars at many others. $QRWKHU µSRVVLEOH ZRUOGV¶
view of modality takes possible worlds to be abstract entities, whereby 
there are QR µUHDO¶ZRUOGVother than the actual world. The proponent of 
this view believes we can judge our modal claims through this kind of 
abstract entity ± often envisaged as a set of maximally consistent 
propositions. Take the abstract world, a, corresponding to the actual 
world, w; that is, the abstract entity including an abstract form of every 
state of affairs in the actual world (for a particular giraffe, g, in w, there is 
an abstract entity g* in a). In the following sections I show why neither of 
these views of possible worlds seem to allow for a dispositional 
essentialist account of modality. 
9.4.2 What determines the property instantiations ± Questioning 
metaphysical necessity in Dispositional Essentialism? 
By now one is XVHG WR WDONLQJ DERXW µPHWDSK\VLFDO QHFHVVLW\¶ LQ WKH
necessitarian metaphysical accounts of law and causation. An event is 
called metaphysically necessary when some kind of modal-force, or 
necessary connection links two properties together. It is the N-relation in 
Armstrong, and the equivalent second-order properties of dispositions in 
dispositional essentialism. In this section, though, I question whether 
dispositional essentialists have the right to claim that the nature of natural 
properties metaphysically necessitates the pattern of events in our world. 
 The notation of N(F,G) in Armstrongian accounts of modality is 
familiar, but there is no reason why we cannot use the same, or at least 
similar notation for dispositional essentialist accounts, too. Call this 
N(F,G)*. F and G, for the dispositional essentialist, are natural properties 
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in the form of universals. N, when applied to F and G to give us N(F,G)*, 
denotes an SM-relation holding between F and G ± where F is the stimulus 
for the manifestation property, G (the ordering tells us which is the 
stimulus and which is the manifestation). There is, of course, a difference 
EHWZHHQ$UPVWURQJ¶V1)*DQG1)*LQWKDW1SOD\VDFRQVWLWXWLYH
role in the latter ± nonetheless, N(F,G)* tells us all we need to know in 
this context. 
 According to the dispositional essentialist, if N(F,G)* is true, then 
all Fs are Gs (or in some cases, all Fs are followed by Gs, depending on 
what F and G stand for ± let us stick with all Fs are Gs for simplicity) in 
all possible worlds. So what does the constraining? What makes it the case 
that all Fs are Gs? Well, for the dispositional essentialist, the answer to 
WKLV TXHVWLRQ PXVW EH µ1¶ ± that is, the second order relation that is a 
property of both F and G. There can be no F that is not a G, and this is 
PDGH WUXHE\ WKLV µFRQVWUDLQLQJ¶ VHFRQGRUGHUSURSHUW\ WKH60-relation, 
that F and G stand in to one another ± it LV D SDUW RI WKHVH SURSHUWLHV¶ 
nature. So how can this be demonstrated in terms of a possible worlds 
account of modality? 
 Firstly, consider the Armstrongian N(F,G), again. Given that 
N(F,G) holds in a world, w LW LV µFRQWLQJHQWO\QHFHVVDU\¶ WKDWDOO)VDUH
*V µ1¶ GRHV WKH FRQVWUDLQLQJ VXFK WKDW LW LV not possible in an N(F,G) 
world that there is an F that is not a G. But what if N(F,G) does not hold? 
There can be two (what happen to be) qualitatively identical worlds, 
where the patterns of first-order property instantiation are identical, but in 
one world N(F,G) holds and in the other it does not. In the second world it 
is a contingent fact that all Fs are Gs, but in the first world it was 
necessary given N(F,G). There is an asymmetry here that allows 
Armstrong to point to the N-relation as the relational property present and 
constraining the property instantiations in the first world. However, the 
dispositional essentialist cannot make such a claim, as there are no 
examples of an asymmetry of this kind ± whether the natural property-
instantiations are constrained by N(F,G)*, or whether N(F,G)* is 
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constrained by the natural property instantiations is not demonstrable. The 
dispositional essentialists just tell us that the former is true, without giving 
us sufficient reason for thinking so. N(F,G)* could just be a fact made true 
by the pattern of property instantiations in the metaphysically possible 
worlds. 
 It looks pretty implausible that these doubts should arise, but even 
a brief look at the metaphysically possible worlds in a dispositional 
essentialist metaphysic, will show that these doubts are fully justified. The 
dispositioQDO HVVHQWLDOLVW¶V 1-relations, or SM-relations as I called them 
before this comparison with Armstrong, constitute the identity of a 
property. So if F and G are instantiated in a world, then so is N(F,G)*. It is 
a simple consequence of the dispositional essentialist metaphysic that here 
are no possible worlds where µF and G and not-N(F,G)*¶, so, it seems, 
there is no way of judging what is constraining what.  
 The dispositional essentialist might respond by saying that 
N(F,G)* constrains what possible worlds there are. This cannot be right. 
Possible worlds just are, or they are not. Properties are not, it seems to 
me, prior to worlds in such a way that they can determine which worlds 
come into existence and which do not. Which possible worlds exist and 
which do not is not determined by some kind of sieve, filtering out the bad 
ones. Worlds, at least for the modal realist, are just there in the form of 
four-dimensional blocks of property instantiations. In desperation the 
dispositionalist might appeal to the truth-values of counterfactuals, but as I 
have already shown, dispositional essentialism does not give us a plausible 
means of judging counterfactuals, so this option is not available. 
 The dispositional essentialist can therefore give us no reason to 
think N(F,G)* constrains the property instantiations rather than vice versa. 
They can say that N(F,G) constitutes F and G as instantiated in our world, 
and also that it constrains them in this world, but only if we take constraint 
to be a special kind of regularity relation ± one that holds between natural 
properties and the properties of those natural properties (a constant 
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FRQMXQFWLRQDQGZLWKDSULPLWLYHµGLUHFWLRQ¶WKHVHFRQG-order properties 
primitively constrain the first-order).  But this claim has nothing 
interestingly modal in it at all ± we have just defined constraint in such a 
way that it conforms to the usage the dispositionalist wishes to impose. As 
it stands this does not capture our conception of constraint (in terms of 
metaphysical glue) at all, VR WKH QRWLRQ RI µLQWHUQDOly governing 
properties¶ (RU LQ RWKHU ZRUGV µWKH QDWXUH second-order properties) of 
QDWXUDO SURSHUWLHV FRQVWUDLQLQJ SURSHUW\ LQVWDQWLDWLRQ¶) which Bird 
proposes, has little justified metaphysical substance. At this time I will not 
be so bold as to say dispositional essentialists cannot come up with a 
modal picture that does, in a more metaphysically meaty sense, capture 
RXUFRQFHSWRIµJRYHUQLQJLQWULQVLFSURSHUWLHV¶EXWDWWKHYHU\OHDVW,KRSH
I have shown there is more work to be done. 
9.5 Chapter 9 Conclusions 
In this chapter I have tried to provide good reasons for rejecting the 
dispositional essentialist metaphysic. These are serious challenges the 
dispositional essentialist has not yet met, that even question whether 
dispositional essentialism really is a new way of looking at laws and 
causation; it turns out, I have argued, that dispositional essentialism is 
simply an Armstrongian-style view, but one where the GLVSRVLWLRQDOLVW¶V
SM-relation plays a constitutive role. 
 As a result of this conclusion, it should hardly be surprising that 
%LUG¶V DUJXPHQW DJDLQVW $UPVWURQJ SURYHV VHULRXVO\ SUREOHPDWLF IRU KLV
own metaphysic. Of course, these problems arise from claims about the 
nature of dispositional properties that Bird would deny - namely that the 
identity of dispositional properties is ultimately constituted by second-
order categorical relations, with a quidditistic base. A satisfactory answer 
to how natural properties are relationally constituted, as opposed to how 
their identities are relationally constituted, might have solved this 
problem. But the dispositionalist never provides us with an answer to this 
question, and with good reason: because a satisfactory answer cannot be 
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found! Both of the two possible answers, namely the bundle theory and 
thin-property theory, fail to produce a successful account of property 
constitution. 
 Finally, , TXHVWLRQHG WKH GLVSRVLWLRQDO HVVHQWLDOLVW¶V DFFRXQW RI
modality; that is, how he explains the metaphysical necessity in his view 
of laws and causation. Armstrong, it seemed, had a reasonable way of 
demonstrating that the N-relation constrained the property instantiations 
and not the other way around (as his necessitation relation holds 
FRQWLQJHQWO\DWZRUOGV+RZHYHU WKHGLVSRVLWLRQDOHVVHQWLDOLVW¶VDFFRXQt 
is not asymmetric in this way - the dispositionalist never provides us with 
an account of what relational constitution actually is, and furthemore they 
have no way of showing what constrains what ± the neo-dispositionalist 
simply tell us what way they want it to be.  
 For the four reasons I have articulated in this chapter, I conclude 
that as things stand, we have no reason to accept dispositional essentialist 
views of any kind as plausible metaphysical accounts of cause and law. 
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Chapter 10: Thesis Conclusions 
 
My aim in this thesis was not to devise a perfect metaphysics of cause and 
law. Nor was it fully to endorse any individual existing metaphysic. My 
aims were far more modest: to discover the most coherent account of our 
conception of causation, of our conception of laws, and the link between 
the two; to find out what conditions metaphysical accounts of laws and 
causation must satisfy; and to examine existing (and conflicting) 
metaphysics to determine their consistency with our concepts, their ability 
to stand up to the main objections made against them, and to see whether 
these metaphysics achieve what they set out to do. The conclusion of this 
thesis is to reject the existing anti-Humean metaphysics. There were three 
main anti-Humean options: Armstrongianism, Scientific Essentialism, and 
Dispositional Essentialism. All three are untenable accounts.  
10.1 Our Concept of Causation 
The opening chapters discussed the nature of our conception of cause and 
law. This, I believed, was necessary, as were we to start presenting 
metaphysical accounts of cause and law that did not cohere with our 
conception, as a matter of de dicto necessity we would not be talking 
about causation and laws of nature at all. I concluded that the most 
coherent and intuitive account requires causation to be analysed in terms 
of counterfactuals. Although temporal priority and spatial contiguity were 
ruled out as necessary conditions, its asymmetry, and the link between 
cause and law were deemed fundamental aspects of our conception of 
causation. 
Conceptions of laws of nature can differ whilst remaining 
internally consistent ± what I wished to unravel were those aspects of this 
conception common to all consistent conceptual analyses. Universality, at 
the fundamental level at least, I deemed to be a necessary condition of a 
law of nature. Ceteris Paribus laws are often discussed, but it seems to me 
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that violations of these laws are not violations at all. When I fall from a 
plane and do not continue to accelerate at 9.81 metres per second per 
second, due to air resistance, this is not a violation of the law of gravity. 
/DZV FRQVWDQWO\ µFRQWULEXWH¶ WKH VDPH WR HDFK PRWLRQ DQG WKLV FDQ be 
accommodated in all metaphysical analyses. Another suggestion was that 
laws must govern, but many have perfectly consistent non-governing 
intuitions about ODZV µ*RYHUQLQJ¶ FDQQRW WKHUHIRUH EH D QHFHVVDU\
condition of our concept of a law of nature. 
It was later shown that our concept of cause and our concept of 
laws of nature share many features ± in particular, they are both appealed 
WRZKHQH[SODLQLQJDQGSUHGLFWLQJHYHQWV7KHTXHVWLRQ³ZK\GLG,IDOOWR
WKHJURXQG"´FDQEHDQVZHUHGERWKLQWHUPVof cause and in terms of law: 
³EHFDXVH'DYLGSXVKHGPH´DQG³EHFDXVHRIWKHODZVRIJUDYLWDWLRQ´DUH
both reasonable responses; which explanation we choose merely depends 
on the context in which the question is asked. It was unsurprising, 
therefore, to find out that in at least three of the four metaphysics of cause 
and law considered, either the account of the former featured prominently 
in the account of the latterRUYLFHYHUVD,Q+XPH¶VUHJXODULW\WKHRU\DQG
LQ$UPVWURQJ¶VJRYHUQLQJFRQFHSWLRQRIODZs, an instance of causation is 
simply an instance of law; LQ /HZLV¶V PRUH VRSKLVWLFDWHG %HVW 6\VWHPV
Analysis of Laws, causation is analysed in terms of counterfactuals ± but 
the truth values of the counterfactuals is determined by the laws of nature; 
and LQ %LUG¶V GLVSRVLWLRQDO HVVHQWLDOLVP WKH ODZV VXSHUYHQH RQ WKH
dispositional properties of things, that is, the underlying metaphysics of 
causation, and the underlying metaphysics of laws, are ultimately the same 
phenomena: dispositional properties.   
Ultimately, regardless of the metaphysics underlying cause and law, 
my conceptual analysis lead me to these two most important conclusions: 
1. The cause-effect relationship, from a conceptual analysis perspective, 
should be analysed in terms of counterfactuals. 
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2. The propositions expressing the most fundamental laws of nature are 
universal statements, that, together allow us to explain and predict the 
evolution of the entire physical system, in the simplest and strongest 
possible way. 
10.2 The Metaphysics of Causation 
Many metaphysicians believe that the suggestion that laws (and ipso facto 
causes, given the metaphysics of the relevant philosphers) supervene on 
the evolution of the physical system and not vice versa is entirely 
unacceptable. This, they claim, deprives them of any ability to provide 
explanations of events, and any right for us to use them to predict future 
events or make inductive inferences about future states of affairs. As a 
result of these beliefs, anti-Humeans have devised a number of possible 
alternatives, the major contestants being the Armstrongian governing 
conception of laws, Scientific Essentialism, and Dispositional 
Essentialism. Not only did I contest their claims that Humeanism fails in 
the above respects, but I also showed that all three anti-Humean accounts 
fail by their own standards when we consider the implications of their 
various metaphysics. 
In chapter 8 we saw that dispositional essentialism would, in 
principle, be able to account for possibly our most fundamental scientific 
principle ± the Principle of Least Action. But this required the prima facie 
extremely unlikely event of all particulars omnitemporally instantiating 
the PLA disposition. However, dispositional essentialism, I argued, is not 
tenable as an account of causation - firstly because it cannot account for 
counterfactuals, which form the basis of our concept of causation (and so, 
as a matter of de dicto necessity, theirs is not an account of causation); 
secondly because it is subject to an identity regress (with the failure to fix 
the identity of the SM-relation); thirdly because they cannot provide an 
account of the constitution of dispositional properties in terms of their 
second order properties (SM-relations between natural properties); and 
finally it fails because the dispositional essentialist does not achieve what 
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he sets out to - namely to find a completely different metaphysical 
approach to cause and law to Humeanism and Armstrongianism, that also 
provides us with metaphysical glue. Dispositional Essentialism, it turned 
out, collapses into an alternative form of Armstrongianism, an account 
that Bird himself rejects by demonstrating how it falls into an identity 
regress. Furthermore, the SM-relations, that is, the second-order properties 
of natural properties for the dispositional essentialist, turn out to be 
categorical. If the properties of natural properties are all quidditistic, the 
dispositional essentialists DUH VXEMHFW WR WKH YHU\ VDPH µTXLGGLWLVP¶
objections they raise against both the Humeans and Armstrong100. 
Dispositional Essentialism is not, therefore, a viable anti-Humean 
metaphysic.  
Scientific Essentialism fails for similar reasons: DOWKRXJK (OOLV¶V 
account of laws is based upon the essential properties of natural kinds, the 
evolution of the physical system, for Ellis, depends upon dispositional 
properties as well as categorical properties. There are many reasons, I 
think, to prefer scientific essentialism to dispositional essentialism, but the 
mere existence of properties that are wholly dispositional leads to the 
same problems faced by the neo-dispositionalist ± without powerful 
SURSHUWLHVLQ(OOLV¶VRQWRORJ\WKHUHLVQRRRPSK 
All forms of Armstrongianism fail. Armstrong claims that his 
QDWXUDO QHFHVVLWDWLRQ UHODWLRQ µFRQWLQJHQWO\ QHFHVVLWDWHV¶ WKH
events/property-constant-conjunctions it stands between. However, there 
is little in the way of metaphysical explanation to substantiate this claim. 
$UPVWURQJ¶V1-relation is a universal (albeit a second-order universal) just 
like any other, and as such it is a categorical, quidditistic property. The N-
relation plays an identifiable role, but if it is quidditistic, there needs to be 
some explanation for why this relation always plays the role that it does. If 
WKLVH[SODQDWLRQLVDUHJXODULW\WKHQ$UPVWURQJ¶V own position would (a) 
                                                          
100
 I reject the claim that these quidditism objections are problematic over and above their 
perceived counter-intuitiveness, but the ability of dispositional essentialism to avoid the 
quidditism objections is one of the biggest motivators for their position, so I deem it a strong 
objection to dispositional essentialism nonetheless.  
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force him to reject the explanation as viable, and (b) negate the need for 
the N-relation in the first place, as the regularity would suffice as the best 
explanation at the first-order level. On the other hand, if Armstrong posits 
the explanation to be a third order N-relation we end up with a regress, as 
this third order N-relation holding in all worlds itself requires an 
explanation. As we have seen, the regress formed is vicious, and to all 
intents and purposes rules Armstrongianism out as a contender. Humeans, 
it seems, are the last men standing. 
In chapters 3 and 4 I discussed WZR IRUPV RI +XPHDQLVP +XPH¶V
naïve regularity theory of laws of nDWXUH DQG /HZLV¶V VRSKLVWLFDWHG
version, the Best System Analysis. Lewis followed Hume in postulating 
both that laws are universally quantified statements, and proposing that 
there is no metaphysical necessity in the world ± there is no metaphysical 
glue tying events to one another, such thDW DQ µHIIHFW¶ HYHQWRFFXUVZLWK
metaphysical necessity JLYHQWKHRFFXUUHQFHRIDµFDXVH¶HYHQWWKDWLVLQ
a world, w, where event X causes event Y, there are many possible worlds 
in which the events preceding and including event X match w perfectly, 
but event Y does not occur. The main objections to Hume¶VDFFRXQW were 
as follows: 
1. Humean laws do not explain events, as a regularity cannot explain one 
(or more) of its instances; 
2. Humeans do not have the right to reason inductively, so we cannot use 
them to predict future events; 
3. Humean laws do not govern their instances; 
4. Humean laws, as mere regularities, cannot distinguish between 
accidental and non-accidental regularities. 
5. Humeanism is a quidditistic ontology  
 In chapter 3 I demonstrated that the anti-Humeans are not able to 
criticise Humeans on the grounds of objections 1 and 2, as it can clearly be 
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seen that Humean regularities, and indeed regularities in general, can and 
often do have explanatory value. In fact, to deny this would lead to 
absurdity even on their part, for many (explicable) every-day events can 
QHYHUEHH[SODLQHGLQWHUPVRIµPHWDSK\VLFDOJOXH¶ 
Furthermore it was demonstrated that the regularity theorist has at 
least as much right to reason inductively as the necessitarian. In section 
3.3 I made the narrower claim that Humean had as least as much right to 
reason inductively as Armstrong, but as it has been shown that 
dispositionalist accounts collapse into Armstrongianism, this can be 
extended to necessitarian metaphysical positions in general. 
Objection 3 above might have been successful, were it the case that 
laws had to govern their instances. But it was deemed that a coherent 
conception of laws could be found where laws do not play a governing 
role, so objection 3  holds no weight whatsoever. 
Objection 4, however, is a genuine problem fRU +XPH¶V naïve 
regularity theory. With the only requirement for a law being that it is a 
true universally quantified statement, there would be no way of 
distinguishing merely accidental regularities from non-accidental, law-like 
regularities - any proposition expressing a (true) single-case uniformity 
would be a law of nature. This, of course, is unacceptable. But this 
objection did not rule out DOO +XPHDQ SRVLWLRQV /HZLV¶V EHVW V\VWHP
analysis, I believe, dealt with this objection perfectly adequately. 
Lewis claimed that laws of nature are universally quantified statements 
that describe the regularities in our physical system with the best balance 
between simplicity and strength; the laws are universally quantified 
statements that maximise the number of truths derivable from as few 
statements as possible. Under this account, single-case uniformities, and 
indeed any universally quantified statements we would consider to be 
accidental, would not come out as laws of nature unless nature was 
particularly unkind to us (or the world was a very simple one, in the case 
of a single-case uniformity). /HZLV¶VDFFRXQWLWVHHPVWo me, would more 
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often than not provide us with exactly the right laws. It was easy to see 
when we looked at the Principle of Least Action, for example, that 
Lewisian Humeanism would very easily pick out the PLA as a 
fundamental law of nature. 
Objection 5, the problem of quidditism, demonstrated some 
VXSSRVHGO\FRXQWHULQWXLWLYHFRQVHTXHQFHVRI/HZLV¶VQRPLODOLVWDFFRXQW- 
the most prominent of which being that the same property would play 
many different roles in different possible worlds. But counterintuitiveness 
cannot be considered a knock down objection to any metaphysical 
DFFRXQW%LUG¶VDWWHPSWHG WRSURYLGHDPRUHVXEVWDQWLDOREMHFWLRQEXWas 
we saw in section 4.6.3, this attempt fails, as Humeans take de dicto 
QHFHVVLWLHV VHULRXVO\ /HZLV¶V DFFRXQW LV QRW SHUIHFW Lewis gives us no 
DFFRXQWRIZK\WKHVSDUVHSURSHUWLHVµJORZLQWKHGDUN¶± there is nothing 
about their nature that distinguishes them from the abundant properties. I 
suggested we follow the line of trans-world objective similarity, but this 
was itself unsatisfying in many respects.  
  
There is, I acknowledge, more work to be done before we can fully 
embrace a metaphysical account of laws and causation, but it seems to me 
that this account will, in one way or another, be broadly Humean. 
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